THE TSUNAMI THAT NEVER BROKE

 THE INVISIBLE NAVAL DETERRENT

 Air Marshal Raghunath Nambiar PVSM AVSM VM & BAR VSM (Ret'd)

As an Indian Air Force veteran, I couldn’t help but roll my eyes at Admiral Arun Prakash’s love letter to the Indian Navy’s Operation Sindoor, as published in his grandiose article, 'Indian Navy stood tall in Operation Sindoor'. The admiral paints a picture of naval might so dazzling you’d think the Arabian Sea was hosting a fireworks show. But let’s cut through the nautical fanfare and get real—while the Navy was busy flexing its 'non-contact warfare' muscles, the Indian Air Force could’ve done the same job faster, quieter, and without all the splashy theatrics.

The article’s obsession with “maritime domain awareness” and “situational awareness” is almost comical. Satellites, aircraft, coastal radars—does the Navy think the Air Force is flying blind? Our AWACS and ISR platforms have been stitching together real-time battle pictures since before the Navy’s BrahMos missiles were more than a PowerPoint slide. And let’s not kid ourselves about the Pakistan Navy cowering in their harbours. They didn’t “venture forth” during Operation Sindoor? Maybe they just didn’t see the point in playing hide-and-seek with a carrier group flexing in international waters north of Mumbai, far from any real threat.

Then there’s the ‘de facto blockade’ south of Karachi, complete with ‘live missile firing drills’ to show off ‘crew readiness’. Sounds more like an expensive photo-op than a strategic masterstroke. If the goal was to disrupt Pakistan’s maritime trade, where’s the evidence of actual economic impact? A few ships delayed at Karachi or Port Qasim? The Air Force could’ve cratered a runway or two and achieved the same psychological effect, probably faster and with less fuel burned. Admiral Prakash calls the Navy the ‘Silent Service’, but this article is anything but silent—it’s practically shouting from the rooftops. Meanwhile, the IAF quietly maintained air superiority, conducted interdiction missions, and kept the adversary guessing without needing to publish a manifesto about it.

Operation Sindoor might’ve looked good on paper, but let’s not confuse a naval pageant with decisive military impact. The real work of keeping the enemy in check happened this time in the skies, where the IAF has been setting the pace for decades. Nice try, Navy, but maybe you should stick to ruling the waves and leave the heavy lifting to us flyboys.

THE INDIAN NAVY AND OP SINDOOR

 The Indian Navy’s Role and Impact in Operation Sindoor: Historical Precedents and Future Imperatives

Capt Sarabjeet S Parmar (Ret'd) | May 30, 2025

India’s Operation Sindoor deployed 36 naval ships, including a Carrier Battle Group, establishing surveillance and de facto blockade along Pakistan’s coast. Following India’s new “any attack equals act of war” policy, the Indian Navy is shifting from a passive quasi-deterrence to active compellence strategy, requiring faster response times and potentially earlier escalation in future Pakistan conflicts.

The success of the Indian Navy in 1971, along with the two later deployments during Op Talwar in 1999 and Op Parakram in 2002, have established a template that—with appropriate changes based on political directives, prevailing security scenario and available technology and assets—can frame strategic-level planning and offer multiple operational-level deployment options.

This was evident during the Operation Sindoor tri-service briefing, where the Director General Naval Operation highlighted that the Indian Navy had maintained continuous surveillance and was ready to deliver requisite firepower when ordered. Though stationed abeam Surat, north of Mumbai, this surveillance extended across the entire Makran Coast of Pakistan, which features significant maritime infrastructure—mainly ports running west to east: Jiwani, Gwadar, Pasni, Ormara, Karachi, and Port Qasim—as well as critical energy and connectivity assets. Such surveillance monitors ships and aircraft movements, essentially from the Pakistan Navy and Air Force, as well as Pakistani maritime and coastal shipping. This, in turn, provides a high level of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and targeting information for conducting maritime strikes against both maritime and land targets.

While Karachi was viewed as the main target by many media outlets and analysts, and rightfully so, there are other targets that add to the degradation of Pakistan’s military and economic capabilities. 36 Indian naval ships, including the Carrier Battle Group, were deployed. Hence, the firepower available, in terms of both ship- and air-launched missiles, would have imposed a significant toll along the Makran Coast.

             

The effectiveness of MDA and the operational reach were enabled by networked operations within the Navy and through joint coordination with the Army and Air Force—both of which are categorised as 'Operational Enablers' in the 'Strategy for Conflict'. This strategy also places the delivery of firepower under 'Force Projection' against designated legal targets, thereby conforming to the additional operational principles of 'Application of Force' and 'Strategic Effect'.

Major operations and employment of the India Navy are centered on “Sea Control”. The number of ships at sea, especially the Carrier Battle Group, supported by land-based maritime reconnaissance aircraft (such as P8Is and HALE UAVs), would have enabled the requisite degree of sea control. This was, of course, made easier by the absence of the Pakistan Navy in the areas of deployment.

The conduct of firing exercises in late April by both navies is a routine measure during times of high tension, signalling intent to use firepower when required, while also honing crew skills and procedures. That the exercises were conducted beyond each other’s maritime zones indicates restraint on both sides. Such an exercise is possibly a first for Pakistan, suggesting the Pakistan Navy’s active involvement in overall planning. In contrast, the Indian Navy has carried out several such exercises to demonstrate its intent. While the actual areas of Indian Navy operations may never be publicly known, it is reasonable to assume that deployed ships and submarines operated around designated attack points— potentially within Pakistan’s maritime zones, depending on onboard equipment and missile ranges. Consequently, the Indian Naval force established a de facto blockade, confining Pakistan Navy units to their harbors, proving the template and associated operational plans. It is important to note that an actual blockade is an act of war; thus, its imposition would be a deliberate and hence considered decision.

FUTURE IMPERATIVES

Policy shift on terrorism

First, is the change in policy against terrorism that ‘any attack on Indian soil will be considered as an act of war’. This could result in the India Navy being brought into action earlier than before—with maritime strikes on designated targets at sea along the coast, and potentially inland, or, over the coast.

This would expand the area of operations for both India and Pakistan, and the resultant escalation could expand into a full-fledged conflict. This policy shift would require re-evaluating and shortening the Navy’s response time, including the operationalisation of forward operating bases and logistical chains.

Failure of deterrence and the role of compellence

As deterrence has failed to contain terrorist attacks from Pakistan, compellence may become the preferred strategy. Doctrinally, the Indian Navy recognises compellence as a concept related to the use-of-force and hence includes it under the military role in its “Strategy for Conflict”. Incorporating actions that support compellence into operational plans is therefore straightforward. In the context of Op Sindoor, it has been stated that “the carrier group acted as a force for compellence”. The Carrier Battle Group and other deployed ships, supported by adequate logistics, can act as effective instruments of compellence.

Other dimensions

International sentiment must be accounted for, as maritime conflict in the region would impact global trade—especially shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb. Any restrictions on international shipping, whether due to blockades or military operations, would need to be formally communicated through exclusion zones or navigational area warnings, as outlined in the Indian Maritime Doctrine.

A future conflict with Pakistan, triggered by a terrorist attack, will require a re-calibration of operational plans—particularly in terms of intensity and design—so as to enable early conflict termination on terms favourable to India.

This article was first published in the Council For Strategic And Defence Research. It is available at this source: https://csdronline.com/blind-spot/the-indian-navys-role-and-impact-in-operation-sindoor-historical-precedents-and-future-imperatives/

GEN SHINGHAL ON OP SINDOOR

 INTER SERVICES Jointness was the game changer IN OP SINDOOR

Lt Gen Vipul Shingal on INDIA TODAY May 23, 2025

Efforts to braid the three services across all domains into integrated war fighting bore fruit in India's precise actions in Operation Sindoor.

Operation Sindoor, India’s calibrated response to the Pakistan-sponsored terror attack in Pahalgam, was characterised by precise and devastating strikes on Pakistani terror hubs and later on military infrastructure. One of the reasons for its successful execution was the very high level of jointness and integration within the three services, which was the result of a concerted effort led by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the HQ Integrated Defence Staff over the past few years. About 200 tasks and initiatives were identified for fostering jointness. These were distributed over eight clear domains—intelligence, logistics, training, capability development, communications, human resource, maintenance and administration—to be implemented in a time-bound road map.

Two parallel tracks have been at work. In one track, measures towards jointness have primarily been conceptual in nature, affecting changes in the cognitive domain, building understanding and confidence among the services. This has been made possible by picking the best practices of each service and fostering a unique joint culture aided by common planning and training, tri-service courses and cross-postings. In the second track, measures towards integration have been implemented by creating structures, networks, computer applications and protocols to enable synergy in application of combat power, communications, intelligence, logistics and administration. Formulation of the Combined Operational Planning Process, joint doctrines, integrated intelligence and communication network and establishment of joint logistics nodes have all contributed to operational efficiency and have been validated during tri-service exercises and war games.

The effectiveness of India’s Air Defence Umbrella was also due to the integration of the Indian Air Force and Indian Army’s operational networks.

Joint training has been the bedrock of this transformation, from cadets at the national level to the Defence Services Staff College at the mid-service level. For colonels and equivalents at the respective service war colleges, joint content, cross-attendance, and joint faculty have been enhanced, resulting in a deeper understanding of integrated war fighting, further cemented as one-star participants at the National Defence College. These measures have been augmented by the establishment of new joint service training institutions in areas like intelligence, cyber and unmanned aerial systems.

These efforts were a game-changer in the execution of multi-domain operations during Op. Sindoor. The empowered tri-services organisations, that is, the Defence Cyber Agency (DCyA), Defence Space Agency (DSA) and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) specialise in the new domains of cyber, space and information, respectively. Intelligence of the terror camps and Pakistani military sites was collated through the merging of multiple streams of intelligence fused under the DIA. Precision engagement of the targets was possible due to detailed satellite imagery coordinated by the DSA. The DCyA kept close watch over our cyber frontiers. The effective operationalisation of an Air Defence umbrella over the country was a result of the integration of two networks—the IAF’s Integrated Air Command and Control System and the army’s Akashteer, working seamlessly on the backbone provided by the tri-service Defence Communication Network. A coordinated response was also visible in communication through joint press briefings by the three directors general of operations of each of the services. ‘Victory Through Jointness’, the motto of HQ IDS, was on display during Op. Sindoor. Its unequivocal success vindicates the need for the Indian security structure to delve deeper into aspects of jointness and integration, indigenisation, capability development and capacity-building.

Lt Gen V. Shinghal is Deputy Chief at HQ, Integrated Defence Staff. He plays a crucial role in coordinating and integrating the Armed Forces, focussing on policy planning, force development and ensuring inter-service synergy.

This article was first published in INDIA TODAY Magazine, dated 23 May 2025.

WHY SHOULDN'T INDIAN PILOTS SEEK GREENER PASTURES?

 How Dare You Demand Market Wages?

A Rebuttal to India’s Plea at ICAO to Cage Indian Aviation Professionals

Oh, how the tables have turned! India, with its booming aviation market — poetic in ambitions and tragic in execution — has now taken its grievances to the august chambers of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The grievance? That skilled Indian aviation professionals — pilots, engineers, and technicians — have had the audacity, the gall, the unspeakable nerve to seek better pay and working conditions in foreign skies.

The very idea!

In a working paper drenched in bureaucratic self-pity and cloaked in righteous outrage, the Indian delegation paints a picture where global aviation is apparently being ruined by countries that dare offer Indian talent salaries competitive on the international stage. How dare Emirates, Qatar Airways, Etihad, Lufthansa, or any other airline lure away Indian pilots who have undergone years of rigorous training (often self-funded) and are now drawn by dramatically better pay, working hours, and respect?

Let’s Translate This, Shall We?

What India is really saying is: “We want to run one of the world’s fastest-growing aviation sectors — at global scale — but please let us do so by paying 2005-level wages, keeping pilots chained in endless notice periods stretching up to 6 months, and protecting our homegrown airlines from the consequences of their defective labor policies.”

It is amply evident that the problem isn’t that Indian airlines pay significantly less, run chaotic rosters, or burn out their staff. No. The problem is that those pesky, freedom-loving “Contracting States” are maliciously offering better working conditions to Indian professionals who’ve had enough.

How criminal.

The Tragicomedy of the ‘Orderly Conduct of International Civil Aviation’

One must applaud the sheer creativity of invoking the ‘orderly conduct’ clause from the Chicago Convention — an agreement meant to foster global cooperation — and twisting it to argue that Indian professionals should be held hostage in a market where their labor is undervalued and their wings clipped.

Apparently, pilots choosing where to live and work is now a threat to international civil aviation. Freedom of labour? Pfft. That’s only for IT engineers maybe, not for hard-working men and women who fly jets at 35,000 feet.

Where is this international code of conduct really headed?

Shall we also propose to ICAO that Canada, the USA, or Australia stop luring away Indian doctors, scientists, and tech geniuses, too? Maybe countries stealing Bangalore-based coders should face sanctions?

Of Course They’re Leaving — Why Wouldn’t They?

Consider the reality for an Indian pilot: You slog through flying school (on personal loans), claw your way up to a first officer position, and then wait years — in many airlines — to be upgraded to Captain. Pay? Often a fraction of what your colleagues earn abroad. Contract stability? Shaky, especially after COVID. Work hours? Let’s just say ‘hectic’ is an understatement.

Now cue foreign carriers who offer not only triple the salary but also:

        •       Predictable rosters

        •       Respectful HR policies

        •       Better insurance, benefits, and job security

        •       No bureaucratic fog or DGCA red tape

And suddenly, these professionals choosing to leave becomes a crime worthy of an ICAO investigation?

Airlines Want Labour Mobility — But Only in One Direction

The irony is so thick you could land a Boeing with engine failed on it. Indian carriers, many of whom benefit from global Open Skies agreements, happily fly abroad, recruit expat executives, and demand deregulation when it suits their expansionist narratives. Yet when it comes to their own employees exercising the same rights across borders?

“Not fair!”

They call it “poaching.” No, it’s called a market — one in which individuals sell their skills at the best price they can legally obtain.

Perhaps the real lesson here for Indian airlines is this: If you want to retain talent, pay them what they’re worth. You can’t grow an aviation superpower on the wages of a regional bus driver and then complain when your staff leaves you mid-takeoff.

DGCA’s Role — The Watchdog That Also Keeps the Workers in the Kennel

Instead of protecting the safety of aviation and ensuring airlines treat staff fairly, DGCA has often been a silent accessory to exploitative practices — from inordinate notice periods (up to 12 months, for some!) to opaque medical disqualifications and license renewals.

And now, it wants ICAO to bless a framework that could essentially restrict free movement of trained personnel, camouflaged as “orderly development.” What’s next? Aviation exit visas?

Final Descent — Into Absurdity

What India’s ICAO pitch reveals is less about foreign airlines “poaching” staff and more about a broken HR ecosystem unable to retain its own. It’s a cry for help disguised as a policy proposal — one that seeks to export a domestic inefficiency to the international level, and legitimize it through multilateral diplomacy.

Here’s a radical counterproposal: Maybe, just maybe, Indian airlines should treat their employees like professionals and not indentured labour. Pay them competitively, respect their time, and offer career growth — and they won’t need to look abroad.

Until then, no international code can plug the brain drain — because as long as aircraft can fly, so will the people who fly them.

Air Marshal R Nambiar PVSM AVSM VM & BAR VSM (Ret'd)

INDIA COMPLAINS ABOUT PILOTS LEAVING FOR BETTER JOBS

 

IS DISSECTING SHORT DECISIVE WARS IN PUBLIC WISE?

 WHY WAR LESSONS MUST STAY CLASSIFIED

Air Marshal R Nambiar PVSM AVSM VM & BAR VSM

Admiral Arun Prakash’s recent article, “After Operation Sindoor, Don’t Delay the Stocktaking,” has sparked widespread interest and lively debate. A decorated war hero and recipient of the Vir Chakra for gallantry during the 1971 Indo-Pak War, Admiral Prakash commands respect across military and civilian circles alike. His dual-service career in both the Indian Navy and Air Force lends weight to his strategic insights. However, his critique of the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) performance in the ongoing Operation Sindoor raises a fundamental concern: should lessons from an active military operation be publicly dissected?

While his observations stem from distinguished service and strategic depth, the public dissemination of such analysis—particularly mid-conflict—carries serious risks. As an IAF veteran, I find this deeply unsettling. Revealing operational insights, even with the best intentions, can inadvertently benefit adversaries. Worse still, it risks undermining the morale and operational freedom of our serving forces at a critical juncture.

The Danger of Public Debriefs

Admiral Prakash’s article essentially performs a debrief in public—an approach more suited to secure military settings than open forums. In classified environments, post-operation reviews are indispensable tools. They help commanders refine tactics and strategy through rigorous internal scrutiny. But when operational critiques are published in the public domain, they become treasure troves of information for hostile intelligence.

Modern warfare is not confined to battlefields; it plays out in psychological, informational, and cyber domains. Every detail—sortie rates, weapon choices, target patterns, or even apparent gaps—can be exploited to construct a revealing picture of our operational thinking. In an active campaign like Operation Sindoor, such disclosures risk shifting the psychological advantage to the enemy.

Seemingly minor details, when collated by hostile analysts, can become key intelligence. Past operations like Kargil (1999) and Balakot (2019) underscore the value of disciplined silence. Their success was rooted not just in combat prowess but in operational secrecy that kept adversaries guessing. The same ethos must govern Operation Sindoor.

Moreover, fixating on losses—whether aircraft, tanks, or personnel—harkens back to outdated metrics such as “body counts” or kill ratios, often irrelevant in modern strategic contexts. Victory today is measured in capability degradation, strategic leverage, and deterrence—not simply in numerical attrition.

Secrecy as Strategy

Operational security is not an impediment to transparency—it is a strategic imperative. Kargil and Balakot demonstrated the importance of need-to-know compartmentalisation. In both cases, critical lessons were internalised and applied effectively without media fanfare. The IAF’s ability to maintain the element of surprise was crucial to operational success.

Operation Sindoor demands similar restraint. The IAF has not officially acknowledged any losses—standard protocol during ongoing missions. Once operations conclude, the force has consistently shown transparency in reviewing and reporting lessons learned. Premature speculation or disclosure, however well-intentioned, serves no strategic purpose and risks giving adversaries a cognitive edge.

Instead of dissecting our own performance mid-conflict, public attention should focus on the gains: the rapid degradation of the adversary’s air force and military infrastructure within the first 90 hours of Operation Sindoor. That outcome, rather than our own attrition, should define public perception.

The “Need-to-Know” Principle: Military Security’s Bedrock

The IAF follows time-tested systems of internal review through secure briefings, war colleges, and classified reports. These forums transform operational experience into doctrinal evolution—away from prying eyes. The “need-to-know” principle is not designed to suppress discourse but to channel it constructively and securely.

Veterans like Admiral Prakash hold deep reservoirs of experience. Their wisdom is invaluable—within appropriate forums. Behind closed doors, they mentor the next generation and enrich our strategic institutions. But open analysis of current operations can inadvertently expose tactical or technological gaps, and sometimes reflect an understanding outpaced by new domains of warfare, such as network-centric operations or AI-enabled targeting.

Veterans must also respect that accountability and authority reside with serving personnel and elected leadership. The baton has been passed. Our successors carry the operational burden and must be empowered to do so without being second-guessed in the public eye.

A Call for Discretion

This is not a dismissal of Admiral Prakash’s right to express his views. His service is legendary, and his intention undoubtedly patriotic. But discretion is vital during active operations. Lessons drawn in the crucible of conflict must be protected—not broadcast. The strategic value of such insights lies in their application, not in their publication.

The legacy of Kargil and Balakot is not only one of bravery in battle, but also of operational discretion. Let Operation Sindoor follow in that tradition. Let us trust in the processes that have long guided the IAF and the government to assess, absorb, and act—at the right time, and in the right way.

Veterans have served with honour. Now, let us honour those who serve today—by giving them the space, confidence, and security they need to carry forward our proud military tradition.

AIR DOMINANCE TO THE FORE

 90 Hours of Dominance: The Decisive Role of the Indian Air Force in Shaping Modern Warfare

Air Marshal Raghunath Nambiar PVSM AVSM VM & BAR (Ret’d)

As an Indian Air Force Veteran, one reflects with immense pride on the unprecedented and decisive role played by the Indian Air Force (IAF) in compelling the Pakistani forces to seek a ceasefire a mere 90 hours after the initiation of full-scale offensive air operations by India. This swift outcome stands as a unique testament to the efficacy of Air Power in modern warfare and marks a significant milestone in Military History.

The catalyst for this telling robust response was the reprehensible murder of 26 innocent tourists in Kashmir on 22 April 2025, a heinous act targeting the Hindu community and demanding a firm, unequivocal and unforgettable answer.   

The Indian Air Force immediately brought its formidable capabilities to bear, deploying a potent combination of advanced aerial assets. This included the agile Rafale fighters, the versatile Mirage 2000s, the powerful Su-30 MKIs, the reliable MiG-29s and the trustworthy Jaguars. Each of these platforms played its predefined crucial role in the ensuing operations, showcasing the IAF's multi-faceted strike capabilities.

The sequence of these historic events unfolded with precision and intensity a fortnight later. Offensive air operations commenced on the night of May 6th/early morning of May 7th at 0115 hours, with pre-planned coordinated long-range strikes against nine identified terrorist camps located within Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. These initial strikes were aimed exclusively at terrorist infrastructure used to perpetrate violence against India and employed vectors such as the Hammer, Rampage, and Spice 1000/2000. The stated intent of India was to differentiate between the State of Pakistan and the state-sponsored terrorist entities funded and controlled by the Government of Pakistan.

Pakistan's retaliatory actions definitely resulted in attrition on the Indian side and caused the conflict to escalate. The IAF reacted with a technologically superior and strategically astute riposte. On the morning of May 8th, the IAF effectively utilised Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) such as the Harpy and Harrop loitering munitions. These assets proved instrumental in neutralising a significant number of Pakistan's Air Defence (AD) assets. Furthermore, the strategic employment of the S-400 Air Defence System against Pakistani aircraft at long ranges demonstrated the IAF's capacity to dominate the airspace and protect Indian assets while projecting power.

The pressure on the adversary was relentlessly escalated. On May 9th and 10th, the IAF executed strikes with long-range vectors. The Rafale aircraft, armed with SCALP cruise missiles, and the Su-30 MKIs, equipped with the BrahMos-A air-launched cruise missiles, conducted deep strikes at multiple enemy air bases with precision. These aerial attacks were complemented by strikes from land-based BrahMos missile systems, creating a multi-pronged assault that overwhelmed Pakistan's defensive capabilities.

The cumulative impact of these relentless and precise offensive operations by the Indian Air Force was undeniable. By 1535 hours on May 10th, the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) of Pakistan was compelled to request a ceasefire. The ceasefire subsequently came into effect at 1700 hours on the same evening. It is pertinent to note that the Indian Air Force, confident in its operational momentum and ability to further degrade the enemy's war-waging potential, was willing to continue offensive action.

The events of those 90 hours underscore the pivotal and decisive role of the Indian Air Force. It was the sustained and impactful application of air power, targeting critical enemy infrastructure and capabilities that directly led to the Pakistani establishment suing for peace in such a remarkably short timeframe. While broader geopolitical considerations and actions by other arms of the military played their part, the offensive air campaign was undoubtedly the principal factor that broke the enemy's will to continue the conflict. The IAF's ability to project power, achieve air dominance, and deliver precision strikes proved to be the linchpin of India's response, compelling a swift cessation of hostilities on terms favourable to India.

This operation will be studied for generations as an exemplary clinical demonstration of how strategic Air Power can shape the outcome of a conflict with unparalleled speed and decisiveness.

AIR MARSHAL RAGHUNATH NAMBIAR
PVSM, AVSM, VM & BAR (Ret’d) 

Air Marshal Raghunath Nambiar is an Experimental Test Pilot who has flown 52 types of aircraft, logging more than 5,200 flying hours. He has held numerous prestigious Service appointments in his distinguished 40-year career, ultimately retiring in 2019 as the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Western Air Command. He commanded No. 1 Squadron AF, flying the Mirage 2000 aircraft; was Defence Attaché of India in Israel; Air Officer Commanding of Air Force Station Jamnagar and Commandant of the Aircraft and Systems Testing Establishment (ASTE) in Bangalore, the IAF’s premier flight test organisation. He was awarded the Vayu Sena Medal (Gallantry) for his legendary exploits during the 1999 Kargil Conflict, a Bar to his Vayu Sena Medal for his pioneering work on the Tejas as well as the Ati Vishisht Seva Medal (AVSM) and the Param Vishisht Seva Medal (PVSM) for distinguished service of an exceptional order.

DID THE INDIAN NAVY TAKE PART IN OP SINDOOR?

 Indian Navy Stood Tall In Operation Sindoor

Admiral Arun Prakash (Ret’d) PVSM, AVSM, VrC, VSM  May 20, 2025

OPERATION Sindoor has served as a compelling demonstration of India’s growing military capabilities in several key areas. The technical means to acquire intelligence of targets deep inside the opponent’s territory; to strike them with long-range missiles with pinpoint accuracy — all the while maintaining a multi-layered, impervious air defence of its own assets. This capacity for waging “non-contact warfare”, using guided weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) without ground troops or air forces crossing borders, marks a paradigm shift in warfare.

In this context, maritime power has, historically, specialised in employing strategies that aim to achieve political objectives through their presence and “non-contact” force projection rather than by engaging in direct combat. Decades ago, Admiral Sergey Gorshkov (Commander-in-Chief, Soviet Navy, 1956-85) had described the perennial utility of naval power: “Demonstrative actions by the fleet, in many cases, have made it possible to achieve political ends without resorting to armed action, merely by application of pressure and threat of military operations.”

The Indian Navy’s (IN) 2015 maritime strategy offers, in detail, various options for potential force projection. These include maritime strikes with carrier-borne aircraft or long-range weapons like the ship-launched BrahMos, or the ship/submarine-launched Klub land-attack missiles. In order to apply ‘strategic leverage, including economic and psychological pressure’, the strategy also envisages disruption/denial of the adversary’s use of the sea for military purposes and maritime trade.

The IN, while drawing up its contingency plans for Operation Sindoor in coordination with sister services, would have taken note of Pakistan’s maritime vulnerabilities stemming from its geography, relatively limited naval capabilities and economic dependence on key coastal infrastructure.

Pakistan’s 1,000-km-long coastline, stretching mostly across the troubled province of Balochistan, hosts just a handful of ports. Of these, only Karachi, Port Qasim and Gwadar handle merchant ship traffic, while Ormara is a naval base and the rest are fishing harbours. Pakistan’s economy, already strained, relies heavily on maritime trade, mostly through Karachi and Port Qasim. Disruption of shipping traffic to and from these ports, even temporarily, can cause a significant impact on Pakistan’s economy, industry and military operations, apart from affecting public wellbeing and morale.

As far as naval strength goes, the IN is a diverse and substantial force organised into two fleets, each fielding an aircraft carrier and a cohort of missile-armed destroyers and frigates as well as fleet support vessels. India’s submarine force of nuclear and diesel-powered submarines is strategically deployed on both seaboards. The Pakistan Navy (PN) is relatively smaller and lacks many of these key assets.

While the IN aspires to play the role of a blue-water navy, with power-projection capabilities across the Indian Ocean and beyond, the PN’s focus is primarily on coastal defence and maintaining credible maritime deterrence against India through a strategy of “sea denial”. Although the past few decades have seen both navies growing in size and capabilities, the IN has managed to retain its significant edge.

In the 1971 war, India’s maritime power had played a key role in the outcome of the operations in both theatres of war. In the west, it had undertaken two attacks with ship-launched surface-to-surface missiles, inflicting attrition on the PN and heavy damage to the Karachi port, bringing its operations to a halt. In the eastern theatre, the IN’s carrier-borne aircraft had ranged far and wide over East Pakistan and inflicted heavy damage on ports, shipping and riverine traffic. The trauma of this conflict has lingered in the Pakistani psyche, and PN units did not venture forth during Operation Sindoor.

Today, a major advantage accrues to the IN from its comprehensive capability for “maritime domain awareness”. This is a dynamic framework that receives inputs from satellites, aircraft, UAVs, ships and coastal radars to compile a real-time operational picture of all activities at sea in the region. The availability of “situational awareness” on a 24x7 basis in all three dimensions enables the IN to keep track of the adversary’s moves and respond with alacrity to any suspicious activity. The PN lacks a similar facility.

‘Naval compellence’ has, historically, been a useful instrument of state policy to influence the behaviour of others and force an adversary to do something he does not want to do, or to stop him from doing something that he intends to do. This is achieved by the deployment of coercive sea-based forces, which may or may not involve actual violence.

During media briefings by the three armed forces, the Director General of Naval Operations announced that within hours of the Pahalgam terror attack, the IN had deployed a powerful task force composed of destroyers, frigates and submarines, led by the aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, in the Arabian Sea, south of Karachi. Posing a serious challenge in numbers and capability to the Pakistani fleet, this force established a de facto blockade, confining PN units to their harbours. Units of the task force are understood to have conducted live missile firing drills to revalidate crew readiness and ensure operational preparedness of units.

From its location in international waters, where it could have remained poised for prolonged periods, the IN carrier group acted as a force for ‘compellence’. Through rapid deployment and strategic positioning of overwhelming maritime power, India confined Pakistan’s navy to harbour, disrupted its maritime operations and reinforced its dominance in the Arabian Sea.

The IN task force had ample firepower to target ships, harbours and shore facilities with missiles having a range up to 300-450 km at sea. But the Navy, true to its sobriquet of the “Silent Service”, has not said so.

This article has been taken from the Tribune newspaper of 20 May 2025. It can be found at this source: https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/indian-navy-stood-tall-in-operation-sindoor/