HAS PAKISTAN BEEN A CIVILIAN OR A MILITARY STATE SINCE INDEPENDENCE?
The history of the modern-day military of Pakistan began in 1947, when that country achieved its independence as a modern nation. Since creation, Pakistan has been under a military dictatorship spanning a total of 34 years. When not directly in power, the military elite has engaged in hybrid regimes, overtly exerting considerable influence on civilian governments from behind the scenes. The military thus continues to hold a significant place in the evolution of Pakistan as a Nation State, playing a significant role in the Pakistani establishment and the shaping of the country.
Pakistan was founded as a democracy after independence from the British Raj but the military has remained one of the country's most powerful institutions and has on multiple occasions overthrown democratically elected civilian governments on the basis of mismanagement and corruption. Their rise to power is linked to cultivating a collective ethos that portrays politics as inherently corrupt, while positioning themselves as the sole bastion of honesty, discipline and nationalism.
Amid the ever-changing political landscape, the only permanent force is the military establishment, while the political parties only coexist to share power with it. As a result, successive civilian governments have made sure that the military was consulted before they took key decisions, especially when those decisions related to the Kashmir conflict and foreign policy. They are painfully aware that the military has slipped into the political arena through coup d'état to establish military dictatorships, and could do so again. Up to today, no civilian Prime Minister has ever completed his tenure!
On 22 Nov 2022, Pakistan’s outgoing Army Chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, accepted in his last address as Army Chief that the military had routinely, even unlawfully, meddled in politics for decades and declared that it will no longer do so. He was criticised roundly across the globe, and most vocally so by the Prime Minister who gave him a three-year extension of tenure in 2019, Imran Khan, only to be ousted and jailed, where he is still languishing. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif then appointed Lieutenant General Syed Asim Munir Ahmad Shah, a former Director-General of the Inter Services Intelligence agency, or spy chief, as Bajwa’s successor in the rank of General. On 20 May 2025, General Munir was promoted to Field Marshal, becoming the second to reach the rank in Pakistan's history after FM Ayub Khan and only person to serve office of the Chief of Army Staff with Field Marshal rank. As it stands, the Field Marshal exerts considerable clout in Pakistan and global media is abuzz with speculation that a coup is in the offing, given that Pakistan’s economy is in trouble and the political instability in the country is at an all time high.
Prelude: The Siachen Glacier – the world's highest battlefield–holds significant strategic importance for India, primarily due to its location overlooking key areas and routes. It acts as a buffer against potential threats from Pakistan and China in the context of the disputed Gilgit-Baltistan region and the Shaksgam Valley, which was illegally ceded to China by Pakistan. The glacier's control provides India with access to vital water resources and the ability to monitor movements along the border areas, like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
In 1984, the Siachen Glacier, under the illegal control of Pakistan since 1965 was re-occupied by India after Operation Meghdoot. India took control of the 76-kilometre-long (47 mi) Siachen Glacier and its tributary glaciers, as well as all the main passes and heights of the Saltoro Ridge immediately west of the glacier, including Sia La, Bilafond La, and Gyong La. India established a military base there that it maintains at a cost of more than US$1 million per day. Pakistan tried in 1987 and 1989 to retake the whole glacier but was unsuccessful. Even so, preparations were not abandoned, but continued on a small but steady scale, hidden among military exercises. It still holds two posts that overlook five km of the Glacier, forcing all Indian helicopters to route around the posts to preclude the use of small arms fire and the Stinger SAM.
The Betrayal: At the onset of 1999, General Pervez Musharraf’s name held little recognition beyond Pakistan. However, by the year’s end, he had skyrocketed to global notoriety. He became the central figure in igniting a conflict between two nuclear-armed nations and subsequently orchestrated a coup to seize power domestically, becoming Pakistan’s first military dictator since Gen. Zia-Ul-Haq. He had, however, begun his silent machinations in late 1998 as the chief of Army Staff and, later, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Gen. Musharraf planned to use to his advantage the fact that some months earlier, both India and Pakistan had conducted nuclear tests. Pakistan believed that it now had a working nuclear deterrent; once it had taken the Kargil hills, he gambled that the international community, fearing a nuclear war, would urge a secession of hostilities. Pakistan would emerge with an improved tactical advantage along the LOC and bring the Siachen Glacier conflict to the forefront of international resolution.
Gen. Musharraf began clandestinely reinforcing the groundwork for a bold military incursion across the Kargil border. In February 1999, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee of India was invited by his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, to Pakistan on a pioneering journey toward peace and warmly received. Unbeknownst to the Sharif government, preparations for an invasion were underway. Musharraf’s actions would soon shatter the optimism of the peace mission, transforming it from a historic mission to a footnote in history. He thrust Sharif into a conflict he could not disavow and pushed Vajpayee into a confrontation he could not avoid.
Musharraf had serious confrontations and became involved in altercations with other senior officers, Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Fasih Bokhari, Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal PQ Mehdi and senior Lieutenant-General Ali Kuli Khan. Problems with his lifelong friend, Air Chief Marshal PQ Mehdi also arose when Air Chief refrained to participate or authorise any air strike to support the elements of army operations in the Kargil region. The absence of the PAF left the IAF a free hand to operate at its own pace.
The Indians seemed to be a rather naïve lot. At the onset of winter, all Indian troops would withdraw to from their posts which would see murderous -40°C temperatures to warmer climes, returning to their posts only starting early April at the lower levels and early May at the inhospitable heights. Gen. Musharraf made full use of this naivety and started pushing his troops, in the guise of shepherds, into the Indian posts, carefully avoiding the lower posts as that could give the game away.
Some elements of the Pakistani SSG Commandos, Northern Light Infantry Forces and Pak Kashmiri militants planned to take over the abandoned Indian bunkers on various hills that overlooked the vital Srinagar–Leh highway that serviced the logistics base from which supplies were ferried through helicopter to the Indian Army at the top of the Siachen Glacier.
The Indian military apparatus got their intel inputs routinely, but these were dismissed as routine sheep herder movements. The Indian Air Force also provided Elint that Pakistani radio activity had increased, but the Army brushed it off. This was while Operation Ibex was underway in Siachen Feb – May 1989. In February Indian troops launched an attack on Pakistani positions there and, after an initial reversal, launched an artillery attack on Kauser Base, the Pakistani logistical node in the area and successfully destroyed it. The destruction of Kauser Base induced Pakistani troops to vacate their posts concluding Operation Ibex.
The Pakistani-backed forces, now including Mujahideens and local insurgents, took over the vacant bunker complexes around April and May 1999, but the winter snows had melted earlier than usual and an Indian reconnaissance team sent to inspect the bunkers was wiped out by them. The influx of regulars from Pakistan reached alarming proportions. The Indian Army Chief, Gen VP Malik, requested the Air Chief, Air Chief Marshal AY Tipnis for a few helicopter gunship sorties, suggesting that would be enough to seal off the influx route and evict the soldiers who had taken over the Indian posts. Tipnis refused, stating that the induction of the Indian Air Force would require Ministerial sanction and that Gen Malik was being overly optimistic, predicting that almost all helicopters would be lost to SAMs.
The Indian Army, as of itself, responded and massed a force of around 30,000 men to re-take the Kargil hills in Operation Vijay starting May 10, 1999. The Pakistani-backed forces were not fully prepared yet, needing another two to three weeks to meet their requirements of heavy weaponry, ammunition, food, shelter, and medicine. Given the undue uphill tasks, the Indians proved to be easy prey for the Pakistani troops who retained most of the heights in spite of continuous attacks. Two months into the conflict, Indian troops by sheer persistence had retaken most of the ridges that were encroached by the infiltrators; according to official count, about 25-30% of the intruded area and high ground had returned to Indian control, but at an inordinately high cost.
Even without PAF interference, the IAF had its problems, primarily the lack of targets identifiable by troop mobility and action. As winter withdrew, sunrise cast shadows in Kashmir's valleys from 8AM, when visibility was considerably reduced and targets could not be seen. Low clouds engulfed the ridges and peaks by 11 a.m. The window of opportunity was restricted to the three-hour period between 8 a.m. and 11 a.m., provided there was no drizzle. In effect, the Pakistani forces in that area knew they had to stay under cover throughout the morning and start hostile actions only after an early lunch.
The high-altitude environment presented unique challenges, including reduced aircraft and weapon performance, to which a surprise element had to be added, viz., the sudden launch of Stinger SAMs out of virtually nowhere. The Jaguar was impotent at height and the MiG-21 and MiG-27 were proving ineffective, particularly after additional restrictions were imposed following the loss of the three aircraft. In this time-frame, trig points were identified where the Pakistani soldiers had shrewdly used terrain masking and difficult to attack hill tops as assault points.
The best aircraft for this kind of Ground Attack at heights of around 15-20,000’ (4,500-6,000m) was the Mirage 2000. Their attack on Muntho Dhalo, their primary Logistics Camp at noon on June 16 had convinced the brass that the Mirage was indeed very potent and therefore, when the Litening Laser Designation Pod and Paveway Laser Guidance Kit combination was available to the Mirage fleet finally, and had proven itself capable of delivering bombs, it was but natural that the Mirage fleet would be tasked for all important targets. Muntho Dhalo was eviscerated with 24 x 250 kg dumb Spanish bombs dropped by four Mirage 2000 and proved to be the turning point of the war. 300 Pakistani personnel were killed at Muntho Dhalo.
The introduction of Laser-guided bombs dropped by the Mirage-2000 starting 24 Jun turned the war on its head. The first target chosen was the one that had proved to be the most difficult to attack, Tiger Hill. Thestory of that air attack is at this link. Within four days, all unapproachable targets had been destroyed and the Pakistani Army routed, with heavy casualties. The Indian Army made the most of this opportunity and quickly had the enemy back-tracking, which soon turned into a run for safe havens. Talks of a ceasefire began as early as 12 July, but Pakistani outposts, cut off from the main body and with no radio contact didn’t receive the news in time. Finally, Pakistan sued for peace on 26 July, a day celebrated in India as Vijay Divas.