THE INDIAN NAVY AND OP SINDOOR

 The Indian Navy’s Role and Impact in Operation Sindoor: Historical Precedents and Future Imperatives

Capt Sarabjeet S Parmar (Ret'd) | May 30, 2025

India’s Operation Sindoor deployed 36 naval ships, including a Carrier Battle Group, establishing surveillance and de facto blockade along Pakistan’s coast. Following India’s new “any attack equals act of war” policy, the Indian Navy is shifting from a passive quasi-deterrence to active compellence strategy, requiring faster response times and potentially earlier escalation in future Pakistan conflicts.

The success of the Indian Navy in 1971, along with the two later deployments during Op Talwar in 1999 and Op Parakram in 2002, have established a template that—with appropriate changes based on political directives, prevailing security scenario and available technology and assets—can frame strategic-level planning and offer multiple operational-level deployment options.

This was evident during the Operation Sindoor tri-service briefing, where the Director General Naval Operation highlighted that the Indian Navy had maintained continuous surveillance and was ready to deliver requisite firepower when ordered. Though stationed abeam Surat, north of Mumbai, this surveillance extended across the entire Makran Coast of Pakistan, which features significant maritime infrastructure—mainly ports running west to east: Jiwani, Gwadar, Pasni, Ormara, Karachi, and Port Qasim—as well as critical energy and connectivity assets. Such surveillance monitors ships and aircraft movements, essentially from the Pakistan Navy and Air Force, as well as Pakistani maritime and coastal shipping. This, in turn, provides a high level of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and targeting information for conducting maritime strikes against both maritime and land targets.

While Karachi was viewed as the main target by many media outlets and analysts, and rightfully so, there are other targets that add to the degradation of Pakistan’s military and economic capabilities. 36 Indian naval ships, including the Carrier Battle Group, were deployed. Hence, the firepower available, in terms of both ship- and air-launched missiles, would have imposed a significant toll along the Makran Coast.

             

The effectiveness of MDA and the operational reach were enabled by networked operations within the Navy and through joint coordination with the Army and Air Force—both of which are categorised as 'Operational Enablers' in the 'Strategy for Conflict'. This strategy also places the delivery of firepower under 'Force Projection' against designated legal targets, thereby conforming to the additional operational principles of 'Application of Force' and 'Strategic Effect'.

Major operations and employment of the India Navy are centered on “Sea Control”. The number of ships at sea, especially the Carrier Battle Group, supported by land-based maritime reconnaissance aircraft (such as P8Is and HALE UAVs), would have enabled the requisite degree of sea control. This was, of course, made easier by the absence of the Pakistan Navy in the areas of deployment.

The conduct of firing exercises in late April by both navies is a routine measure during times of high tension, signalling intent to use firepower when required, while also honing crew skills and procedures. That the exercises were conducted beyond each other’s maritime zones indicates restraint on both sides. Such an exercise is possibly a first for Pakistan, suggesting the Pakistan Navy’s active involvement in overall planning. In contrast, the Indian Navy has carried out several such exercises to demonstrate its intent. While the actual areas of Indian Navy operations may never be publicly known, it is reasonable to assume that deployed ships and submarines operated around designated attack points— potentially within Pakistan’s maritime zones, depending on onboard equipment and missile ranges. Consequently, the Indian Naval force established a de facto blockade, confining Pakistan Navy units to their harbors, proving the template and associated operational plans. It is important to note that an actual blockade is an act of war; thus, its imposition would be a deliberate and hence considered decision.

FUTURE IMPERATIVES

Policy shift on terrorism

First, is the change in policy against terrorism that ‘any attack on Indian soil will be considered as an act of war’. This could result in the India Navy being brought into action earlier than before—with maritime strikes on designated targets at sea along the coast, and potentially inland, or, over the coast.

This would expand the area of operations for both India and Pakistan, and the resultant escalation could expand into a full-fledged conflict. This policy shift would require re-evaluating and shortening the Navy’s response time, including the operationalisation of forward operating bases and logistical chains.

Failure of deterrence and the role of compellence

As deterrence has failed to contain terrorist attacks from Pakistan, compellence may become the preferred strategy. Doctrinally, the Indian Navy recognises compellence as a concept related to the use-of-force and hence includes it under the military role in its “Strategy for Conflict”. Incorporating actions that support compellence into operational plans is therefore straightforward. In the context of Op Sindoor, it has been stated that “the carrier group acted as a force for compellence”. The Carrier Battle Group and other deployed ships, supported by adequate logistics, can act as effective instruments of compellence.

Other dimensions

International sentiment must be accounted for, as maritime conflict in the region would impact global trade—especially shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb. Any restrictions on international shipping, whether due to blockades or military operations, would need to be formally communicated through exclusion zones or navigational area warnings, as outlined in the Indian Maritime Doctrine.

A future conflict with Pakistan, triggered by a terrorist attack, will require a re-calibration of operational plans—particularly in terms of intensity and design—so as to enable early conflict termination on terms favourable to India.

This article was first published in the Council For Strategic And Defence Research. It is available at this source: https://csdronline.com/blind-spot/the-indian-navys-role-and-impact-in-operation-sindoor-historical-precedents-and-future-imperatives/

GEN SHINGHAL ON OP SINDOOR

 INTER SERVICES Jointness was the game changer IN OP SINDOOR

Lt Gen Vipul Shingal on INDIA TODAY May 23, 2025

Efforts to braid the three services across all domains into integrated war fighting bore fruit in India's precise actions in Operation Sindoor.

Operation Sindoor, India’s calibrated response to the Pakistan-sponsored terror attack in Pahalgam, was characterised by precise and devastating strikes on Pakistani terror hubs and later on military infrastructure. One of the reasons for its successful execution was the very high level of jointness and integration within the three services, which was the result of a concerted effort led by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the HQ Integrated Defence Staff over the past few years. About 200 tasks and initiatives were identified for fostering jointness. These were distributed over eight clear domains—intelligence, logistics, training, capability development, communications, human resource, maintenance and administration—to be implemented in a time-bound road map.

Two parallel tracks have been at work. In one track, measures towards jointness have primarily been conceptual in nature, affecting changes in the cognitive domain, building understanding and confidence among the services. This has been made possible by picking the best practices of each service and fostering a unique joint culture aided by common planning and training, tri-service courses and cross-postings. In the second track, measures towards integration have been implemented by creating structures, networks, computer applications and protocols to enable synergy in application of combat power, communications, intelligence, logistics and administration. Formulation of the Combined Operational Planning Process, joint doctrines, integrated intelligence and communication network and establishment of joint logistics nodes have all contributed to operational efficiency and have been validated during tri-service exercises and war games.

The effectiveness of India’s Air Defence Umbrella was also due to the integration of the Indian Air Force and Indian Army’s operational networks.

Joint training has been the bedrock of this transformation, from cadets at the national level to the Defence Services Staff College at the mid-service level. For colonels and equivalents at the respective service war colleges, joint content, cross-attendance, and joint faculty have been enhanced, resulting in a deeper understanding of integrated war fighting, further cemented as one-star participants at the National Defence College. These measures have been augmented by the establishment of new joint service training institutions in areas like intelligence, cyber and unmanned aerial systems.

These efforts were a game-changer in the execution of multi-domain operations during Op. Sindoor. The empowered tri-services organisations, that is, the Defence Cyber Agency (DCyA), Defence Space Agency (DSA) and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) specialise in the new domains of cyber, space and information, respectively. Intelligence of the terror camps and Pakistani military sites was collated through the merging of multiple streams of intelligence fused under the DIA. Precision engagement of the targets was possible due to detailed satellite imagery coordinated by the DSA. The DCyA kept close watch over our cyber frontiers. The effective operationalisation of an Air Defence umbrella over the country was a result of the integration of two networks—the IAF’s Integrated Air Command and Control System and the army’s Akashteer, working seamlessly on the backbone provided by the tri-service Defence Communication Network. A coordinated response was also visible in communication through joint press briefings by the three directors general of operations of each of the services. ‘Victory Through Jointness’, the motto of HQ IDS, was on display during Op. Sindoor. Its unequivocal success vindicates the need for the Indian security structure to delve deeper into aspects of jointness and integration, indigenisation, capability development and capacity-building.

Lt Gen V. Shinghal is Deputy Chief at HQ, Integrated Defence Staff. He plays a crucial role in coordinating and integrating the Armed Forces, focussing on policy planning, force development and ensuring inter-service synergy.

This article was first published in INDIA TODAY Magazine, dated 23 May 2025.

WHY SHOULDN'T INDIAN PILOTS SEEK GREENER PASTURES?

 How Dare You Demand Market Wages?

A Rebuttal to India’s Plea at ICAO to Cage Indian Aviation Professionals

Oh, how the tables have turned! India, with its booming aviation market — poetic in ambitions and tragic in execution — has now taken its grievances to the august chambers of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The grievance? That skilled Indian aviation professionals — pilots, engineers, and technicians — have had the audacity, the gall, the unspeakable nerve to seek better pay and working conditions in foreign skies.

The very idea!

In a working paper drenched in bureaucratic self-pity and cloaked in righteous outrage, the Indian delegation paints a picture where global aviation is apparently being ruined by countries that dare offer Indian talent salaries competitive on the international stage. How dare Emirates, Qatar Airways, Etihad, Lufthansa, or any other airline lure away Indian pilots who have undergone years of rigorous training (often self-funded) and are now drawn by dramatically better pay, working hours, and respect?

Let’s Translate This, Shall We?

What India is really saying is: “We want to run one of the world’s fastest-growing aviation sectors — at global scale — but please let us do so by paying 2005-level wages, keeping pilots chained in endless notice periods stretching up to 6 months, and protecting our homegrown airlines from the consequences of their defective labor policies.”

It is amply evident that the problem isn’t that Indian airlines pay significantly less, run chaotic rosters, or burn out their staff. No. The problem is that those pesky, freedom-loving “Contracting States” are maliciously offering better working conditions to Indian professionals who’ve had enough.

How criminal.

The Tragicomedy of the ‘Orderly Conduct of International Civil Aviation’

One must applaud the sheer creativity of invoking the ‘orderly conduct’ clause from the Chicago Convention — an agreement meant to foster global cooperation — and twisting it to argue that Indian professionals should be held hostage in a market where their labor is undervalued and their wings clipped.

Apparently, pilots choosing where to live and work is now a threat to international civil aviation. Freedom of labour? Pfft. That’s only for IT engineers maybe, not for hard-working men and women who fly jets at 35,000 feet.

Where is this international code of conduct really headed?

Shall we also propose to ICAO that Canada, the USA, or Australia stop luring away Indian doctors, scientists, and tech geniuses, too? Maybe countries stealing Bangalore-based coders should face sanctions?

Of Course They’re Leaving — Why Wouldn’t They?

Consider the reality for an Indian pilot: You slog through flying school (on personal loans), claw your way up to a first officer position, and then wait years — in many airlines — to be upgraded to Captain. Pay? Often a fraction of what your colleagues earn abroad. Contract stability? Shaky, especially after COVID. Work hours? Let’s just say ‘hectic’ is an understatement.

Now cue foreign carriers who offer not only triple the salary but also:

        •       Predictable rosters

        •       Respectful HR policies

        •       Better insurance, benefits, and job security

        •       No bureaucratic fog or DGCA red tape

And suddenly, these professionals choosing to leave becomes a crime worthy of an ICAO investigation?

Airlines Want Labour Mobility — But Only in One Direction

The irony is so thick you could land a Boeing with engine failed on it. Indian carriers, many of whom benefit from global Open Skies agreements, happily fly abroad, recruit expat executives, and demand deregulation when it suits their expansionist narratives. Yet when it comes to their own employees exercising the same rights across borders?

“Not fair!”

They call it “poaching.” No, it’s called a market — one in which individuals sell their skills at the best price they can legally obtain.

Perhaps the real lesson here for Indian airlines is this: If you want to retain talent, pay them what they’re worth. You can’t grow an aviation superpower on the wages of a regional bus driver and then complain when your staff leaves you mid-takeoff.

DGCA’s Role — The Watchdog That Also Keeps the Workers in the Kennel

Instead of protecting the safety of aviation and ensuring airlines treat staff fairly, DGCA has often been a silent accessory to exploitative practices — from inordinate notice periods (up to 12 months, for some!) to opaque medical disqualifications and license renewals.

And now, it wants ICAO to bless a framework that could essentially restrict free movement of trained personnel, camouflaged as “orderly development.” What’s next? Aviation exit visas?

Final Descent — Into Absurdity

What India’s ICAO pitch reveals is less about foreign airlines “poaching” staff and more about a broken HR ecosystem unable to retain its own. It’s a cry for help disguised as a policy proposal — one that seeks to export a domestic inefficiency to the international level, and legitimize it through multilateral diplomacy.

Here’s a radical counterproposal: Maybe, just maybe, Indian airlines should treat their employees like professionals and not indentured labour. Pay them competitively, respect their time, and offer career growth — and they won’t need to look abroad.

Until then, no international code can plug the brain drain — because as long as aircraft can fly, so will the people who fly them.

Air Marshal R Nambiar PVSM AVSM VM & BAR VSM (Ret'd)

INDIA COMPLAINS ABOUT PILOTS LEAVING FOR BETTER JOBS