LESSONS LEARNT FROM OP SINDOOR

THE PRIMACY OF AIR POWER

Air Marshal R Nambiar PVSM, AVSM, VM & BAR (Ret’d)

My in-depth analysis of and response to the article by Vice Admiral Harinder Singh (Ret’d) in The Tribune of 18 October, 2025, viz., The Lessons Not Learnt From Op Sindoor, has evoked varied responses from certain quarters. The principal issues raised are:

• Long-range vectors and missiles in future combat.
• An integrated HQ to control them.

The neo-strategists are querying the rationale that it should be the exclusive privilege of the IAF to address both issues while retaining absolute command and control thereof. Surely the Army or Navy can handle the above tasks, implying that the concept of an integrated headquarters to control them is more than possible without being held “hostage” by the IAF. This may also be an oblique reference to the supposed intransigence shown by the IAF in accepting the Theatre Command proposal advocated by the Army and Navy.

As an IAF veteran with years in aerospace operations, I have witnessed firsthand how Air Power evolves and integrates into joint warfare. The question of why the Army or Navy could not handle these functions may, prima facie, seem reasonable. After all, we are part of the same tri-service team, each branch bringing unique strengths. However, long-range targeting and strike operations are not merely about possessing hardware; they demand a deeply ingrained skill set honed over a century of aviation history. The Air Force’s expertise in this domain traces its origins to the dawn of military aviation in World War I, refined through the massive air campaigns of World War II, and battle-tested in numerous operations since—from Korea and Vietnam to the Gulf Wars, and in India’s own conflicts, including 1965, 1971, Kargil, Balakot, and now Operation Sindoor.

This expertise is not transferable overnight—it is doctrinal, experiential, and highly specialised.

One must also consider the sheer speed and complexity of air operations. We deal with platforms moving at near Mach 1 speeds, not the 15-knot pace of surface forces. Aircrew undergo continuous rigorous training to master decision-making in this high-tempo environment, where rapid judgments on altitude, velocity, weather, and countermeasures determine mission success or failure. Long-range vectors and missiles require an intrinsic understanding of three-dimensional battlespace management—something ground and naval forces, with their largely planar focus, are not optimised for.

This is not a reflection on their competence; it is simply a matter of specialisation. If one needs an astronaut to navigate space, one turns to a test pilot who has pushed the envelope in flight—not a tank commander or a ship’s helmsman. It is that straightforward.

Long-range targeting is a complex blend of art and science, doctrinally embedded in the Air Force’s core competencies. It involves a seamless chain: target assessment through advanced Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance (ISR) assets such as Earth Observation (EO) satellites; Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), and AWACS; precise weapon-target matching; accurate delivery under contested conditions; post-strike damage assessment and concurrent electronic warfare to suppress enemy air defences. Add to this the intricacy of strike packaging—coordinating multiple assets for saturation attacks, managing fuel logistics, timing, weapon effects, and mid-mission adjustments. These are not skills one can simply “plug and play.” They are built through years of simulator hours, live training, and operational experience. Transferring such capabilities outside the Air Force risks diluting their effectiveness—akin to using a scalpel to chop wood. As airmen, we retain a degree of scepticism when air assets are subordinated to commanders with core competencies in surface force operations—not out of arrogance, but from hard lessons where improper application of scarce airpower resources and diffusion of control led to gross inefficiencies or significant operational losses. This is akin to the reluctance a neurosurgeon might feel if an ENT specialist were tasked with brain surgery.

These specialised capabilities underscore the IAF’s concerns about proposals like Theatre Command, as advocated by senior serving Army and Navy officers. The proposal has been vehemently opposed by IAF officers. Every CAS has unequivocally stated this is a bad idea. Perhaps they have a point. Maybe it’s time to listen to them. History offers many examples where a lack of centralised command diminished air power’s potential. Air operations demand unified air command to prevent fragmentation and ensure that long-range capabilities remain focussed on strategic priorities—particularly vital today, when the IAF has been reduced to under 25 squadrons with the phasing out of the MiG-21 and Jaguars due for retirement soon.

A Joint Operations Centre is certainly desirable under the CDS framework, but it must harness the specialised strengths of each service.

Ultimately, this is not a question of turf but of operational efficacy in future warfare. The way forward lies in genuine integration—where the IAF controls the skies, the Army dominates the land, and the Navy commands the seas—working synergistically under a truly joint architecture.