AIR POWER AND OPERATION SINDOOR
There is considerable confusion in the air about the role of the Indian Air Force in Operation Sindoor. However, a close scrutiny reveals that it stems from the lack of proper understanding of the concept of Air Power.
To begin with, the assertion that the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was “fully ready and already airborne” waiting for the IAF lacks operational logic. I’m afraid I do not agree. Air forces do not achieve superiority through early airborne presence or “waiting in the air”; they do so through the intelligent orchestration of planning, timing, and mission effectiveness.
Air campaigns are designed around objective achievement, escalation control, and strategic messaging — not the theatrics of who launched first. The IAF’s conduct during Operation Sindoor must be viewed through the prism of strategic restraint and precise force application, both of which ensured that escalation did not spiral uncontrollably. To overlook this is to misunderstand not only the mission but also the fundamental tenets of modern air warfare.
Air campaigns do not occur in a technological vacuum; they are outcomes of years of threat assessments, acquisition policies, and force modernisation efforts. The IAF’s planning and execution are guided by a continuous evaluation of adversary capabilities, regional trends, and indigenous technology developments. Its emphasis on networked operations, precision munitions, and electronic warfare integration in recent years exemplifies the very opposite of technological blindness. Indeed, the same institution that seamlessly integrated indigenous platforms like Tejas, Akash, and Astra into the combat matrix cannot be dismissed as guilty of flawed planning.
Some people have made claim that the Number of Squadrons had “no role to play” in Operation Sindoor.
This assertion demonstrates a superficial understanding of force structure. The number of available combat squadrons directly influences operational flexibility, rotation capability, and sustainability during prolonged contingencies. Numbers are not symbolic — they define how many targets can be struck simultaneously, how many formations can remain on patrol, and how resilient the force remains under attrition. Attempting to delink quantity from quality in aerial warfare contradicts every known military planning principle.
The allegation of “poor preparation and training” during earlier operations, specifically referencing the Balakot air strikes, ignores the precision, professionalism, and strategic discipline demonstrated during that mission. The operation achieved desired political-military objectives without provoking uncontrolled escalation or international backlash — an outcome that can only emerge from exceptional planning, rehearsed coordination, and high pilot skill. The deliberate misinformation campaign later undertaken by Pakistan to conceal the actual damage sustained further underscores the effectiveness of the IAF’s execution.
The assertion that Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missiles, drones, and Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) systems render manned aircraft obsolete does not hold ground. This is very likely to be proved as we move into the 1935s, though this argument collapses at this moment when confronted with the global trend among advanced air powers. The United States, possessing unmatched superiority in unmanned and network-centric systems, continues to invest heavily in next-generation manned fighters like the F-35 Lightning II, the B-21 Raider stealth bomber, and the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) programme — each of which will operate alongside, not instead of, unmanned assets.
Air combat remains an inherently cognitive domain requiring human intuition, adaptability, and ethical judgement — qualities no artificial system currently replicates. If conventional dogfights were truly obsolete, there would be no reason for the F-35 to retain a gun pod while carrying Meteor-class long-range missiles.
Air power, at its core, is about layered capability — where manned and unmanned assets combine in mutually reinforcing roles. Drones and autonomous systems extend range, persistence, and surveillance; manned fighters deliver the rapid, flexible, multi-domain decision-making that machines cannot. Only a balanced force structure fulfils national requirements. Suggesting a purely unmanned or missile-dominated paradigm not only ignores the evolving hybrid nature of warfare but risks undermining the very foundations of deterrence credibility.
A casual analogy with US and Chinese theatre command structures also reflects conceptual carelessness. The American and Chinese theatrisation models function in geostrategic contexts vastly different from India’s. Each of their theatres addresses distinct geographic expanses separated by oceans or extensive buffer zones. A simultaneous multi-theatre war is strategically improbable for those nations. By contrast, India’s northern and western theatres are contiguous, interdependent, and likely to become active simultaneously in the event of a two-front conflict. Blindly transplanting foreign models without considering this geographic and geopolitical uniqueness contradicts the very logic of theatrisation, whose essence lies in optimising command for realistic war scenarios — not in administrative experimentation. For India, balanced integration must enhance coordination without diluting specialised domain expertise.
Armed forces remain instruments of national power, not targets for rhetorical assaults. Constructive debate strengthens institutions; unsubstantiated generalisations corrode public trust in the guardians of national sovereignty. The IAF’s record of professional evolution — from analogue cockpits to networked combat systems, from regional air defence to multi-domain integration — reflects adaptability, discipline, and foresight. Its role in humanitarian operations, joint exercises, and indigenous innovation further underscores its strategic maturity and institutional integrity.
To attribute every challenge of modernisation or inter-service coordination solely to the Air Force is intellectually dishonest and professionally unfair. National defence is a composite enterprise where every service, every civilian agency, and the national industrial base share responsibility. Blaming one arm of the defence apparatus for systemic complexities only weakens the collective resolve essential for credible deterrence.
Sound strategic analysis demands balance, evidence, and respect for institutional ethos. Casting aspersions on the integrity and competence of an entire service demeans not only its personnel but also the very standards of military discourse. The IAF, through its evolution, modernisation, and professional conduct, has consistently upheld the highest traditions of national service. To question its moral and operational foundations without substantiated evidence is not critical scholarship — it is poor taste dressed as commentary, and it contributes nothing to the cause of serious defence analysis.
No comments:
Post a Comment