FURTHER DEBATES ON OP SINDOOR

 AIR POWER AND OPERATION SINDOOR

There is considerable confusion in the air about the role of the Indian Air Force in Operation Sindoor. However, a close scrutiny reveals that it stems from the lack of proper understanding of the concept of Air Power.

To begin with, the assertion that the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was “fully ready and already airborne” waiting for the IAF lacks operational logic. I’m afraid I do not agree. Air forces do not achieve superiority through early airborne presence or “waiting in the air”; they do so through the intelligent orchestration of planning, timing, and mission effectiveness.

Air campaigns are designed around objective achievement, escalation control, and strategic messaging — not the theatrics of who launched first. The IAF’s conduct during Operation Sindoor must be viewed through the prism of strategic restraint and precise force application, both of which ensured that escalation did not spiral uncontrollably. To overlook this is to misunderstand not only the mission but also the fundamental tenets of modern air warfare.

Air campaigns do not occur in a technological vacuum; they are outcomes of years of threat assessments, acquisition policies, and force modernisation efforts. The IAF’s planning and execution are guided by a continuous evaluation of adversary capabilities, regional trends, and indigenous technology developments. Its emphasis on networked operations, precision munitions, and electronic warfare integration in recent years exemplifies the very opposite of technological blindness. Indeed, the same institution that seamlessly integrated indigenous platforms like Tejas, Akash, and Astra into the combat matrix cannot be dismissed as guilty of flawed planning.

Some people have made claim that the Number of Squadrons had “no role to play” in Operation Sindoor.

This assertion demonstrates a superficial understanding of force structure. The number of available combat squadrons directly influences operational flexibility, rotation capability, and sustainability during prolonged contingencies. Numbers are not symbolic — they define how many targets can be struck simultaneously, how many formations can remain on patrol, and how resilient the force remains under attrition. Attempting to delink quantity from quality in aerial warfare contradicts every known military planning principle.

The allegation of “poor preparation and training” during earlier operations, specifically referencing the Balakot air strikes, ignores the precision, professionalism, and strategic discipline demonstrated during that mission. The operation achieved desired political-military objectives without provoking uncontrolled escalation or international backlash — an outcome that can only emerge from exceptional planning, rehearsed coordination, and high pilot skill. The deliberate misinformation campaign later undertaken by Pakistan to conceal the actual damage sustained further underscores the effectiveness of the IAF’s execution.

The assertion that Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missiles, drones, and Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) systems render manned aircraft obsolete does not hold ground. This is very likely to be proved as we move into the 1935s, though this argument collapses at this moment when confronted with the global trend among advanced air powers. The United States, possessing unmatched superiority in unmanned and network-centric systems, continues to invest heavily in next-generation manned fighters like the F-35 Lightning II, the B-21 Raider stealth bomber, and the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) programme — each of which will operate alongside, not instead of, unmanned assets.

Air combat remains an inherently cognitive domain requiring human intuition, adaptability, and ethical judgement — qualities no artificial system currently replicates. If conventional dogfights were truly obsolete, there would be no reason for the F-35 to retain a gun pod while carrying Meteor-class long-range missiles.

Air power, at its core, is about layered capability — where manned and unmanned assets combine in mutually reinforcing roles. Drones and autonomous systems extend range, persistence, and surveillance; manned fighters deliver the rapid, flexible, multi-domain decision-making that machines cannot. Only a balanced force structure fulfils national requirements. Suggesting a purely unmanned or missile-dominated paradigm not only ignores the evolving hybrid nature of warfare but risks undermining the very foundations of deterrence credibility.

A casual analogy with US and Chinese theatre command structures also reflects conceptual carelessness. The American and Chinese theatrisation models function in geostrategic contexts vastly different from India’s. Each of their theatres addresses distinct geographic expanses separated by oceans or extensive buffer zones. A simultaneous multi-theatre war is strategically improbable for those nations. By contrast, India’s northern and western theatres are contiguous, interdependent, and likely to become active simultaneously in the event of a two-front conflict. Blindly transplanting foreign models without considering this geographic and geopolitical uniqueness contradicts the very logic of theatrisation, whose essence lies in optimising command for realistic war scenarios — not in administrative experimentation. For India, balanced integration must enhance coordination without diluting specialised domain expertise.

Armed forces remain instruments of national power, not targets for rhetorical assaults. Constructive debate strengthens institutions; unsubstantiated generalisations corrode public trust in the guardians of national sovereignty. The IAF’s record of professional evolution — from analogue cockpits to networked combat systems, from regional air defence to multi-domain integration — reflects adaptability, discipline, and foresight. Its role in humanitarian operations, joint exercises, and indigenous innovation further underscores its strategic maturity and institutional integrity.

To attribute every challenge of modernisation or inter-service coordination solely to the Air Force is intellectually dishonest and professionally unfair. National defence is a composite enterprise where every service, every civilian agency, and the national industrial base share responsibility. Blaming one arm of the defence apparatus for systemic complexities only weakens the collective resolve essential for credible deterrence.

Sound strategic analysis demands balance, evidence, and respect for institutional ethos. Casting aspersions on the integrity and competence of an entire service demeans not only its personnel but also the very standards of military discourse. The IAF, through its evolution, modernisation, and professional conduct, has consistently upheld the highest traditions of national service. To question its moral and operational foundations without substantiated evidence is not critical scholarship — it is poor taste dressed as commentary, and it contributes nothing to the cause of serious defence analysis.

LESSONS LEARNT FROM OP SINDOOR

THE PRIMACY OF AIR POWER

Air Marshal R Nambiar PVSM, AVSM, VM & BAR (Ret’d)

My in-depth analysis of and response to the article by Vice Admiral Harinder Singh (Ret’d) in The Tribune of 18 October, 2025, viz., The Lessons Not Learnt From Op Sindoor, has evoked varied responses from certain quarters. The principal issues raised are:

• Long-range vectors and missiles in future combat.
• An integrated HQ to control them.

The neo-strategists are querying the rationale that it should be the exclusive privilege of the IAF to address both issues while retaining absolute command and control thereof. Surely the Army or Navy can handle the above tasks, implying that the concept of an integrated headquarters to control them is more than possible without being held “hostage” by the IAF. This may also be an oblique reference to the supposed intransigence shown by the IAF in accepting the Theatre Command proposal advocated by the Army and Navy.

As an IAF veteran with years in aerospace operations, I have witnessed firsthand how Air Power evolves and integrates into joint warfare. The question of why the Army or Navy could not handle these functions may, prima facie, seem reasonable. After all, we are part of the same tri-service team, each branch bringing unique strengths. However, long-range targeting and strike operations are not merely about possessing hardware; they demand a deeply ingrained skill set honed over a century of aviation history. The Air Force’s expertise in this domain traces its origins to the dawn of military aviation in World War I, refined through the massive air campaigns of World War II, and battle-tested in numerous operations since—from Korea and Vietnam to the Gulf Wars, and in India’s own conflicts, including 1965, 1971, Kargil, Balakot, and now Operation Sindoor.

This expertise is not transferable overnight—it is doctrinal, experiential, and highly specialised.

One must also consider the sheer speed and complexity of air operations. We deal with platforms moving at near Mach 1 speeds, not the 15-knot pace of surface forces. Aircrew undergo continuous rigorous training to master decision-making in this high-tempo environment, where rapid judgments on altitude, velocity, weather, and countermeasures determine mission success or failure. Long-range vectors and missiles require an intrinsic understanding of three-dimensional battlespace management—something ground and naval forces, with their largely planar focus, are not optimised for.

This is not a reflection on their competence; it is simply a matter of specialisation. If one needs an astronaut to navigate space, one turns to a test pilot who has pushed the envelope in flight—not a tank commander or a ship’s helmsman. It is that straightforward.

Long-range targeting is a complex blend of art and science, doctrinally embedded in the Air Force’s core competencies. It involves a seamless chain: target assessment through advanced Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance (ISR) assets such as Earth Observation (EO) satellites; Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), and AWACS; precise weapon-target matching; accurate delivery under contested conditions; post-strike damage assessment and concurrent electronic warfare to suppress enemy air defences. Add to this the intricacy of strike packaging—coordinating multiple assets for saturation attacks, managing fuel logistics, timing, weapon effects, and mid-mission adjustments. These are not skills one can simply “plug and play.” They are built through years of simulator hours, live training, and operational experience. Transferring such capabilities outside the Air Force risks diluting their effectiveness—akin to using a scalpel to chop wood. As airmen, we retain a degree of scepticism when air assets are subordinated to commanders with core competencies in surface force operations—not out of arrogance, but from hard lessons where improper application of scarce airpower resources and diffusion of control led to gross inefficiencies or significant operational losses. This is akin to the reluctance a neurosurgeon might feel if an ENT specialist were tasked with brain surgery.

These specialised capabilities underscore the IAF’s concerns about proposals like Theatre Command, as advocated by senior serving Army and Navy officers. The proposal has been vehemently opposed by IAF officers. Every CAS has unequivocally stated this is a bad idea. Perhaps they have a point. Maybe it’s time to listen to them. History offers many examples where a lack of centralised command diminished air power’s potential. Air operations demand unified air command to prevent fragmentation and ensure that long-range capabilities remain focussed on strategic priorities—particularly vital today, when the IAF has been reduced to under 25 squadrons with the phasing out of the MiG-21 and Jaguars due for retirement soon.

A Joint Operations Centre is certainly desirable under the CDS framework, but it must harness the specialised strengths of each service.

Ultimately, this is not a question of turf but of operational efficacy in future warfare. The way forward lies in genuine integration—where the IAF controls the skies, the Army dominates the land, and the Navy commands the seas—working synergistically under a truly joint architecture.

OPERATION SINDOOR: A NAVAL OFFICER’S MISFIRE ON AIRPOWER

 

AN ADROIT REJOINDER BY THE HERO OF KARGIL

“Operation Sindoor: A Naval Officer’s Misfire on Airpower”

By Air Tiger

In the wake of Operation Sindoor, India’s most sophisticated air campaign to date, one would expect thoughtful analyses from our military veterans. Instead, we are treated to a foghorn of confusion from Vice Admiral Harinder Singh (Retd), whose recent article reads less like strategic insight and more like a misguided attempt to fly a submarine through hostile airspace.

Let’s dissect his claims — line by line — and expose the intellectual vacuity and concomitant turbulence beneath the surface.

1. Prestige Platforms And Solitary Glory?

The Admiral accuses the Indian Air Force of clinging to “prestige platforms” and “solitary glory.” Apparently, investing in Rafales — aircraft with Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars, Spectra EW suites, sensor fusion and Meteor BVR missiles — is vanity, not capability. One wonders if he’d prefer we fight future wars with vintage Gnats and a prayer.

2. Pakistan Anticipated The Strike?

Yes, and still failed to prevent precision strikes on nine terror infrastructure sites. The IAF executed its mission with surgical accuracy, avoiding escalation and civilian casualties. That’s not failure — that’s textbook Air Power.

3. Rafale Downed?

Official briefings clearly indicate the entire strike package recovered to base. Even if a Rafale was lost, what’s the big deal? This was air combat, not a walk in the park. What must be remembered is the speed at which the PAF folded and cried uncle within just 90 hours of offensive air operations. Separately, the IAF has stated that long-range SAM engagements, including S-400 shots at extreme ranges, constrained PAF freedom of action, with 12 PAF aircraft destroyed. Debate the figures, but not the deterrent effect.But sure, if the Admiral insists let’s just pretend the PAF had a field day.

4.     Shift To Standoff Weapons

Correct—and prudent. Adapting to high-threat airspace with BrahMos, SCALP, and similar standoff munitions is doctrinal evolution, not retreat. The aim was precision effects without opening every ladder of escalation.

5.     Operational Shortcomings

Every Service has history to study. The IAF has publicly absorbed lessons from Balakot to Sindoor and is deepening AI-enabled intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), BVR doctrine, and safety culture. What needs to be remembered is that Balakot brought us six years of relative peace, despite the revocation of Article 370. The IAF’s transparency is visible in briefings, awards for specific units, and rapid remediation actions.

6.     Failure To Break Fighter Defences

The mission was to punish terror infrastructure and degrade enabling military nodes, not stage gratuitous within-visual-range Top Gun style dogfights. Effects on Command and Control, radars, runways, and logistics mattered more than airshow-style engagements.

7.     Disconnect Between Missiles And Fighters

This sweeping allegation demonstrates a clear misunderstanding of integrated air operations. Standoff missiles, fighters, Ground-Based Air Defense, Electronic Warfare (EW), and ISR were sequenced to suppress, strike, and assess in a single kill web. That is the point of joint air planning.

8.     Dogfights Are Obsolete

They are rarer, not extinct. BVR dominance is now the new normal in 2025; Meteor-class weapons, networked sensors, and EW give the IAF decisive reach while keeping pilots outside the densest threat rings.

9.     Lesser Aircraft With Superior Weapons

Weapons demand platforms with appropriate sensors, processing, self-protection and endurance to make them count. The Rafale and the Su-30MKI aircraft bring that ecosystem; one cannot bolt a Meteor to a basic airframe and expect parity.

10.   BrahMos Could Have Done It Alone

BrahMos was a key tool—and many of those strikes were air-launched. By Pakistani accounts, the Indian carrier group stayed near Mumbai and, at its closest, safely around 400 nm off Pakistan’s coast. The decisive effects in this window came from air-delivered precision and layered air defence.

11.   Why Invest In Expensive Aircraft?

This implied question betrays a singular lack of forward thinking and contemporary strategic overview. The said investment is essential because deterrence rests on credible, repeatable options across the spectrum—penetration, standoff, escort, suppression, and time-sensitive targeting. The mere availability of such options, albeit big-ticket, alters the adversary’s calculus before a shot is fired.

12.   Resistance To Jointness

The IAF has repeatedly asserted that it supports joint operations while insisting on clear command relationships and unity of effort—eminently reasonable conditions for complex, time-compressed missions. Jointness means common plans, interoperable C2 and rehearsed tactics, not token participation.

Invoking 1971 half-century-old episodes to judge 2025 is not a proxy for today’s force design. The relevant present is that the IAF leads in ISR integration, EW, precision strike, and air defence networking under contested conditions.

13.   Drumbeat Of Victories

Calling Sindoor a success is not chest-thumping; it reflects calibrated objectives achieved in days, validated by official citations and operational outcomes. Pride and professional self-critique can—and should—coexist.

Final Approach

Vice Admiral Singh’s article is a masterclass in misdirection—a naval officer critiquing Air Power with all the irrelevance of using sonar in a Mach 2 dogfight. His arguments are riddled with factual errors, strategic blunders, and a flawed grasp of modern aerial warfare. The IAF doesn’t need to “come clean.” It needs to keep doing what it did during Operation Sindoor: adapt, integrate, and dominate—from 300 km away if necessary.

The next step for the joint force is straightforward: harden ISR against third-party surveillance, tighten cross-service kill chains, and ensure maritime posture is visibly aligned with the tempo and aims of the air campaign. Until then, the airspace will be commanded by those who can sense earliest, shoot first, and remain unseen the longest.

AIR MARSHAL RAGHUNATH NAMBIAR
PVSM, AVSM, VM & BAR (Ret’d) 

Air Marshal Raghunath Nambiar is an Experimental Test Pilot who has flown 52 types of aircraft, logging more than 5,200 flying hours. He has held numerous prestigious Service appointments in his distinguished 40-year career, ultimately retiring in 2019 as the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Western Air Command. He commanded No. 1 Squadron AF, flying the Mirage 2000 aircraft; was Defence Attaché of India in Israel; Air Officer Commanding of Air Force Station Jamnagar and Commandant of the Aircraft and Systems Testing Establishment (ASTE) in Bangalore, the IAF’s premier flight test organisation. He was awarded the Vayu Sena Medal (Gallantry) for his legendary exploits during the 1999 Kargil  Conflict, a Bar to his Vayu Sena Medal for his pioneering work on the Tejas as well as the Ati Vishisht Seva Medal (AVSM) and the Param Vishisht Seva Medal (PVSM) for distinguished service of an        exceptional order.

NAUTILUS WAKES UP SIX MONTHS LATE

 

The Lessons Not Learnt From Op Sindoor
The Tribune, 18 October, 2025 

By: Vice Admiral (ret'd) Harinder Singh, former Deputy Chief of Naval Staff

DETAILED REBUTTAL

It would have been professionally educative if the three star officer had deemed it fit to explain to the nation as to why Indian Navy in 2025 does not have a single AIP enabled Submarine, while Pakistan Navy is nearing acquisition of AIP enabled submarine in double digits. He ought to have also expressed his pearls of wisdom about the future operational employment of ‘WHITE ELEPHANTS’ of the Indian Navy (as called by former Chief of Naval Staff Admiral JG Nadkarni at the time of acquisition of Admiral Goroshkov from Russia), the Aircraft Carriers. In any full blown conflict with Pakistan and China in future Indian Navy will have two distinct roles. First and obvious to fight and neutralize Adversary’s Naval Power but the second role would be more demanding and interesting; To protect the ‘WHITE ELEPHANTS’ from being sent to bottom of Indian Ocean or Arabian Sea and becoming an infungible asset.

Instead the former DCNS opted to narrate the shortcomings of sister service, the IAF. Indeed IAF and the other services require to upgrade not only their respective weapons but also the employment strategy from time to time. It is a continuous process.

His statements, some of which will be quoted below, reflect his extremely poor understanding of employment of Air Power. One must never breach the undefined red line while talking about other’s capability about which one has no clue since that was not her/his profession. For instance it is the specialists at ISRO, who are competent to decide the launch window, trajectory etc of rocket launch. Anyone else attempting to do that will obviously mess it up as the former DCNS has done deliberately and not inadvertently talking about IAF operational capability. It reflects on his poor inter-service grooming. Sadly he does not comprehend the meaning of words ‘MUTUAL INTER DEPENDENCE’.

His views in public domain castigating sister service is an outstanding example of professional profligacy. If indeed he wanted to advise the IAF, he ought to have written to present CAS and not in news paper to earn brownie points. Unfortunately he has unwittingly castigated the current CAS. Perhaps he has done it inadvertently due to poor command of language.

Few of his ‘pearls of wisdom’ (in black), in original as expressed by former DCNS are listed below with my comments. 

·        Yet the IAF’s reluctance to acknowledge operational shortcomings whilst it is claiming it won every war and skirmish since independence is not new---- ------.

By making such statement he has willfully acknowledged his total ignorance about IAF operations. I will quote just one out of the hundreds of outstanding accomplishment by IAF. He has no clue that J&K is part of India because IAF PILOTS FLEW OVERLOADED IAF Dakotas and  crossed the Banihal Pass and landed at Srinagar with brilliant and brave soldiers of our great Army. Western Air Forces, USAF in particular, still cannot believe that brilliant IAF pilots flew Dakotas well outside limits of performance successfully.

·        During Balakot airstrikes in February 2019 deploying outdated MiG 21-----

Such mention about one of the most versatile aeroplane reflects his total ignorance not only about the platform but also those, who were in charge of operations. By expressing his views about MiG 21, he has joined the club of unprofessional, who have called MiG 21 a flying coffin etc. I wish he had spent more time viewing Indian Navy’s submarine fleet capability during his tenure as DCNS. If he had done so Indian Navy will not be without AIP enable Submarines in 2025. Incidentally operations are under direct control of DCNS. Due to his lack of initiative National Security has indeed been jeopardized because Indian Ocean region is susceptible to attacks by Pak AIP enabled Submarines.

·        The loss of an IAF helicopter to friendly fire despite minimal aerial activity was unacceptable poor preparation and training.

.        He has obviously never heard of ‘FRATRICIDE’, an unwanted and undesirable event under hot war conditions. His mention of ‘minimal aerial activity’ further reflects his total ignorance about actual happenings in matter of few seconds.He ought to know thatnce a light bulb is meant to give light but it also produces heat, an unwanted product. Fratricide during HOT WAR conditions is akin to that.

·        If the IAF CLINGS to outdated notions of presige platformsand solitary glory, it will not only squander scarce resources but also compromise national security.

What a disgraceful comment/opinion about sister service as if IAF is any less patriotic than other services. It is a matter of professional shame that former DCNS decided to let such derogatory words appear as the centre piece of his professionally despicable write up.

·        Why invest in increasingly expensive aircraft that won’t cross borders or engage in close combat?

Yet another profligate statement reflecting his total lack of knowledge and understanding about employment of Air Power. Will the former DCNS educate the nation as to how a WHITE ELEPHANT costing INR 39,000 Crore defend the nation, when it cannot defend itself.

·        Air Chief is even now fighting a rearguard action to persuade the Raksha Mantri away from jointness.-----resist integration into joint theatre commands.

It is a sad commentary on professional grooming of former DCNS. He does not know that SERVICE CHIEFS are INSTITUTIONS not INDIVIDUALS. A mature professional would avoid such utterances about any serving or past Chief. He obviously cannot comprehend that decision makers are obviously not convinced about validity of utterly flawed Theatre Command concept propagated by first CDS. It is five years and counting but former DCNS and his protégé currently in chair are unable to contest IAF logic. Proposal of unified AIR DEFENCE COMMAND has already been thrown in the dust bin. Ist CDS wanted Air Defence Command to be set up by 30th June, 2020. Will the former DCNS tell the nation any instance under HOT WAR conditions, in which Indian Military faced adverse results due to lack of coordination. He obviously has no clue about ‘MEGHNA RIVER CROSSING’ during 1971 war executed by professionally competent and motivated IAF and Indian Army commanders without any SOPs in existence. Unstated precept of ‘mutual inter dependence’ is ingrained during NDA training. I wonder if he is ex NDA. If not, his utterances are understandable.

·        For decades, it (IAF) has operated in isolation, seeking accolades without offering mutual support to the other services.

His ignorance is unbelievable. For records during 1971 conflict IAF flew 6609 sorties of which 3243 sorties were for CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, a whopping 49%. I am shocked that he did not know such basics yet became DCNS.

·        Even the 1971 missile attack on Karachi went without air support.

Former DCNS is not aware of facts. IAF had already struck the refinery, Shahbaz airfield a day prior to Naval missile attack, one of the most daring feat by Indian Navy. Kindly read Cmde Ranjit’s book dealing with facts to educate yourself. Will the DCNS also tell the nation that naval missile boats struck Karachi Harbour in pitch dark conditions. PAF could have done nothing to retaliate. In fact burning flames of oil tanks was the guide to naval boats to aim the missiles. Even  subsequent IAF strikes used the flames as target identification.

·        The IAF has often been accused of overstating its achievement while underplaying its lapses.

In short former DCNS has breached all standards of morality, both professional and personal, by calling IAF as a LIAR. For his info; Only a LIAR calles someone else a LIAR without substantive proof.

·        It is time for the IAF and its leadership to be held to account.

It is time the former DCNS did self appreciation instead of maligning sister service, a despicable act of professional immaturity and ignorance.

·        They must come clean-not just about the causes of recent setbacks and what they plan to do about it.

Former DCNS needs to come clean as to how and why he wrote such professionally unwarranted piece full of lies and wrong facts. Former DCNS must not worry about IAF operations because IAF has been and is in extremely competent hands and does not practice maligning sister service. Anyone maligning a sister service is unfit to be called a soldier.

Vice Admiral Harinder Singh sought premature release as FOC-in-C. I cannot recall if any C-in-C LEVEL officer from Army and IAF sought premature release, grounds notwithstanding. I always believed Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat was not wrong in not accepting him as DCNS. Vice Admiral Harinder Singh has confirmed it by writing this article. No one can denigrate a service and get away. It is unfortunate that former DCNS did not learn this basic etiquette. It is never too late to learn.

Gp Capt TP Srivastava
Former Director
Ministry of Defence
18 October, 2025

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