THE STORY OF JUMBO MAJUMDAR AND HIS MEDALS

‘JUMBO’ MAJUMDAR CENTRE

INDIAN AIR FORCE MUSEUM 

INDIAN AIR FORCE STATION PALAM

Jumbo with his first DFC

In September 2013, Sailen Majumdar, a well to do Indian Chartered Accountant settled in the UK, was approached by an unknown Punjabi-speaking gentleman, who apparently had Sailen’s father’s World War II medals and wanted to sell them. Sailen acquired them next year in a surreptitious deal made without meeting or speaking with the Punjabi gentleman. Sailen had a sister, Anjali Noel Lobo, in Pune, India. He rang her up mid 2014 to tell her how he had acquired their father’s medals. She felt very happy that the medals had been found as they would enhance the already strong undercurrent of recognition of her late father’s exploits. She asked him why he didn’t meet or speak with the Punjabi gentleman, to get an odd reply that he didn't understand Punjabi, but the medals were safe and with him. 

Mrs Anjali Lobo

He called her up again in October 2014 to tell her that he didn’t want their children and grandchildren to squabble over this issue, so he had decided to sell the medals. In fact, he had already put them up for auction through a Central London Auction House specialising in the sale of collectors' coins of all periods and historical medals. He had set a reserve price of £20,000. He went on to say that he believed that their father would have been very happy and proud that he was doing so. Anjali was furious and heatedly replied, 'I am sorry, I don’t think our father would have been happy or proud that you are selling his medals. He died for the Indian Air Force (IAF) and for the country.” That was the last conversation she had with her brother.

When contacted telephonically by the media, Sailen had his own side of the story. He insisted that he had been completely honest with his sister and when told about the medals, she didn’t express any particular interest in them. She had nonchalantly quipped that were she in his place, she wouldn’t bother. Everybody knew their father had a Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC, UK) and Bar. She was now conveniently saying that she didn't remember any of their conversations.

Her riposte to the media was on expected lines. "I feel really sad about it. What else can I say? My father died for the IAF. He would be very sad at this impasse. These are my father's medals and it is shocking that they have become an object of commerce. The auction was called off because bidding did not reach the cutoff price of £20,000.  After media pressure, the IAF bought the medals for £30,000. I am glad that they have reached the IAF. It is what my father would have wanted but I don’t think it was very nice that the Air Force had to pay to acquire them.”

So what was the bond that connected Anjali Lobo, Sailen Majumdar and WW II gallantry medals? The two were siblings, both the offspring of Wing Commander Karun Krishna Majumdar DFC & Bar, the first Indian Officer to reach the rank of Wing Commander and also to be twice decorated for valour. In fact, he was awarded the first DFC on the Burma front in 1942 and next, deep in Europe in 1945. He also baled out once on each front, escaping through raw guts and derring do and setting an example in Leadership.

Wing Commander Karun Krishna Majumdar DFC & Bar, a six foot two inch tall lad, with equally commanding personality, courage and forthrightness, had been given the nickname ‘Jumbo’ by his friends in the Indian Air Force (IAF). He was born on September 6, 1913 at Calcutta to an illustrious family of ardent nationalists. His cousins Jayanto Nath Chaudhuri and Hem Chaudhuri also joined the Forces; the former joined the Army and ultimately became the Chief of Army Staff, while the latter followed Majumdar into the Air Force and rose to a high rank. A bright child, he was honest, fiercely independent and not afraid of going his own way, even in the face of criticism.These traits were abundantly manifest in his role as one of the prominent pioneers of the Indian Air Force.

From early childhood, he had only one passion, one purpose for living – to ‘Fly’.  He took the entrance exam to join The Royal Flying College, Cranwell, UK and stood second in the order of merit.  On commissioning, he joined the newly raised and prestigious first Squadron of the IAF, No. 1 Squadron, as a Flying Officer in the mid 1930s. Flying the Wapiti and later, the Hawker Hart aircraft, he was soon identified as an outstanding flier with tremendous potential for leadership. On June 27, 1941, Jumbo was promoted to Squadron Leader (Sqn Ldr) and took over command of No. 1 Squadron in anticipation of action during the ongoing WW II. The IAF in those days was a minuscule force and clearly under the influence of long-standing British tradition. Majumdar, however, was all for ‘Indianising’ the Air Force environment, famously stating, “The IAF must be an Indian Banyan tree and not an English Oak”.

On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbour. Plans were hurriedly made to contain the Japanese and Jumbo’s No. 1 Squadron, now equipped with the Lysander aircraft, was moved to Taungoo Airfield in Burma. One morning, the Japanese attacked the airfield and damaged several aircraft. Only the IAF’s Lysanders remained untouched. Majumdar planned a retaliatory attack and flew out in a Lysander with two 250lb bombs. Flying at treetop level, he entered the Japanese base and dropped the bombs with precision, destroying the hangar and the aircraft in it. The very next day, he led his Sqn, the Tigers, to lay siege to and demolish the Japanese base.

Jumbo and his squadron of Lysanders flew offensive missions that inflicted extensive damage to enemy airfields and installations. For his leadership of the Squadron and daring performance in the Burma Campaign, Squadron Leader Majumdar was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC), thus becoming the first Indian Officer in World War II to be so decorated. Promoted to Wing Commander (Acting) in 1942, the first Indian to reach this rank, he voluntarily returned to the war front in England in March 1944, demitting his Acting rank and reverting to Sqn Ldr. 

Jumbo Getting his Second DFC

He flew the Mustang and Typhoon aircraft during the Allied invasion of Europe in numerous reconnaissance and ground attack missions deep into occupied France and Belgium, totally unmindful of personal safety. For his gallant role in these operations, Majumdar was awarded a Bar to his DFC in January 1945, again the first and only Indian to be so decorated. The London Gazette praised him for his operational skills and LIFE magazine listed him as one of the 12 best pilots in the allied air forces for his work in Burma and Europe.

On his return from Europe, this avid flier commanded the Air Force Display Flight. He toured the country extensively, conducting aerobatic shows and displays. He was scheduled to carry out a display near Lahore on February 17, 1945 on a Hawker Hurricane aircraft.The aircraft had a history of snags and he was advised by the Flight's Engg Officer Flt Lt Harjinder Singh to be extra cautious and carry out only safe manoeuvres at a reasonably high altitude. In the aerobatic display flight, his  aircraft developed a serious snag, became unstable and crashed, tragically killing him. Jumbo Majumdar died as he had always wanted to, with his flying boots on in the cockpit of an aircraft, flying to his heart’s content.

Mid 2015, the Indian Air Force (IAF) used its internal discretionary funds to acquire the Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC) and the war medals of the World War II veteran Wing Commander Jumbo Majumdar from the auction house. This was because the apathetic Ministry of Defence (MoD) refused to sanction 30,000 pounds (approximately Rs. 28 lakh), the price fixed by the auction house which had acquired the medals from Jumbo Majumdar's son Sailen Majumdar. MoD said that the decision was that of the Ministry of Culture-typical stalling tactics- and that they had sent the file to the Culture (agriculture?) Ministry to take a call on whether the medals should be acquired in the first place. After waiting several months, the auction house Morton and Eden set a May 26 deadline after the IAF had entered into a binding contract with the auction house but failed to reach a settlement. Keen to avoid defaulting on an agreement, the IAF went ahead with the purchase on its own through its Air Attache in London.

Despite the government's rejection, the Indian Air Force has been clear that the memory of the man they consider the father of the modern IAF must be honoured. Yet, in a strange order to avoid controversy, where they should have raised the roof, the IAF decided not to celebrate the return of the medals to India and made no press release on the acquisition of the World War Two treasures. The medals, now in India, were showcased prominently at the Air Force Museum, Air Force Station, Palam, in a formal function on 16 July 2019.

In a statement to NDTV, the AOC-in-C Western Air Command, Air Marshal R Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VM&Bar, had said, "Jumbo's contribution during the Second World War both in Burma and in the Normandy Campaigns has been acknowledged in professional circles.  He was the first and the only IAF pilot to be awarded DFC and Bar.  Having understood the importance of Air Power at a very early age, he worked relentlessly to build a strong Air Force for India.  Jumbo led from the front by personal example and worked relentlessly to lay the foundation of the IAF.  His spirit shall live as long as there are young men to take up the challenge of his legacy, and the trail of glory shall be remembered and cherished by the IAF for all time to come."

The auction documents states, "Jumbo Majumdar's seeming disregard for his own safety on solo bombing raids and leading others against what appeared to be insurmountable odds made him a legendary figure both in the Royal Air Force and among his own countrymen. It is generally agreed that had he lived, his example and vision for Indian air power would have seen him rise to the highest level in the post-Independence Indian Air Force."

Sailen Majumdar revealed that he also has somewhere the crucifix that his paternal grandmother Jonaki Agnes Penelope Majumdar (nee Bonnerjee) had made from the metal of the ill-fated Hurricane that his father crashed in. In addition, a note book where he made very personal and philosophical comments about his role in World War 2 (sic). He had to decide what to do with numerous letters between his parents during World War 2. Personal, but such a long time ago, that perhaps they should now be in the public domain for anyone who is interested, rather than them being binned or left in a drawer forever!

As eulogised by Air Marshal R Nambiar, late "Wg Cdr Karun Krishna 'Jumbo' Majumdar was the ultimate flier, a hero in the truest sense of the word."

REMEMBERING OP SAFED SAGAR AT KARGIL 1999

KARGIL : WHEN A BUDDING 'Tiger' COMMANDER ATTACKED 'Tiger' HILL

Air Marshal R Nambiar PVSM AVSM VM & Bar

"Early on the morning of this very day 21 years ago, 24 June 1999, the Indian Air Force dropped its first Laser Guided Bomb (LGB) in anger. Release was from a Mirage 2000TH two-seater and I was privileged to have been the pilot in command. In the exciting days that followed, I had the singular honour of dropping four more LGBs, thus dropping five out of the total of 8 LGBs delivered by the Mirage 2000 in the entire Kargil Conflict."

           Air Marshal R Nambiar PVSM AVSM VM & Bar

Air Marshal Raghunath Nambiar, an Experimental Test Pilot with vast experience totalling some 5250 hrs on 42 types of aircraft, first flew the Mirage 2000H/TH as a young and promising fighter pilot in 1986 at AF Stn Maharajpur, Gwalior, a proud member of 7 Sqn IAF, The Battle Axes. In time, he went on to command 1 Sqn AF, the Tigers, also at Gwalior, from 22 April 2002 to 07 July 2003 and has, since then, steadily progressed upwards on outstanding and exemplary personal qualities and ability. He is currently the Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Western Air Command.

As winter withdrew, sunrise cast shadows in Kashmir's valleys from 8AM, when visibility was considerably reduced and targets could not be seen. Low clouds engulfed the ridges and peaks by 11 a.m. The window of opportunity was restricted to the three-hour period between 8 a.m. and 11 a.m., provided there was no drizzle. In effect, the Pakistani forces in that area knew they had to stay under cover throughout the morning and start hostile actions only after an early lunch. The Indian Army thus had the entire morning to themselves.

2002: Wg Cdr R Nambiar, CO 1 Sqn AF

Adampur is a major Air Force Base in Punjab and Wg Cdr Raghunath Nambiar (Nambi) had been deployed there since 22 May 1999 for Operation Safed Sagar, the Indian Air Force designation for its Air Operations in Kargil from May to July 1999. Nambi was then a Wing Commander and posted as the Station Flight Safety & Inspection Officer, Air Force Station Maharajpur, Gwalior, where the Mirage 2000H/TH is normally based. He had just over 1900 flying hrs on the Mirage and was soon to become the only IAF pilot to cross 2000 hrs on that type. The Battle Axes were deployed at Adampur and he had been attached to the unit as an “Augmentee” along with a few other officers from other units of the IAF. That's where this epic saga begins.

On the evening of 22 June 7 Sqn was tasked to attack Tiger Hill with LGBs the next morning. Nambi was to captain a two-seater with Sqn Ldr Monish Yadav as his back seater. The target was a set of enemy tents perched at the top of Tiger Hill. They got airborne in a two aircraft formation at 0630h and set course in a North Easterly direction to rendezvous (RV) with two Mirages from Tiger Sqn, ex-Ambala as their escorts. The join up was uneventful and they maintained radio (R/T) silence as they winged their way to the target.

Tiger Hill is unique in shape and size when viewed from the ground. But from 30,000 ft up, it is indistinguishable from the other tall peaks in the vicinity. The only mountain that stands out in this grand vista is K2, Mount Godwin-Austen or Chhogori, which at 8,611 metres (28,251 ft), towers over its surroundings. The aids on board the Mirage allowed them to spot Tiger Hill with relative ease. They had it in contact from 50 km afar and were unpleasantly surprised to find a tiny cloud perched right on its tip, obscuring the Designated Mean Point of Impact  (DMPI) and rendering the LGB impotent. The endurance of the Mirage allowed them to hold on station for about 30 min, so they went around three more times hoping the cloud would drift away and they could complete their mission.

In the fourth attempt, as they turned away from the target, Monish yelled at Nambi to “flare left” indicating a surface to air missile (SAM) launch from the ground. He reacted instantly as per prevailing tactics and commenced dropping flares. He did not spot the tiny shoulder launched missile, but Monish did see it climb towards them and thereafter fall away as they were outside its envelope. They had no choice but to go back with the armament load and prepare for a reshoot the next day. A surprise lay in store for them.

The non-upgraded Mirage 2000 2-seater of today

On the 23^rd afternoon, they were informed that Air Chief Marshal AY Tipnis, the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), would be at Adampur and they spent the rest of the day tidying up the Squadron premises for the visit, among routine duties. The CAS landed in the evening and was keen to fly and observe the first LGB drop. The mission profile was revised and the Commanding Officer of 7 Sqn, Wg Cdr Chhabra, was scheduled to fly the CAS as an observer in a third two-seater, with the attack formation remaining unchanged.

Morning Met briefing on the 24^th was at 0500h and by 0530h a short brief was carried out with the CAS in attendance. The plan was for a three aircraft mission with the two lead aircraft armed with an LGB each, while the third aircraft would follow behind, with the CAS in the rear seat. They were to hit Tiger Hill first and then proceed to recce Point 4388 located 30 km NW of Tiger Hill. By 0600h they had walked to the aircraft. Walking to the aircraft is a tedious task in wartime. They were overloaded with their G-suits, helmets and Makarov 9mm pistols along with the various essential items necessary for a successful sortie, such as maps, call-sign cards, MIPs (data cartridges), Electronic Warfare (EW) MIPs, Inertial Navigation Unit (INU) plans, authentication tables-all in all, a very cumbersome procedure.

Wheels roll was at 0630h and their escort Mirages from Ambala joined up with them about 300 km from the target. The RV had been selected well away from the border to remain outside the enemy radar cover, and as before, was uneventful. They maintained R/T silence and meticulously went over the attack drill to ensure all their EW systems and weapons were up and ready. The passage of the magnificent scenery around and below them was barely noticed. They were on the alert, checking their systems time and again, all perked up to go.

Tiger Hill-A very difficult target to hit mandatorily requiring LGB attacks

Tiger Hill was spotted again from about 50 km away in the Litening Pod and they were thrilled to see a totally cloudless sky. Things then moved forward at a rapid pace. Nambi had altered heading to place the aircraft track directly at a set of seven Arctic tents perched precariously on the South face of Tiger Hill. The white tents made good camouflage sense in winter, but in summer, with most of the snow melted away, they stood out in stark contrast against the black rock formations.

Tiger Hill is at an altitude of 16,600 ft, and the pre-briefed altitude for the attack was 28,000 ft, to which they quickly descended. A glance at the INU indicated that the winds at this altitude was 70 kts (~130 kph) in a westerly direction and at 90° to their planned track. This was excessive and well outside the release envelope of the LGB.

Going up was not an option as the Laser was known to switch off automatically at around 30,000 ft. A different direction was also not viable as the target would be shadowed. A quick decision was taken to descend to 26,000 ft, placing them well within the envelope of shoulder fired SAMs. The crosswinds, however, were more tolerable at 50 kts(~93 kph) and just within the limit of the LGB delivery envelope. They had their regulation IR flares onboard and considered going down into the shoulder fired SAMs' operational envelope an operational risk which they were willing to take. Inter-cockpit understanding was excellent and Monish knew exactly what to do.

At 28 km, Nambi pulsed the laser to designate the target for the first time. The Litening Pod instantly ranged the distance to target. They had by then accelerated to a ground speed of 550 kts(~1000 kmph) and the distance to the release point rapidly reduced. Nambi repeatedly re-designated the target as it became more discernible when they closed in. At the release range, he depressed the trigger and felt the aircraft jerk upwards as it suddenly shed 600 kg of load. He immediately commenced a hard turn to the left at 4G and stated dropping flares. Monish took over pod steering and pointed the laser directly at the target while he concentrated on flying a steady 4G turn and monitored the video image. The Laser was steadily flashing and they waited anxiously for the target to explode,  signalling a successful delivery. The time of flight of an LGB, under the delivery conditions that Nambi had dropped it in, was under 30 sec, but to the two pilots in their cockpits, it seemed an eternity. Their joy knew no bounds as the video image of the target showed it to burst out into a wide and soundless explosion.

Bang on target and what an explosion! 

Nambi had by then rolled out on a westerly course and reversed right climbing back to 30,000 ft and checked the air distance with the other strike aircraft. The plan was to gather together and then set course for Pt 4388. He noticed that the distance between the two of them had started to build up as they turned towards the North West. Their escorts from 1 Squadron were, however, with them so they decided to press on with the mission. A quick R/T call to check fuel and intention revealed that the other members had already set course back to base. They continued and scanned Pt 4388 for targets. On return, 15 min later, they routed back via Tiger Hill to film the Hill from as close as possible to assess the damage they had caused. The target area had been blown to smithereens, so they filmed the rest of the hill for any other visible signs of the enemy. They had sufficient fuel so they accelerated to their limit speed to get back to Base by 0800h.

After landing they extracted the video tape from the Litening Pod and headed to the crew room for the debrief. The entire squadron was gathered around the TV as the tape was rewound and played back. Loud cheers and back thumping erupted in ecstasy, as, clearly visible on the tape, four enemy soldiers were rushing across the screen a few seconds before the bomb got to them and the huge explosion. Nobody present there could have survived. The video on the way back also revealed a person 2,000 ft below the hill top, climbing painstakingly upward to the camp. The ongoing retreat of the Pakistani soldiers and mujahideen picked up expressly after this and other deadly LGB attacks.

The IAF also used the MiG-25R – which normally cruises at 65-80,000 ft and M 2.3 – at medium altitude (33-35,000’) for high resolution pictures, something that its Russian designers may never have contemplated. The first such photo mission flown by Wg Cdr PV Thakur, was escorted by a pair of Mirage 2000H aircraft, with all three aircraft at M 0.95, the escorts once again led by Nambi. The cameras on the Mig-25 required delicate recalibration to produce optimal results, as it was designed to film from 40-50,000 feet above the target. The films turned out to be exceptionally good.

Nambi was awarded the Vayu Sena Medal (Gallantry) for repeatedly descending into SAM infested heights to deliver LGBs. This particular mission is specifically mentioned in his citation.

All Service details of this highly decorated Air Marshal and various citations are available at http://bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/Database/16378

 

*Image of Tiger Hill explosion courtesy IAF.

INTERIM ACQUISITION OF SECOND HAND MIRAGE 2000 TO BOLSTER IAF CAPABILITY

Meeting IAF’s Demand for Combat Aircraft Cost-effectively

The IAF is clearly unhappy with the delay in the Tejas induction. The 1983 concept is starting to bear fruit today, but is miles short of operational deployment in significant numbers. The Rafale induction has been cut down to 36. Considering the steep payout involved in obtaining this aircraft — which is plainly giving the RM Ms Nirmala Sitharaman sleepless nights, why not bolster the IAF with more Mirage 2000 aircraft, the Almighty’s gift to the IAF?

An easy way out is to acquire from a financially strapped Greece its nearly three squadrons of Mirage 2000 aircraft. The Hellenic AF operates 45 Mirage 2000s — 20 EGM/BGM variant and 25 “5 Mk-II” version.The difference between the Greek EGM/BGM and the 5-Mk II Mirage 2000 is fleeting; post upgrade, they would be identical. Greece also has some 150-odd F-16s. So Athens might willingly sell its Mirages, what with the Greek govt being pushed by EU creditors to repay the outstanding national debt. The upgrade of the Indian fleet of Mirage 2000 costs roughly $43 million per aircraft. Additionally, Qatar might sell off of its 9 Mirage 2000s which India can buy.

That totals 54 planes, more than doubling IAF’s Mirage 2000 fleet of 49. Furthermore, India will not have to invest in any infrastructure or training pilots or technicians. The Modi govt should approach Athens with a deal it cannot refuse, say, $60 million per aircraft plus all the stores, spares, and weapons holdings available for another $100 million. India will have to pay $2.8 billion for the Greek Mirages and an addition one billion $ for the Qatari deal. India will have to pay less than $4 billion for 54 Mirage 2000 versus $8-$9 billion for only 36 Rafales. The latter has an AESA, but then DRDO is building an AESA for the Tejas jointly with Israel that’s going to be tested later this year.That could be retrofitted into the new buys.

RAFALE OFFSET PARTNERS

COMMON KNOWLEDGE

As explained in a later post, the Indian Ministry of Defence had announced that Dassault Rafale had won the MMRCA competition to supply the Indian Air Force with 126 aircraft, along with an option for 63 additional aircraft. The first 18 aircraft were to be supplied by Dassault Aviation fully built and the remaining 108 aircraft were to be manufactured under license by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) with transfer of technology from Dassault.

in April 2015, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced that India would acquire 36 fully built Rafales citing "critical operational necessity". Defence Minister Parrikar informed the Rajya Sabha that the tender for 126 aircraft had been withdrawn and negotiations for 36 aircraft had begun, and concluded at a total cost of Euros 7.87 billion, with a 50% offset. In effect, Euros 3.94 billion would have to be invested in Indian companies to manufacture components in India, with associated transfer of technology. This was the cheapest buy when compared to the price paid by both Egypt and Qatar.

The leader of the Congress Party in India, Mr Rahul Gandhi called the deal a SCAM and that the unilateral decision to purchase only 36 Rafales at Euros 7.87 billion was made to ensure that Indian billionaire Anil Ambani would get the offset contract and laugh his way to the bank with the Euros 3.94 billion, which should have rightfully gone to HAL. He was immediately countered by saying that he had not read the contract which specified that approximately €1.2 billion or ₹9,000 crore) would be reserved for the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). He did not accept this statement, calling it a part of the scam.

The published list of offset partners has vindicated the Indian Govt stand that Ambani was one of the approx 90 Indian agencies involved in the offset. That list is given below:

The biggest offset partner in Rafale deal is DRDO with Rs 9,000 crore. Not Ambani, as claimed. The balance of Rs 21,000 crore is split between the three main manufacturers of the Rafale, Thales Rs 6,300 crore, Dassault Rs 8,400 crore & Safran Rs 6,300 crore. Offsets from Thales have been given to 12 Indian companies, from Dassault to 55 Indian companies and from Safran to 22 Indian companies. Ambani's Reliance is one of these 89 companies, clocking only about 3% of the total i.e. around Rs 900 crore. Among the known ones, L&T, Mahindra, HCL, TCS, Cap Gemini India, Titan, Wipro & Godrej feature prominently. HAL also features via a JV (Joint Venture) with Safran. 

HALF BAKED POSTS ABOUT THE RAFALE HURT THE INTELLIGENTSIA

POINT OF VIEW: A LIABILITY CALLED RAFALE

I refer to an article by some self-professed expert on India's excellent Rafale deal. It is built on the surmise that "a fully loaded Rafale is only as capable as the Su-30, MiG-29 and Mirage 2000." The talk of Su-30/Rafale for distant nuclear delivery against China is too far in the future to consider today.

I am aghast at the tripe pushed out by this author, confirming that he has little or no clue about strategic concepts in sub-continental Air Power. To even raise the issue of long-range strategic bombers, such as the Tu-22 and the Tu-160 shows up a strait jacketed forward vision and puerile logic. He seems totally unaware of our multi-service Strategic Forces Command, aka Strategic Nuclear Command, the major chunk of India's Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), which is mandated to look after our nuclear arsenal and its deployment. We have surface-to-surface missiles dedicated to nuclear attack over various ranges as well as aircraft that can deliver tactical nuclear weapons. Moreover, in the air, we have specific force multipliers in the AWACS and Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR) capability. The Rafale has flown 6-hour missions with AAR over Libya under the control of their AWACS.

The SU-30 MKI is an excellent aircraft, with certain shortcomings in their BVR missile capability that will be updated in time, but it has ONE major drawback-it is licence manufactured by HAL, an overstaffed and underworked aviation organisation considered to be incompetent. Equating 2.5 hrs of an HAL worker to one hour of a Dassault worker is a sad reflection of this agency's capability. Boeing has deemed it unworthy of partnering with, as has Dassault. Dassault has foregone a US$22-25 billion deal rather than risk partnering with and vouching for HAL.

He forgets that an aircraft is potent only when it is airborne. Unfortunately, the SU-30, as also other ex-USSR/Russian bloc aircraft produced by HAL in the past and the present suffer from a common ailment, poor serviceability due to non-availability of spares. HAL is responsible for providing these spares. The IAF cries itself hoarse because HAL shows it two fingers when it complains.

Every year, the CAG blames the IAF for sub-optimal utilisation of such very expensive aircraft acquisitions, while appending an addendum that the IAF is held captive by HAL. The routine indictment was presented in 2018 as well, which slammed HAL for sub-optimal performance, both as an entity and supplier of the SU-30 MKI, despite the first fighter being inducted 19 years ago. The jets also suffer from ‘frequent snags’ in their fly-by-wire systems and deficient radar warning receivers, among other things. The French aircraft boast of a near-zero rate of failure in these two subsystems, though a recent shadow has been cast on the EFCS after a two-seat Mirage 2000 crashed on Feb 01, 2019, during take off in an acceptance test, killing both test pilots. Since security precludes revelation of figures, let’s just accept that it is unbelievably lower than that guaranteed by Dassault Rafale and seen in the best-ever induction of a fleet yet, the Dassault Mirage 2000.

The Govt of that era was reminded time and again to buy the offered production line of the Mirage 2000 at a discounted price, a much simpler aircraft to build, but our pro-USSR bent of mind scuppered the issue. Had that been done, the MMRCA project could have been phased in progressively and at a far lower cost.

The author has no idea how attack plans are made for enemy targets and which aircraft will go where, how and with what weapons. Do we have aircraft launched cruise missiles? Just the Brahmos and, perhaps, the Nirbhay. The most damage inflicting weapon that set up air dominance in the Iraq attacks was the Tomahawk cruise missile. Will we get western cruise missiles? Yes. From where? I’ll give you three guesses. Do we have the French AM39 Exocet sea skimming missile? No. Will we get it? Yes. If not at this juncture, then with the Naval version. The Meteor 100 km+ BVR missile? No, but we will get it. By the way, the Meteor was designed as the primary air-to-air missile of the Eurofighter Typhoon! It is not a purely French-built BVR but an MBDA multi-national product. Does any IAF aircraft have a comprehensive onboard self-defence system? Yes, an Israeli system; like on the Mirage 2000 which has a fairly efficient self-defence system. Which ac can operate in battle conditions from Leh (10,700’ AMSL)? The Rafale can. Finally, the Rafale is the only IAF aircraft that can supercruise, i.e., sustain supersonic flight with a useful weapons load efficiently in dry power, meaning without the use of afterburner or ‘reheat’.

Most importantly, the French aircraft weapon computer is compliant with NATO MIL-STD-1760, an electrical interface between an aircraft and its carriage stores, thereby simplifying the incorporation of many of NATO’s existing weapons and equipment, a major National First. The 14-hardpoint aircraft can thus carry US weapons without tinkering with its innards, as was necessary for some Mirage 2000 in the Kargil ops--this may well be an India-specific requirement. In fact, it has dropped the US laser guided bomb (LGB), the GBU-12 Paveway II in Afghanistan. Today, it can also carry the GBU-22 Paveway III, GBU-24 Paveway III and the GBU-49 Enhanced Paveway II LGBs, not that it will be required to. It has a payload of 9.5 tons. If 4.5 tons are allowed in external fuel tanks, it could carry weapons weighing up to 5.0 tons, which is more than, if not equal to what the IAF’s workhorse cargo aircraft, the AN-32 usually carries as load.

It is battle-proven. It flew in the 2011 Libyan theatre, which brought forth deficiencies that have since been upgraded to best operating standards. Unbiased aviation journalists reported that the Rafale had maintained a high operational rate throughout the deployment. It took part in ‘Opération Serval’ in 2013, Opération Chammal over Iraq against the IS in 2014, and in the April 2018 missile strikes against Syria. It is carrier operable and the Indian Navy is to conduct trials before a planned procurement of 57 Rafale Naval aircraft.

Detailed analysis of the 36 aircraft deal shows that India has bought it at the cheapest price, when compared to Egyptian and Qatar inductions. At least five other nations are in a dialogue with Dassault to purchase the Rafale. The UAE wants 90 aircraft. Against the Indian cost of around Rs 1,611 cr per aircraft, Egypt is paying the equivalent of Rs 1,702 cr for 24 aircraft, with another deal for 12 more in the offing and Qatar, Rs 1,893 cr for 36 aircraft in a different basic configuration, with plans for 36 more.

Last week, The Hindu newspaper stated that the Specific to India Equipment (ISE) cost was US$1.4 billion in the 2007 deal for 126 aircraft, or $11.1 million per ac. In the 36 ac deal, the ISE was US$1.3 billion, or $36.1 million per ac, a significant loss to the nation at $25 million per ac, totting up to $900 million.  

This is a simple case of mathematical jugglery by a master of disinformation, one Mr Ram. The fellow has even quoted wrong figures.  According to Forbes India, 22 April 2010, "during his younger days, N.Ram also started a journal called Radical Review, with his friends, P.Chidambaram (his classmate!) and Prakash Karat." Is this a case of 'You scratch my back???'

When you buy your best or first suit, you are reminded that for best results and longevity, you must buy a hanger, a dust-proof suit cover--plastic, synthetic, cloth-based, whichever-- and hang it in your clothing cupboard. If you do not have a clothing cabinet, you buy one. If you then buy a dozen suits, you will use a dozen clothes hangers and covers and place them all in that same cupboard, a one-time buy. The number of suits is irrelevant-you have to first buy that cupboard, in this case, the ISE. The number of ac (suits) you fit the specifically advanced kit with is of no consequence.

Dassault has a top-secret aircraft operating protocol, written in an equally top-secret language. The US, Israel, the UK, Japan and other countries have not been able to crack it. So, when you want to integrate items that are not in the aircraft’s compatibility list, you have to pay for designing that protocol. These weapons include the Astra BVRAAM, Brahmos and Nirbhay Cruise Missiles, Infra-red target detection by EO Pods and more. Jugaad, like modifying the Litening laser pod for the Kargil Ops, may or may not work. Can we take such a chance? I don’t think so. A specimen of each of these will, in all probability, be taken to France, the onboard weapons computer adapted to accept these items, test flights done to check viability and portability and so on. These will take time and money. The more Rafales you buy, the cheaper will the modification be on a per ac scale.

I simply don’t see how India Today can let such biased articles be published, tarnishing its own image, such as it is. He says, “The 'Super Sukhoi' version of the Su-30, more­over, meets the Rafale level of on-board data fusion capability.” That’s unfounded nonsense. That aircraft can carry only Russian weapons and some others, with help from a certain friendly country. It cannot carry NATO standard weapons that are infinitely superior to Russian weapons except for the K-74M AAM, an improvement over the upgraded R-73 (AA-11 Archer) AAM, which missile is to be fitted on the Tejas, and possibly the R-77. Yes, the Su-30 is data-link qualified with Indian ground systems, but not as optimally as the Mirage 2000, limited as it is to low-quality Russian processors which have been upgraded by using a quasi-western system. I believe it will also get the US ASRAAM, a modern see-you-kill-you weapon.

I resent the writer’s imputations. “Besotted by Western-origin aircraft, the IAF had hoped to use the initial order of 36 Rafales as a wedge to procure 90 more.” The man is confused. The Western C-130 Hercules is still flying as a frontline aircraft, inducted by the USAF in 1956 (and the IAF in 2011). That’s 63 years. Its USSR equivalent, the AN-12 was first inducted by the USSR air force in 1959, the IAF in 1961 and was retired by the IAF in 1990, 29 years after induction. The ancient Mirage III and V, first flown by the French Air Force in 1961 and acquired by Pakistani in 1967, are still flying, whereas the MiG-21s inducted in 1962 to counter them were retired in 2013, after relegation to and prolonged stay as an unsuitable and hazardous training aircraft. Western aircraft are far superior to their Russian equivalents. Even so, today the IAF has more Russian bloc aircraft than their Western counterparts. Besotted, my foot. 

As the Table shows, India did get the best deal.

Month/Year	Country	No of ac	Cost US$ billion	No of Bases	Cost of 36 ac*	Remarks	Cost per ac
Feb 2015	Egypt	24	5.9	1	8.85	Likely scaling up to 36 ac	Rs 1690 cr
May 2015	Qatar	24	7.02	2	10.53	Meteor and all trg Included, 48 more ac likely	Rs 1893 cr till date
Sep 2016	India	36	8.70	2	8.70	Base model	Rs 1611 cr
Nov 2015	UAE	90	Not known

*US$billion

UNNECESSARY IMBROGLIO ON INDIA'S FIRST RATE RAFALE DEAL

THE TYPHOON VS RAFALE: INDIA'S SENSIBLE CHOICE

A year after Indian PM, Mr Modi agreed to buy 36 Rafale aircraft in April 2015 for US$$8.7 billion, many observers wanted to know how the Typhoon fared. The Typhoon had a list price of about US$140 million. That is Rs 1,000 cr per ac on the bargaining table in flyaway condition, not in any operational status. Using the logic that the final price of the Indian Rafale reached Rs 1,600 cr for a tabled price of Rs 670 cr, i.e., if state-of-the-art weapons/avionics systems and infrastructure costs were added, the Typhoon price would jump to Rs 2,388 cr per piece. 36 ac would cost Rs 85,970 cr if operated from ONE base. If operated from TWO bases, costs would increase to close to Rs 91,000 cr, as explained later.

On an apple to apple basis, in February 2015, Egypt officially ordered 24 Rafales for US$5.9 billion, operating from ONE base. 36 ac in the same year would cost US$8.85 billion from one base and US$9.3 billion from two bases, but India managed 36 ac for US$8.7 billion, operating from TWO bases. A real win-win deal. 

In May 2015, 24 Rafales were contracted for $7.02 billion by Qatar, at a total price of US$298 million per ac (Rs 1892 cr per ac at 2015 exchange rate). This price tag includes provision of long-range cruise missiles and Meteor missiles as well as the training of 36 Qatari pilots and 100 technicians by the French military. The option for 12 more Rafale aircraft was exercised in December 2017 for €1.1 billion (or €92M each) with an additional option for 36 further jets. They are reportedly happy with the ac and its remarkably reduced cost. 

An article of 04 Jan 2019- more than three and a half years after the Kuwait deal-shows costs of new generation aircraft.

Canada is awaiting the outcome of a fighter ac competition between four contenders—the Eurofighter Typhoon, Sweden’s Saab Gripen, Boeing's Super Hornet F-18 and Lockheed Martin’s F-35—for an 88-jet, CAD $26 billion (USD $20 billion) order that should see the new aircraft fielded by the mid-2020s.

Today, if 88 Eurofighter Typhoons are to cost around US$20 bn (Rs.140,000 crores), 36 would cost close to Rs.57,270 cr off the shelf in a standing configuration (each ac would cost Rs.1590 cr). Following the Rafale analogy, this would work out to Rs.137,000 cr in the fully op role, operating out of two bases. This is totally unacceptable under any circumstances.

Germany is facing serviceability problems. In the UK too, serviceability is a major problem, averaging 43%.

The Indian fiat is a 75% serviceability rate for the 36 ac for the first five years after all 36 ac are inducted.

If you so desire, please do your own maths. Please note that infrastructural costs, for basic flying and combat flying simulators, as well as for ground training of technicians using computerised training aids (at least 2 basic simulators), test bays, airframe systems and avionics repair bays, radar and laser bays, anechoic chambers, engine sheds and calibrated ground-test bays apart from complex weapon systems and more, all imported from France, will add a few thousand crores to overall fleet cost, thus reaching a total of Rs 59,000 cr. Reduce that from 59,000 and you will get ~Rs 50,000 cr. The offset requirement will, therefore, be for ~ 25,000cr, denting Rahul Gandhi's plaintive cry. A simple comparison can be made with the Mirage 2000 buy, the best ever fleet induction by the IAF. All Mirage ac are safely located deep in Central India at ONE base and have the capability to fly out to four or six or more forward bases in a few hours, while undertaking some hyper-complex missions from home base itself.

Operationalising two bases entails avoidable duplication. To me, this was a clear signal that the IAF expected to acquire 126 aircraft. On the other hand, we will have infrastructure in place for at least 36 more Rafale ac, which will then be relatively cheaper than the 36 bought. The IAF does not want more SU 30 MKIs or the Tejas. The Govt has forced the IAF to buy 123 Tejas (43 Mk1 & 80 Mk2) at a base price of Rs 543cr, and between 272 and 312 SU-30 MKIs. This should be possible by 2035! The Tejas will be using the GE F-404/F-414 engines --which equip the US F-18 Hornet and Superhornet respectively-- on the Mk1 & 2 as DRDO has failed to produce the Kaveri engine since 1984. This addition will not boost IAF strength to 42 Sqns, as the 43 Mk1s will replace the Mig-21 Bison and the 80 Mk2s the ageing Mirage 2000 and other Bison ac. The upgraded Mirage 2000s are, however, lifed till at least 2036-42.

In April 2018, we issued a fresh RFI to procure 110 fighter jets, including both single and twin engine fighter aircraft. The 110 aircraft should have 17 aircraft in flyaway condition and the remaining 93 are to be made in India by a Strategic Partner. The same 6 agencies that bid for the MMRCA have put in their proposals. This is a smart move by India, as the L1 price of the Rafale is now known and will be kept in mind by the contenders while bidding. This time around, I am certain that ‘Make in India’ will be the primary caveat. The nay-sayers allege that Dassault Reliance Aerospace Limited, the so called AA Company, will have around 6-8 years experience and shrewdly edge HAL out again. This way, we will get the 90 ac left out in the Rafale deal plus more. 

The IAF was wary of the intention to get the most over-staffed, under-performing and inefficient aviation org in the world, HAL, to produce the aircraft. We have lost more than our share of pilots and ac to improperly produced HAL models. The recent accident on 01 Feb 2019 where we lost a Mirage 2000 two-seater and two IAF test pilots during an acceptance check by the IAF is a case in point, where HAL is shown up as a callous culprit.

Reading between the lines, the Modi Govt is aware that the earlier deal fell through because Mr Antony and his cohorts insisted that HAL be included in the deal and that Dassault sign up that they were offering a guarantee of quality for HAL-produced ac. Dassault, like Boeing and the rest of the world, considers HAL to be a worthless organization. The former opted to forgo a 22-25 billion dollar deal rather than vouch for the sub-par HAL.

As the Table shows, India did get the best deal.

Month/Year	Country	No of ac	Cost US$ billion	No of Bases	Cost of 36 ac*	Remarks	Cost per ac
Feb 2015	Egypt	24	5.9	1	8.85	Likely scaling up to 36 ac	Rs 1690 cr
May 2015	Qatar	24	7.02	2	10.53	Meteor and all trg Included, 48 more ac likely	Rs 1893 cr till date
Sep 2016	India	36	8.70	2	8.70	Base model	Rs 1611 cr
Nov 2015	UAE	90	Not known

* In US$billion