Friday 18 January 2019

UNNECESSARY IMBROGLIO ON INDIA'S FIRST RATE RAFALE DEAL

THE TYPHOON VS RAFALE: INDIA'S SENSIBLE CHOICE

A year after Indian PM, Mr Modi agreed to buy 36 Rafale aircraft in April 2015 for US$$8.7 billion, many observers wanted to know how the Typhoon fared. The Typhoon had a list price of about US$140 million. That is Rs 1,000 cr per ac on the bargaining table in flyaway condition, not in any operational status. Using the logic that the final price of the Indian Rafale reached Rs 1,600 cr for a tabled price of Rs 670 cr, i.e., if state-of-the-art weapons/avionics systems and infrastructure costs were added, the Typhoon price would jump to Rs 2,388 cr per piece. 36 ac would cost Rs 85,970 cr if operated from ONE base. If operated from TWO bases, costs would increase to close to Rs 91,000 cr, as explained later.

On an apple to apple basis, in February 2015, Egypt officially ordered 24 Rafales for US$5.9 billion, operating from ONE base. 36 ac in the same year would cost US$8.85 billion from one base and US$9.3 billion from two bases, but India managed 36 ac for US$8.7 billion, operating from TWO bases. A real win-win deal. 

In May 2015, 24 Rafales were contracted for $7.02 billion by Qatar, at a total price of US$298 million per ac (Rs 1892 cr per ac at 2015 exchange rate). This price tag includes provision of long-range cruise missiles and Meteor missiles as well as the training of 36 Qatari pilots and 100 technicians by the French military. The option for 12 more Rafale aircraft was exercised in December 2017 for €1.1 billion (or €92M each) with an additional option for 36 further jets. They are reportedly happy with the ac and its remarkably reduced cost. 

An article of 04 Jan 2019- more than three and a half years after the Kuwait deal-shows costs of new generation aircraft.

Canada is awaiting the outcome of a fighter ac competition between four contenders—the Eurofighter Typhoon, Sweden’s Saab Gripen, Boeing's Super Hornet F-18 and Lockheed Martin’s F-35—for an 88-jet, CAD $26 billion (USD $20 billion) order that should see the new aircraft fielded by the mid-2020s.

Today, if 88 Eurofighter Typhoons are to cost around US$20 bn (Rs.140,000 crores), 36 would cost close to Rs.57,270 cr off the shelf in a standing configuration (each ac would cost Rs.1590 cr). Following the Rafale analogy, this would work out to Rs.137,000 cr in the fully op role, operating out of two bases. This is totally unacceptable under any circumstances.

Germany is facing serviceability problems. In the UK too, serviceability is a major problem, averaging 43%.

The Indian fiat is a 75% serviceability rate for the 36 ac for the first five years after all 36 ac are inducted.

If you so desire, please do your own maths. Please note that infrastructural costs, for basic flying and combat flying simulators, as well as for ground training of technicians using computerised training aids (at least 2 basic simulators), test bays, airframe systems and avionics repair bays, radar and laser bays, anechoic chambers, engine sheds and calibrated ground-test bays apart from complex weapon systems and more, all imported from France, will add a few thousand crores to overall fleet cost, thus reaching a total of Rs 59,000 cr. Reduce that from 59,000 and you will get ~Rs 50,000 cr. The offset requirement will, therefore, be for ~ 25,000cr, denting Rahul Gandhi's plaintive cry. A simple comparison can be made with the Mirage 2000 buy, the best ever fleet induction by the IAF. All Mirage ac are safely located deep in Central India at ONE base and have the capability to fly out to four or six or more forward bases in a few hours, while undertaking some hyper-complex missions from home base itself.

Operationalising two bases entails avoidable duplication. To me, this was a clear signal that the IAF expected to acquire 126 aircraft. On the other hand, we will have infrastructure in place for at least 36 more Rafale ac, which will then be relatively cheaper than the 36 bought. The IAF does not want more SU 30 MKIs or the Tejas. The Govt has forced the IAF to buy 123 Tejas (43 Mk1 & 80 Mk2) at a base price of Rs 543cr, and between 272 and 312 SU-30 MKIs. This should be possible by 2035! The Tejas will be using the GE F-404/F-414 engines --which equip the US F-18 Hornet and Superhornet respectively-- on the Mk1 & 2 as DRDO has failed to produce the Kaveri engine since 1984. This addition will not boost IAF strength to 42 Sqns, as the 43 Mk1s will replace the Mig-21 Bison and the 80 Mk2s the ageing Mirage 2000 and other Bison ac. The upgraded Mirage 2000s are, however, lifed till at least 2036-42.

In April 2018, we issued a fresh RFI to procure 110 fighter jets, including both single and twin engine fighter aircraft. The 110 aircraft should have 17 aircraft in flyaway condition and the remaining 93 are to be made in India by a Strategic Partner. The same 6 agencies that bid for the MMRCA have put in their proposals. This is a smart move by India, as the L1 price of the Rafale is now known and will be kept in mind by the contenders while bidding. This time around, I am certain that ‘Make in India’ will be the primary caveat. The nay-sayers allege that Dassault Reliance Aerospace Limited, the so called AA Company, will have around 6-8 years experience and shrewdly edge HAL out again. This way, we will get the 90 ac left out in the Rafale deal plus more. 

The IAF was wary of the intention to get the most over-staffed, under-performing and inefficient aviation org in the world, HAL, to produce the aircraft. We have lost more than our share of pilots and ac to improperly produced HAL models. The recent accident on 01 Feb 2019 where we lost a Mirage 2000 two-seater and two IAF test pilots during an acceptance check by the IAF is a case in point, where HAL is shown up as a callous culprit.

Reading between the lines, the Modi Govt is aware that the earlier deal fell through because Mr Antony and his cohorts insisted that HAL be included in the deal and that Dassault sign up that they were offering a guarantee of quality for HAL-produced ac. Dassault, like Boeing and the rest of the world, considers HAL to be a worthless organization. The former opted to forgo a 22-25 billion dollar deal rather than vouch for the sub-par HAL.

As the Table shows, India did get the best deal.
Month/Year
Country
No of ac
Cost
US$ billion
No of
Bases
Cost of
36 ac*
Remarks
Cost per ac
Feb 2015
Egypt
24
5.9
1
8.85
Likely scaling up to 36 ac
Rs 1690 cr
May 2015
Qatar
24
7.02
2
10.53
Meteor and all trg
Included, 48 more ac likely
Rs 1893 cr till date
Sep 2016
India
36
8.70
2
8.70
Base model
Rs 1611 cr
Nov 2015
UAE
90
Not known
* In US$billion

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