FURTHER DEBATES ON OP SINDOOR

 AIR POWER AND OPERATION SINDOOR

There is considerable confusion in the air about the role of the Indian Air Force in Operation Sindoor. However, a close scrutiny reveals that it stems from the lack of proper understanding of the concept of Air Power.

To begin with, the assertion that the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was “fully ready and already airborne” waiting for the IAF lacks operational logic. I’m afraid I do not agree. Air forces do not achieve superiority through early airborne presence or “waiting in the air”; they do so through the intelligent orchestration of planning, timing, and mission effectiveness.

Air campaigns are designed around objective achievement, escalation control, and strategic messaging — not the theatrics of who launched first. The IAF’s conduct during Operation Sindoor must be viewed through the prism of strategic restraint and precise force application, both of which ensured that escalation did not spiral uncontrollably. To overlook this is to misunderstand not only the mission but also the fundamental tenets of modern air warfare.

Air campaigns do not occur in a technological vacuum; they are outcomes of years of threat assessments, acquisition policies, and force modernisation efforts. The IAF’s planning and execution are guided by a continuous evaluation of adversary capabilities, regional trends, and indigenous technology developments. Its emphasis on networked operations, precision munitions, and electronic warfare integration in recent years exemplifies the very opposite of technological blindness. Indeed, the same institution that seamlessly integrated indigenous platforms like Tejas, Akash, and Astra into the combat matrix cannot be dismissed as guilty of flawed planning.

Some people have made claim that the Number of Squadrons had “no role to play” in Operation Sindoor.

This assertion demonstrates a superficial understanding of force structure. The number of available combat squadrons directly influences operational flexibility, rotation capability, and sustainability during prolonged contingencies. Numbers are not symbolic — they define how many targets can be struck simultaneously, how many formations can remain on patrol, and how resilient the force remains under attrition. Attempting to delink quantity from quality in aerial warfare contradicts every known military planning principle.

The allegation of “poor preparation and training” during earlier operations, specifically referencing the Balakot air strikes, ignores the precision, professionalism, and strategic discipline demonstrated during that mission. The operation achieved desired political-military objectives without provoking uncontrolled escalation or international backlash — an outcome that can only emerge from exceptional planning, rehearsed coordination, and high pilot skill. The deliberate misinformation campaign later undertaken by Pakistan to conceal the actual damage sustained further underscores the effectiveness of the IAF’s execution.

The assertion that Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missiles, drones, and Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) systems render manned aircraft obsolete does not hold ground. This is very likely to be proved as we move into the 1935s, though this argument collapses at this moment when confronted with the global trend among advanced air powers. The United States, possessing unmatched superiority in unmanned and network-centric systems, continues to invest heavily in next-generation manned fighters like the F-35 Lightning II, the B-21 Raider stealth bomber, and the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) programme — each of which will operate alongside, not instead of, unmanned assets.

Air combat remains an inherently cognitive domain requiring human intuition, adaptability, and ethical judgement — qualities no artificial system currently replicates. If conventional dogfights were truly obsolete, there would be no reason for the F-35 to retain a gun pod while carrying Meteor-class long-range missiles.

Air power, at its core, is about layered capability — where manned and unmanned assets combine in mutually reinforcing roles. Drones and autonomous systems extend range, persistence, and surveillance; manned fighters deliver the rapid, flexible, multi-domain decision-making that machines cannot. Only a balanced force structure fulfils national requirements. Suggesting a purely unmanned or missile-dominated paradigm not only ignores the evolving hybrid nature of warfare but risks undermining the very foundations of deterrence credibility.

A casual analogy with US and Chinese theatre command structures also reflects conceptual carelessness. The American and Chinese theatrisation models function in geostrategic contexts vastly different from India’s. Each of their theatres addresses distinct geographic expanses separated by oceans or extensive buffer zones. A simultaneous multi-theatre war is strategically improbable for those nations. By contrast, India’s northern and western theatres are contiguous, interdependent, and likely to become active simultaneously in the event of a two-front conflict. Blindly transplanting foreign models without considering this geographic and geopolitical uniqueness contradicts the very logic of theatrisation, whose essence lies in optimising command for realistic war scenarios — not in administrative experimentation. For India, balanced integration must enhance coordination without diluting specialised domain expertise.

Armed forces remain instruments of national power, not targets for rhetorical assaults. Constructive debate strengthens institutions; unsubstantiated generalisations corrode public trust in the guardians of national sovereignty. The IAF’s record of professional evolution — from analogue cockpits to networked combat systems, from regional air defence to multi-domain integration — reflects adaptability, discipline, and foresight. Its role in humanitarian operations, joint exercises, and indigenous innovation further underscores its strategic maturity and institutional integrity.

To attribute every challenge of modernisation or inter-service coordination solely to the Air Force is intellectually dishonest and professionally unfair. National defence is a composite enterprise where every service, every civilian agency, and the national industrial base share responsibility. Blaming one arm of the defence apparatus for systemic complexities only weakens the collective resolve essential for credible deterrence.

Sound strategic analysis demands balance, evidence, and respect for institutional ethos. Casting aspersions on the integrity and competence of an entire service demeans not only its personnel but also the very standards of military discourse. The IAF, through its evolution, modernisation, and professional conduct, has consistently upheld the highest traditions of national service. To question its moral and operational foundations without substantiated evidence is not critical scholarship — it is poor taste dressed as commentary, and it contributes nothing to the cause of serious defence analysis.

LESSONS LEARNT FROM OP SINDOOR

THE PRIMACY OF AIR POWER

Air Marshal R Nambiar PVSM, AVSM, VM & BAR (Ret’d)

My in-depth analysis of and response to the article by Vice Admiral Harinder Singh (Ret’d) in The Tribune of 18 October, 2025, viz., The Lessons Not Learnt From Op Sindoor, has evoked varied responses from certain quarters. The principal issues raised are:

• Long-range vectors and missiles in future combat.
• An integrated HQ to control them.

The neo-strategists are querying the rationale that it should be the exclusive privilege of the IAF to address both issues while retaining absolute command and control thereof. Surely the Army or Navy can handle the above tasks, implying that the concept of an integrated headquarters to control them is more than possible without being held “hostage” by the IAF. This may also be an oblique reference to the supposed intransigence shown by the IAF in accepting the Theatre Command proposal advocated by the Army and Navy.

As an IAF veteran with years in aerospace operations, I have witnessed firsthand how Air Power evolves and integrates into joint warfare. The question of why the Army or Navy could not handle these functions may, prima facie, seem reasonable. After all, we are part of the same tri-service team, each branch bringing unique strengths. However, long-range targeting and strike operations are not merely about possessing hardware; they demand a deeply ingrained skill set honed over a century of aviation history. The Air Force’s expertise in this domain traces its origins to the dawn of military aviation in World War I, refined through the massive air campaigns of World War II, and battle-tested in numerous operations since—from Korea and Vietnam to the Gulf Wars, and in India’s own conflicts, including 1965, 1971, Kargil, Balakot, and now Operation Sindoor.

This expertise is not transferable overnight—it is doctrinal, experiential, and highly specialised.

One must also consider the sheer speed and complexity of air operations. We deal with platforms moving at near Mach 1 speeds, not the 15-knot pace of surface forces. Aircrew undergo continuous rigorous training to master decision-making in this high-tempo environment, where rapid judgments on altitude, velocity, weather, and countermeasures determine mission success or failure. Long-range vectors and missiles require an intrinsic understanding of three-dimensional battlespace management—something ground and naval forces, with their largely planar focus, are not optimised for.

This is not a reflection on their competence; it is simply a matter of specialisation. If one needs an astronaut to navigate space, one turns to a test pilot who has pushed the envelope in flight—not a tank commander or a ship’s helmsman. It is that straightforward.

Long-range targeting is a complex blend of art and science, doctrinally embedded in the Air Force’s core competencies. It involves a seamless chain: target assessment through advanced Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance (ISR) assets such as Earth Observation (EO) satellites; Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), and AWACS; precise weapon-target matching; accurate delivery under contested conditions; post-strike damage assessment and concurrent electronic warfare to suppress enemy air defences. Add to this the intricacy of strike packaging—coordinating multiple assets for saturation attacks, managing fuel logistics, timing, weapon effects, and mid-mission adjustments. These are not skills one can simply “plug and play.” They are built through years of simulator hours, live training, and operational experience. Transferring such capabilities outside the Air Force risks diluting their effectiveness—akin to using a scalpel to chop wood. As airmen, we retain a degree of scepticism when air assets are subordinated to commanders with core competencies in surface force operations—not out of arrogance, but from hard lessons where improper application of scarce airpower resources and diffusion of control led to gross inefficiencies or significant operational losses. This is akin to the reluctance a neurosurgeon might feel if an ENT specialist were tasked with brain surgery.

These specialised capabilities underscore the IAF’s concerns about proposals like Theatre Command, as advocated by senior serving Army and Navy officers. The proposal has been vehemently opposed by IAF officers. Every CAS has unequivocally stated this is a bad idea. Perhaps they have a point. Maybe it’s time to listen to them. History offers many examples where a lack of centralised command diminished air power’s potential. Air operations demand unified air command to prevent fragmentation and ensure that long-range capabilities remain focussed on strategic priorities—particularly vital today, when the IAF has been reduced to under 25 squadrons with the phasing out of the MiG-21 and Jaguars due for retirement soon.

A Joint Operations Centre is certainly desirable under the CDS framework, but it must harness the specialised strengths of each service.

Ultimately, this is not a question of turf but of operational efficacy in future warfare. The way forward lies in genuine integration—where the IAF controls the skies, the Army dominates the land, and the Navy commands the seas—working synergistically under a truly joint architecture.

OPERATION SINDOOR: A NAVAL OFFICER’S MISFIRE ON AIRPOWER

 

AN ADROIT REJOINDER BY THE HERO OF KARGIL

“Operation Sindoor: A Naval Officer’s Misfire on Airpower”

By Air Tiger

In the wake of Operation Sindoor, India’s most sophisticated air campaign to date, one would expect thoughtful analyses from our military veterans. Instead, we are treated to a foghorn of confusion from Vice Admiral Harinder Singh (Retd), whose recent article reads less like strategic insight and more like a misguided attempt to fly a submarine through hostile airspace.

Let’s dissect his claims — line by line — and expose the intellectual vacuity and concomitant turbulence beneath the surface.

1. Prestige Platforms And Solitary Glory?

The Admiral accuses the Indian Air Force of clinging to “prestige platforms” and “solitary glory.” Apparently, investing in Rafales — aircraft with Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars, Spectra EW suites, sensor fusion and Meteor BVR missiles — is vanity, not capability. One wonders if he’d prefer we fight future wars with vintage Gnats and a prayer.

2. Pakistan Anticipated The Strike?

Yes, and still failed to prevent precision strikes on nine terror infrastructure sites. The IAF executed its mission with surgical accuracy, avoiding escalation and civilian casualties. That’s not failure — that’s textbook Air Power.

3. Rafale Downed?

Official briefings clearly indicate the entire strike package recovered to base. Even if a Rafale was lost, what’s the big deal? This was air combat, not a walk in the park. What must be remembered is the speed at which the PAF folded and cried uncle within just 90 hours of offensive air operations. Separately, the IAF has stated that long-range SAM engagements, including S-400 shots at extreme ranges, constrained PAF freedom of action, with 12 PAF aircraft destroyed. Debate the figures, but not the deterrent effect.But sure, if the Admiral insists let’s just pretend the PAF had a field day.

4.     Shift To Standoff Weapons

Correct—and prudent. Adapting to high-threat airspace with BrahMos, SCALP, and similar standoff munitions is doctrinal evolution, not retreat. The aim was precision effects without opening every ladder of escalation.

5.     Operational Shortcomings

Every Service has history to study. The IAF has publicly absorbed lessons from Balakot to Sindoor and is deepening AI-enabled intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), BVR doctrine, and safety culture. What needs to be remembered is that Balakot brought us six years of relative peace, despite the revocation of Article 370. The IAF’s transparency is visible in briefings, awards for specific units, and rapid remediation actions.

6.     Failure To Break Fighter Defences

The mission was to punish terror infrastructure and degrade enabling military nodes, not stage gratuitous within-visual-range Top Gun style dogfights. Effects on Command and Control, radars, runways, and logistics mattered more than airshow-style engagements.

7.     Disconnect Between Missiles And Fighters

This sweeping allegation demonstrates a clear misunderstanding of integrated air operations. Standoff missiles, fighters, Ground-Based Air Defense, Electronic Warfare (EW), and ISR were sequenced to suppress, strike, and assess in a single kill web. That is the point of joint air planning.

8.     Dogfights Are Obsolete

They are rarer, not extinct. BVR dominance is now the new normal in 2025; Meteor-class weapons, networked sensors, and EW give the IAF decisive reach while keeping pilots outside the densest threat rings.

9.     Lesser Aircraft With Superior Weapons

Weapons demand platforms with appropriate sensors, processing, self-protection and endurance to make them count. The Rafale and the Su-30MKI aircraft bring that ecosystem; one cannot bolt a Meteor to a basic airframe and expect parity.

10.   BrahMos Could Have Done It Alone

BrahMos was a key tool—and many of those strikes were air-launched. By Pakistani accounts, the Indian carrier group stayed near Mumbai and, at its closest, safely around 400 nm off Pakistan’s coast. The decisive effects in this window came from air-delivered precision and layered air defence.

11.   Why Invest In Expensive Aircraft?

This implied question betrays a singular lack of forward thinking and contemporary strategic overview. The said investment is essential because deterrence rests on credible, repeatable options across the spectrum—penetration, standoff, escort, suppression, and time-sensitive targeting. The mere availability of such options, albeit big-ticket, alters the adversary’s calculus before a shot is fired.

12.   Resistance To Jointness

The IAF has repeatedly asserted that it supports joint operations while insisting on clear command relationships and unity of effort—eminently reasonable conditions for complex, time-compressed missions. Jointness means common plans, interoperable C2 and rehearsed tactics, not token participation.

Invoking 1971 half-century-old episodes to judge 2025 is not a proxy for today’s force design. The relevant present is that the IAF leads in ISR integration, EW, precision strike, and air defence networking under contested conditions.

13.   Drumbeat Of Victories

Calling Sindoor a success is not chest-thumping; it reflects calibrated objectives achieved in days, validated by official citations and operational outcomes. Pride and professional self-critique can—and should—coexist.

Final Approach

Vice Admiral Singh’s article is a masterclass in misdirection—a naval officer critiquing Air Power with all the irrelevance of using sonar in a Mach 2 dogfight. His arguments are riddled with factual errors, strategic blunders, and a flawed grasp of modern aerial warfare. The IAF doesn’t need to “come clean.” It needs to keep doing what it did during Operation Sindoor: adapt, integrate, and dominate—from 300 km away if necessary.

The next step for the joint force is straightforward: harden ISR against third-party surveillance, tighten cross-service kill chains, and ensure maritime posture is visibly aligned with the tempo and aims of the air campaign. Until then, the airspace will be commanded by those who can sense earliest, shoot first, and remain unseen the longest.

AIR MARSHAL RAGHUNATH NAMBIAR
PVSM, AVSM, VM & BAR (Ret’d) 

Air Marshal Raghunath Nambiar is an Experimental Test Pilot who has flown 52 types of aircraft, logging more than 5,200 flying hours. He has held numerous prestigious Service appointments in his distinguished 40-year career, ultimately retiring in 2019 as the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Western Air Command. He commanded No. 1 Squadron AF, flying the Mirage 2000 aircraft; was Defence Attaché of India in Israel; Air Officer Commanding of Air Force Station Jamnagar and Commandant of the Aircraft and Systems Testing Establishment (ASTE) in Bangalore, the IAF’s premier flight test organisation. He was awarded the Vayu Sena Medal (Gallantry) for his legendary exploits during the 1999 Kargil  Conflict, a Bar to his Vayu Sena Medal for his pioneering work on the Tejas as well as the Ati Vishisht Seva Medal (AVSM) and the Param Vishisht Seva Medal (PVSM) for distinguished service of an        exceptional order.

NAUTILUS WAKES UP SIX MONTHS LATE

 

The Lessons Not Learnt From Op Sindoor
The Tribune, 18 October, 2025 

By: Vice Admiral (ret'd) Harinder Singh, former Deputy Chief of Naval Staff

DETAILED REBUTTAL

It would have been professionally educative if the three star officer had deemed it fit to explain to the nation as to why Indian Navy in 2025 does not have a single AIP enabled Submarine, while Pakistan Navy is nearing acquisition of AIP enabled submarine in double digits. He ought to have also expressed his pearls of wisdom about the future operational employment of ‘WHITE ELEPHANTS’ of the Indian Navy (as called by former Chief of Naval Staff Admiral JG Nadkarni at the time of acquisition of Admiral Goroshkov from Russia), the Aircraft Carriers. In any full blown conflict with Pakistan and China in future Indian Navy will have two distinct roles. First and obvious to fight and neutralize Adversary’s Naval Power but the second role would be more demanding and interesting; To protect the ‘WHITE ELEPHANTS’ from being sent to bottom of Indian Ocean or Arabian Sea and becoming an infungible asset.

Instead the former DCNS opted to narrate the shortcomings of sister service, the IAF. Indeed IAF and the other services require to upgrade not only their respective weapons but also the employment strategy from time to time. It is a continuous process.

His statements, some of which will be quoted below, reflect his extremely poor understanding of employment of Air Power. One must never breach the undefined red line while talking about other’s capability about which one has no clue since that was not her/his profession. For instance it is the specialists at ISRO, who are competent to decide the launch window, trajectory etc of rocket launch. Anyone else attempting to do that will obviously mess it up as the former DCNS has done deliberately and not inadvertently talking about IAF operational capability. It reflects on his poor inter-service grooming. Sadly he does not comprehend the meaning of words ‘MUTUAL INTER DEPENDENCE’.

His views in public domain castigating sister service is an outstanding example of professional profligacy. If indeed he wanted to advise the IAF, he ought to have written to present CAS and not in news paper to earn brownie points. Unfortunately he has unwittingly castigated the current CAS. Perhaps he has done it inadvertently due to poor command of language.

Few of his ‘pearls of wisdom’ (in black), in original as expressed by former DCNS are listed below with my comments. 

·        Yet the IAF’s reluctance to acknowledge operational shortcomings whilst it is claiming it won every war and skirmish since independence is not new---- ------.

By making such statement he has willfully acknowledged his total ignorance about IAF operations. I will quote just one out of the hundreds of outstanding accomplishment by IAF. He has no clue that J&K is part of India because IAF PILOTS FLEW OVERLOADED IAF Dakotas and  crossed the Banihal Pass and landed at Srinagar with brilliant and brave soldiers of our great Army. Western Air Forces, USAF in particular, still cannot believe that brilliant IAF pilots flew Dakotas well outside limits of performance successfully.

·        During Balakot airstrikes in February 2019 deploying outdated MiG 21-----

Such mention about one of the most versatile aeroplane reflects his total ignorance not only about the platform but also those, who were in charge of operations. By expressing his views about MiG 21, he has joined the club of unprofessional, who have called MiG 21 a flying coffin etc. I wish he had spent more time viewing Indian Navy’s submarine fleet capability during his tenure as DCNS. If he had done so Indian Navy will not be without AIP enable Submarines in 2025. Incidentally operations are under direct control of DCNS. Due to his lack of initiative National Security has indeed been jeopardized because Indian Ocean region is susceptible to attacks by Pak AIP enabled Submarines.

·        The loss of an IAF helicopter to friendly fire despite minimal aerial activity was unacceptable poor preparation and training.

.        He has obviously never heard of ‘FRATRICIDE’, an unwanted and undesirable event under hot war conditions. His mention of ‘minimal aerial activity’ further reflects his total ignorance about actual happenings in matter of few seconds.He ought to know thatnce a light bulb is meant to give light but it also produces heat, an unwanted product. Fratricide during HOT WAR conditions is akin to that.

·        If the IAF CLINGS to outdated notions of presige platformsand solitary glory, it will not only squander scarce resources but also compromise national security.

What a disgraceful comment/opinion about sister service as if IAF is any less patriotic than other services. It is a matter of professional shame that former DCNS decided to let such derogatory words appear as the centre piece of his professionally despicable write up.

·        Why invest in increasingly expensive aircraft that won’t cross borders or engage in close combat?

Yet another profligate statement reflecting his total lack of knowledge and understanding about employment of Air Power. Will the former DCNS educate the nation as to how a WHITE ELEPHANT costing INR 39,000 Crore defend the nation, when it cannot defend itself.

·        Air Chief is even now fighting a rearguard action to persuade the Raksha Mantri away from jointness.-----resist integration into joint theatre commands.

It is a sad commentary on professional grooming of former DCNS. He does not know that SERVICE CHIEFS are INSTITUTIONS not INDIVIDUALS. A mature professional would avoid such utterances about any serving or past Chief. He obviously cannot comprehend that decision makers are obviously not convinced about validity of utterly flawed Theatre Command concept propagated by first CDS. It is five years and counting but former DCNS and his protégé currently in chair are unable to contest IAF logic. Proposal of unified AIR DEFENCE COMMAND has already been thrown in the dust bin. Ist CDS wanted Air Defence Command to be set up by 30th June, 2020. Will the former DCNS tell the nation any instance under HOT WAR conditions, in which Indian Military faced adverse results due to lack of coordination. He obviously has no clue about ‘MEGHNA RIVER CROSSING’ during 1971 war executed by professionally competent and motivated IAF and Indian Army commanders without any SOPs in existence. Unstated precept of ‘mutual inter dependence’ is ingrained during NDA training. I wonder if he is ex NDA. If not, his utterances are understandable.

·        For decades, it (IAF) has operated in isolation, seeking accolades without offering mutual support to the other services.

His ignorance is unbelievable. For records during 1971 conflict IAF flew 6609 sorties of which 3243 sorties were for CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, a whopping 49%. I am shocked that he did not know such basics yet became DCNS.

·        Even the 1971 missile attack on Karachi went without air support.

Former DCNS is not aware of facts. IAF had already struck the refinery, Shahbaz airfield a day prior to Naval missile attack, one of the most daring feat by Indian Navy. Kindly read Cmde Ranjit’s book dealing with facts to educate yourself. Will the DCNS also tell the nation that naval missile boats struck Karachi Harbour in pitch dark conditions. PAF could have done nothing to retaliate. In fact burning flames of oil tanks was the guide to naval boats to aim the missiles. Even  subsequent IAF strikes used the flames as target identification.

·        The IAF has often been accused of overstating its achievement while underplaying its lapses.

In short former DCNS has breached all standards of morality, both professional and personal, by calling IAF as a LIAR. For his info; Only a LIAR calles someone else a LIAR without substantive proof.

·        It is time for the IAF and its leadership to be held to account.

It is time the former DCNS did self appreciation instead of maligning sister service, a despicable act of professional immaturity and ignorance.

·        They must come clean-not just about the causes of recent setbacks and what they plan to do about it.

Former DCNS needs to come clean as to how and why he wrote such professionally unwarranted piece full of lies and wrong facts. Former DCNS must not worry about IAF operations because IAF has been and is in extremely competent hands and does not practice maligning sister service. Anyone maligning a sister service is unfit to be called a soldier.

Vice Admiral Harinder Singh sought premature release as FOC-in-C. I cannot recall if any C-in-C LEVEL officer from Army and IAF sought premature release, grounds notwithstanding. I always believed Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat was not wrong in not accepting him as DCNS. Vice Admiral Harinder Singh has confirmed it by writing this article. No one can denigrate a service and get away. It is unfortunate that former DCNS did not learn this basic etiquette. It is never too late to learn.

Gp Capt TP Srivastava
Former Director
Ministry of Defence
18 October, 2025

Copied verbatim 

THE ENIGMA THAT IS CALLED PAKISTAN

 HAS PAKISTAN BEEN A CIVILIAN OR A MILITARY STATE SINCE INDEPENDENCE?

The history of the modern-day military of Pakistan began in 1947, when that country achieved its independence as a modern nation. Since creation, Pakistan has been under a military dictatorship spanning a total of 34 years. When not directly in power, the military elite has engaged in hybrid regimes, overtly exerting considerable influence on civilian governments from behind the scenes. The military thus continues to hold a significant place in the evolution of Pakistan as a Nation State, playing a significant role in the Pakistani establishment and the shaping of the country.

Pakistan was founded as a democracy after independence from the British Raj but the military has remained one of the country's most powerful institutions and has on multiple occasions overthrown democratically elected civilian governments on the basis of mismanagement and corruption. Their rise to power is linked to cultivating a collective ethos that portrays politics as inherently corrupt, while positioning themselves as the sole bastion of honesty, discipline and nationalism.

Amid the ever-changing political landscape, the only permanent force is the military establishment, while the political parties only coexist to share power with it. As a result, successive civilian governments have made sure that the military was consulted before they took key decisions, especially when those decisions related to the Kashmir conflict and foreign policy. They are painfully aware that the military has slipped into the political arena through coup d'état to establish military dictatorships, and could do so again. Up to today, no civilian Prime Minister has ever completed his tenure!

On 22 Nov 2022, Pakistan’s outgoing Army Chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, accepted in his last address as Army Chief that the military had routinely, even unlawfully, meddled in politics for decades and declared that it will no longer do so. He was criticised roundly across the globe, and most vocally so by the Prime Minister who gave him a three-year extension of tenure in 2019, Imran Khan, only to be ousted and jailed, where he is still languishing. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif then appointed Lieutenant General Syed Asim Munir Ahmad Shah, a former Director-General of the Inter Services Intelligence agency, or spy chief, as Bajwa’s successor in the rank of General. On 20 May 2025, General Munir was promoted to Field Marshal, becoming the second to reach the rank in Pakistan's history after FM Ayub Khan and only person to serve office of the Chief of Army Staff with Field Marshal rank. As it stands, the Field Marshal exerts considerable clout in Pakistan and global media is abuzz with speculation that a coup is in the offing, given that Pakistan’s economy is in trouble and the political instability in the country is at an all time high.

THE KARGIL WAR 1999

Prelude: The Siachen Glacier – the world's highest battlefield–holds significant strategic importance for India, primarily due to its location overlooking key areas and routes. It acts as a buffer against potential threats from Pakistan and China in the context of the disputed Gilgit-Baltistan region and the Shaksgam Valley, which was illegally ceded to China by Pakistan. The glacier's control provides India with access to vital water resources and the ability to monitor movements along the border areas, like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

In 1984, the Siachen Glacier, under the illegal control of Pakistan since 1965 was re-occupied by India after Operation Meghdoot. India took control of the 76-kilometre-long (47 mi) Siachen Glacier and its tributary glaciers, as well as all the main passes and heights of the Saltoro Ridge immediately west of the glacier, including Sia La, Bilafond La, and Gyong La. India established a military base there that it maintains at a cost of more than US$1 million per day. Pakistan tried in 1987 and 1989 to retake the whole glacier but was unsuccessful. Even so, preparations were not abandoned, but continued on a small but steady scale, hidden among military exercises. It still holds two posts that overlook five km of the Glacier, forcing all Indian helicopters to route around the posts to preclude the use of small arms fire and the Stinger SAM.

The Betrayal: At the onset of 1999, General Pervez Musharraf’s name held little recognition beyond Pakistan. However, by the year’s end, he had skyrocketed to global notoriety. He became the central figure in igniting a conflict between two nuclear-armed nations and subsequently orchestrated a coup to seize power domestically, becoming Pakistan’s first military dictator since Gen. Zia-Ul-Haq. He had, however, begun his silent machinations in late 1998 as the chief of Army Staff and, later, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Gen. Musharraf planned to use to his advantage the fact that some months earlier, both India and Pakistan had conducted nuclear tests. Pakistan believed that it now had a working nuclear deterrent; once it had taken the Kargil hills, he gambled that the international community, fearing a nuclear war, would urge a secession of hostilities. Pakistan would emerge with an improved tactical advantage along the LOC and bring the Siachen Glacier conflict to the forefront of international resolution.

Gen. Musharraf began clandestinely reinforcing the groundwork for a bold military incursion across the Kargil border. In February 1999, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee of India was invited by his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, to Pakistan on a pioneering journey toward peace and warmly received. Unbeknownst to the Sharif government, preparations for an invasion were underway. Musharraf’s actions would soon shatter the optimism of the peace mission, transforming it from a historic mission to a footnote in history. He thrust Sharif into a conflict he could not disavow and pushed Vajpayee into a confrontation he could not avoid.

Musharraf had serious confrontations and became involved in altercations with other senior officers, Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Fasih Bokhari, Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal PQ Mehdi and senior Lieutenant-General Ali Kuli Khan. Problems with his lifelong friend, Air Chief Marshal PQ Mehdi also arose when Air Chief refrained to participate or authorise any air strike to support the elements of army operations in the Kargil region. The absence of the PAF left the IAF a free hand to operate at its own pace.

The Indians seemed to be a rather naïve lot. At the onset of winter, all Indian troops would withdraw to from their posts which would see murderous -40°C temperatures to warmer climes, returning to their posts only starting early April at the lower levels and early May at the inhospitable heights. Gen. Musharraf made full use of this naivety and started pushing his troops, in the guise of shepherds, into the Indian posts, carefully avoiding the lower posts as that could give the game away.

Some elements of the Pakistani SSG Commandos, Northern Light Infantry Forces and Pak Kashmiri militants planned to take over the abandoned Indian bunkers on various hills that overlooked the vital Srinagar–Leh highway that serviced the logistics base from which supplies were ferried through helicopter to the Indian Army at the top of the Siachen Glacier.

The Indian military apparatus got their intel inputs routinely, but these were dismissed as routine sheep herder movements. The Indian Air Force also provided Elint that Pakistani radio activity had increased, but the Army brushed it off. This was while Operation Ibex was underway in Siachen Feb – May 1989. In February Indian troops launched an attack on Pakistani positions there and, after an initial reversal, launched an artillery attack on Kauser Base, the Pakistani logistical node in the area and successfully destroyed it. The destruction of Kauser Base induced Pakistani troops to vacate their posts concluding Operation Ibex.

The Pakistani-backed forces, now including Mujahideens and local insurgents, took over the vacant bunker complexes around April and May 1999, but the winter snows had melted earlier than usual and an Indian reconnaissance team sent to inspect the bunkers was wiped out by them. The influx of regulars from Pakistan reached alarming proportions. The Indian Army Chief, Gen VP Malik, requested the Air Chief, Air Chief Marshal AY Tipnis for a few helicopter gunship sorties, suggesting that would be enough to seal off the influx route and evict the soldiers who had taken over the Indian posts. Tipnis refused, stating that the induction of the Indian Air Force would require Ministerial sanction and that Gen Malik was being overly optimistic, predicting that almost all helicopters would be lost to SAMs.

The Indian Army, as of itself, responded and massed a force of around 30,000 men to re-take the Kargil hills in Operation Vijay starting May 10, 1999. The Pakistani-backed forces were not fully prepared yet, needing another two to three weeks to meet their requirements of heavy weaponry, ammunition, food, shelter, and medicine. Given the undue uphill tasks, the Indians proved to be easy prey for the Pakistani troops who retained most of the heights in spite of continuous attacks. Two months into the conflict, Indian troops by sheer persistence had retaken most of the ridges that were encroached by the infiltrators; according to official count, about 25-30% of the intruded area and high ground had returned to Indian control, but at an inordinately high cost.

Even without PAF interference, the IAF had its problems, primarily the lack of targets identifiable by troop mobility and action. As winter withdrew, sunrise cast shadows in Kashmir's valleys from 8AM, when visibility was considerably reduced and targets could not be seen. Low clouds engulfed the ridges and peaks by 11 a.m. The window of opportunity was restricted to the three-hour period between 8 a.m. and 11 a.m., provided there was no drizzle. In effect, the Pakistani forces in that area knew they had to stay under cover throughout the morning and start hostile actions only after an early lunch.

The high-altitude environment presented unique challenges, including reduced aircraft and weapon performance, to which a surprise element had to be added, viz., the sudden launch of Stinger SAMs out of virtually nowhere. The Jaguar was impotent at height and the MiG-21 and MiG-27 were proving ineffective, particularly after additional restrictions were imposed following the loss of the three aircraft. In this time-frame, trig points were identified where the Pakistani soldiers had shrewdly used terrain masking and difficult to attack hill tops as assault points.

The best aircraft for this kind of Ground Attack at heights of around 15-20,000’ (4,500-6,000m) was the Mirage 2000. Their attack on Muntho Dhalo, their primary Logistics Camp at noon on June 16 had convinced the brass that the Mirage was indeed very potent and therefore, when the Litening Laser Designation Pod and Paveway Laser Guidance Kit combination was available to the Mirage fleet finally, and had proven itself capable of delivering bombs, it was but natural that the Mirage fleet would be tasked for all important targets. Muntho Dhalo was eviscerated with 24 x 250 kg dumb Spanish bombs dropped by four Mirage 2000 and proved to be the turning point of the war. 300 Pakistani personnel were killed at Muntho Dhalo.

The introduction of Laser-guided bombs dropped by the Mirage-2000 starting 24 Jun turned the war on its head. The first target chosen was the one that had proved to be the most difficult to attack, Tiger Hill. Thestory of that air attack is at this link. Within four days, all unapproachable targets had been destroyed and the Pakistani Army routed, with heavy casualties. The Indian Army made the most of this opportunity and quickly had the enemy back-tracking, which soon turned into a run for safe havens. Talks of a ceasefire began as early as 12 July, but Pakistani outposts, cut off from the main body and with no radio contact didn’t receive the news in time. Finally, Pakistan sued for peace on 26 July, a day celebrated in India as Vijay Divas.

 

 

THE TSUNAMI THAT NEVER BROKE

 THE INVISIBLE NAVAL DETERRENT

 Air Marshal Raghunath Nambiar PVSM AVSM VM & BAR VSM (Ret'd)

As an Indian Air Force veteran, I couldn’t help but roll my eyes at Admiral Arun Prakash’s love letter to the Indian Navy’s Operation Sindoor, as published in his grandiose article, 'Indian Navy stood tall in Operation Sindoor'. The admiral paints a picture of naval might so dazzling you’d think the Arabian Sea was hosting a fireworks show. But let’s cut through the nautical fanfare and get real—while the Navy was busy flexing its 'non-contact warfare' muscles, the Indian Air Force could’ve done the same job faster, quieter, and without all the splashy theatrics.

The article’s obsession with “maritime domain awareness” and “situational awareness” is almost comical. Satellites, aircraft, coastal radars—does the Navy think the Air Force is flying blind? Our AWACS and ISR platforms have been stitching together real-time battle pictures since before the Navy’s BrahMos missiles were more than a PowerPoint slide. And let’s not kid ourselves about the Pakistan Navy cowering in their harbours. They didn’t “venture forth” during Operation Sindoor? Maybe they just didn’t see the point in playing hide-and-seek with a carrier group flexing in international waters north of Mumbai, far from any real threat.

Then there’s the ‘de facto blockade’ south of Karachi, complete with ‘live missile firing drills’ to show off ‘crew readiness’. Sounds more like an expensive photo-op than a strategic masterstroke. If the goal was to disrupt Pakistan’s maritime trade, where’s the evidence of actual economic impact? A few ships delayed at Karachi or Port Qasim? The Air Force could’ve cratered a runway or two and achieved the same psychological effect, probably faster and with less fuel burned. Admiral Prakash calls the Navy the ‘Silent Service’, but this article is anything but silent—it’s practically shouting from the rooftops. Meanwhile, the IAF quietly maintained air superiority, conducted interdiction missions, and kept the adversary guessing without needing to publish a manifesto about it.

Operation Sindoor might’ve looked good on paper, but let’s not confuse a naval pageant with decisive military impact. The real work of keeping the enemy in check happened this time in the skies, where the IAF has been setting the pace for decades. Nice try, Navy, but maybe you should stick to ruling the waves and leave the heavy lifting to us flyboys.

THE INDIAN NAVY AND OP SINDOOR

 The Indian Navy’s Role and Impact in Operation Sindoor: Historical Precedents and Future Imperatives

Capt Sarabjeet S Parmar (Ret'd) | May 30, 2025

India’s Operation Sindoor deployed 36 naval ships, including a Carrier Battle Group, establishing surveillance and de facto blockade along Pakistan’s coast. Following India’s new “any attack equals act of war” policy, the Indian Navy is shifting from a passive quasi-deterrence to active compellence strategy, requiring faster response times and potentially earlier escalation in future Pakistan conflicts.

The success of the Indian Navy in 1971, along with the two later deployments during Op Talwar in 1999 and Op Parakram in 2002, have established a template that—with appropriate changes based on political directives, prevailing security scenario and available technology and assets—can frame strategic-level planning and offer multiple operational-level deployment options.

This was evident during the Operation Sindoor tri-service briefing, where the Director General Naval Operation highlighted that the Indian Navy had maintained continuous surveillance and was ready to deliver requisite firepower when ordered. Though stationed abeam Surat, north of Mumbai, this surveillance extended across the entire Makran Coast of Pakistan, which features significant maritime infrastructure—mainly ports running west to east: Jiwani, Gwadar, Pasni, Ormara, Karachi, and Port Qasim—as well as critical energy and connectivity assets. Such surveillance monitors ships and aircraft movements, essentially from the Pakistan Navy and Air Force, as well as Pakistani maritime and coastal shipping. This, in turn, provides a high level of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and targeting information for conducting maritime strikes against both maritime and land targets.

While Karachi was viewed as the main target by many media outlets and analysts, and rightfully so, there are other targets that add to the degradation of Pakistan’s military and economic capabilities. 36 Indian naval ships, including the Carrier Battle Group, were deployed. Hence, the firepower available, in terms of both ship- and air-launched missiles, would have imposed a significant toll along the Makran Coast.

             

The effectiveness of MDA and the operational reach were enabled by networked operations within the Navy and through joint coordination with the Army and Air Force—both of which are categorised as 'Operational Enablers' in the 'Strategy for Conflict'. This strategy also places the delivery of firepower under 'Force Projection' against designated legal targets, thereby conforming to the additional operational principles of 'Application of Force' and 'Strategic Effect'.

Major operations and employment of the India Navy are centered on “Sea Control”. The number of ships at sea, especially the Carrier Battle Group, supported by land-based maritime reconnaissance aircraft (such as P8Is and HALE UAVs), would have enabled the requisite degree of sea control. This was, of course, made easier by the absence of the Pakistan Navy in the areas of deployment.

The conduct of firing exercises in late April by both navies is a routine measure during times of high tension, signalling intent to use firepower when required, while also honing crew skills and procedures. That the exercises were conducted beyond each other’s maritime zones indicates restraint on both sides. Such an exercise is possibly a first for Pakistan, suggesting the Pakistan Navy’s active involvement in overall planning. In contrast, the Indian Navy has carried out several such exercises to demonstrate its intent. While the actual areas of Indian Navy operations may never be publicly known, it is reasonable to assume that deployed ships and submarines operated around designated attack points— potentially within Pakistan’s maritime zones, depending on onboard equipment and missile ranges. Consequently, the Indian Naval force established a de facto blockade, confining Pakistan Navy units to their harbors, proving the template and associated operational plans. It is important to note that an actual blockade is an act of war; thus, its imposition would be a deliberate and hence considered decision.

FUTURE IMPERATIVES

Policy shift on terrorism

First, is the change in policy against terrorism that ‘any attack on Indian soil will be considered as an act of war’. This could result in the India Navy being brought into action earlier than before—with maritime strikes on designated targets at sea along the coast, and potentially inland, or, over the coast.

This would expand the area of operations for both India and Pakistan, and the resultant escalation could expand into a full-fledged conflict. This policy shift would require re-evaluating and shortening the Navy’s response time, including the operationalisation of forward operating bases and logistical chains.

Failure of deterrence and the role of compellence

As deterrence has failed to contain terrorist attacks from Pakistan, compellence may become the preferred strategy. Doctrinally, the Indian Navy recognises compellence as a concept related to the use-of-force and hence includes it under the military role in its “Strategy for Conflict”. Incorporating actions that support compellence into operational plans is therefore straightforward. In the context of Op Sindoor, it has been stated that “the carrier group acted as a force for compellence”. The Carrier Battle Group and other deployed ships, supported by adequate logistics, can act as effective instruments of compellence.

Other dimensions

International sentiment must be accounted for, as maritime conflict in the region would impact global trade—especially shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb. Any restrictions on international shipping, whether due to blockades or military operations, would need to be formally communicated through exclusion zones or navigational area warnings, as outlined in the Indian Maritime Doctrine.

A future conflict with Pakistan, triggered by a terrorist attack, will require a re-calibration of operational plans—particularly in terms of intensity and design—so as to enable early conflict termination on terms favourable to India.

This article was first published in the Council For Strategic And Defence Research. It is available at this source: https://csdronline.com/blind-spot/the-indian-navys-role-and-impact-in-operation-sindoor-historical-precedents-and-future-imperatives/

GEN SHINGHAL ON OP SINDOOR

 INTER SERVICES Jointness was the game changer IN OP SINDOOR

Lt Gen Vipul Shingal on INDIA TODAY May 23, 2025

Efforts to braid the three services across all domains into integrated war fighting bore fruit in India's precise actions in Operation Sindoor.

Operation Sindoor, India’s calibrated response to the Pakistan-sponsored terror attack in Pahalgam, was characterised by precise and devastating strikes on Pakistani terror hubs and later on military infrastructure. One of the reasons for its successful execution was the very high level of jointness and integration within the three services, which was the result of a concerted effort led by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the HQ Integrated Defence Staff over the past few years. About 200 tasks and initiatives were identified for fostering jointness. These were distributed over eight clear domains—intelligence, logistics, training, capability development, communications, human resource, maintenance and administration—to be implemented in a time-bound road map.

Two parallel tracks have been at work. In one track, measures towards jointness have primarily been conceptual in nature, affecting changes in the cognitive domain, building understanding and confidence among the services. This has been made possible by picking the best practices of each service and fostering a unique joint culture aided by common planning and training, tri-service courses and cross-postings. In the second track, measures towards integration have been implemented by creating structures, networks, computer applications and protocols to enable synergy in application of combat power, communications, intelligence, logistics and administration. Formulation of the Combined Operational Planning Process, joint doctrines, integrated intelligence and communication network and establishment of joint logistics nodes have all contributed to operational efficiency and have been validated during tri-service exercises and war games.

The effectiveness of India’s Air Defence Umbrella was also due to the integration of the Indian Air Force and Indian Army’s operational networks.

Joint training has been the bedrock of this transformation, from cadets at the national level to the Defence Services Staff College at the mid-service level. For colonels and equivalents at the respective service war colleges, joint content, cross-attendance, and joint faculty have been enhanced, resulting in a deeper understanding of integrated war fighting, further cemented as one-star participants at the National Defence College. These measures have been augmented by the establishment of new joint service training institutions in areas like intelligence, cyber and unmanned aerial systems.

These efforts were a game-changer in the execution of multi-domain operations during Op. Sindoor. The empowered tri-services organisations, that is, the Defence Cyber Agency (DCyA), Defence Space Agency (DSA) and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) specialise in the new domains of cyber, space and information, respectively. Intelligence of the terror camps and Pakistani military sites was collated through the merging of multiple streams of intelligence fused under the DIA. Precision engagement of the targets was possible due to detailed satellite imagery coordinated by the DSA. The DCyA kept close watch over our cyber frontiers. The effective operationalisation of an Air Defence umbrella over the country was a result of the integration of two networks—the IAF’s Integrated Air Command and Control System and the army’s Akashteer, working seamlessly on the backbone provided by the tri-service Defence Communication Network. A coordinated response was also visible in communication through joint press briefings by the three directors general of operations of each of the services. ‘Victory Through Jointness’, the motto of HQ IDS, was on display during Op. Sindoor. Its unequivocal success vindicates the need for the Indian security structure to delve deeper into aspects of jointness and integration, indigenisation, capability development and capacity-building.

Lt Gen V. Shinghal is Deputy Chief at HQ, Integrated Defence Staff. He plays a crucial role in coordinating and integrating the Armed Forces, focussing on policy planning, force development and ensuring inter-service synergy.

This article was first published in INDIA TODAY Magazine, dated 23 May 2025.

WHY SHOULDN'T INDIAN PILOTS SEEK GREENER PASTURES?

 How Dare You Demand Market Wages?

A Rebuttal to India’s Plea at ICAO to Cage Indian Aviation Professionals

Oh, how the tables have turned! India, with its booming aviation market — poetic in ambitions and tragic in execution — has now taken its grievances to the august chambers of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The grievance? That skilled Indian aviation professionals — pilots, engineers, and technicians — have had the audacity, the gall, the unspeakable nerve to seek better pay and working conditions in foreign skies.

The very idea!

In a working paper drenched in bureaucratic self-pity and cloaked in righteous outrage, the Indian delegation paints a picture where global aviation is apparently being ruined by countries that dare offer Indian talent salaries competitive on the international stage. How dare Emirates, Qatar Airways, Etihad, Lufthansa, or any other airline lure away Indian pilots who have undergone years of rigorous training (often self-funded) and are now drawn by dramatically better pay, working hours, and respect?

Let’s Translate This, Shall We?

What India is really saying is: “We want to run one of the world’s fastest-growing aviation sectors — at global scale — but please let us do so by paying 2005-level wages, keeping pilots chained in endless notice periods stretching up to 6 months, and protecting our homegrown airlines from the consequences of their defective labor policies.”

It is amply evident that the problem isn’t that Indian airlines pay significantly less, run chaotic rosters, or burn out their staff. No. The problem is that those pesky, freedom-loving “Contracting States” are maliciously offering better working conditions to Indian professionals who’ve had enough.

How criminal.

The Tragicomedy of the ‘Orderly Conduct of International Civil Aviation’

One must applaud the sheer creativity of invoking the ‘orderly conduct’ clause from the Chicago Convention — an agreement meant to foster global cooperation — and twisting it to argue that Indian professionals should be held hostage in a market where their labor is undervalued and their wings clipped.

Apparently, pilots choosing where to live and work is now a threat to international civil aviation. Freedom of labour? Pfft. That’s only for IT engineers maybe, not for hard-working men and women who fly jets at 35,000 feet.

Where is this international code of conduct really headed?

Shall we also propose to ICAO that Canada, the USA, or Australia stop luring away Indian doctors, scientists, and tech geniuses, too? Maybe countries stealing Bangalore-based coders should face sanctions?

Of Course They’re Leaving — Why Wouldn’t They?

Consider the reality for an Indian pilot: You slog through flying school (on personal loans), claw your way up to a first officer position, and then wait years — in many airlines — to be upgraded to Captain. Pay? Often a fraction of what your colleagues earn abroad. Contract stability? Shaky, especially after COVID. Work hours? Let’s just say ‘hectic’ is an understatement.

Now cue foreign carriers who offer not only triple the salary but also:

        •       Predictable rosters

        •       Respectful HR policies

        •       Better insurance, benefits, and job security

        •       No bureaucratic fog or DGCA red tape

And suddenly, these professionals choosing to leave becomes a crime worthy of an ICAO investigation?

Airlines Want Labour Mobility — But Only in One Direction

The irony is so thick you could land a Boeing with engine failed on it. Indian carriers, many of whom benefit from global Open Skies agreements, happily fly abroad, recruit expat executives, and demand deregulation when it suits their expansionist narratives. Yet when it comes to their own employees exercising the same rights across borders?

“Not fair!”

They call it “poaching.” No, it’s called a market — one in which individuals sell their skills at the best price they can legally obtain.

Perhaps the real lesson here for Indian airlines is this: If you want to retain talent, pay them what they’re worth. You can’t grow an aviation superpower on the wages of a regional bus driver and then complain when your staff leaves you mid-takeoff.

DGCA’s Role — The Watchdog That Also Keeps the Workers in the Kennel

Instead of protecting the safety of aviation and ensuring airlines treat staff fairly, DGCA has often been a silent accessory to exploitative practices — from inordinate notice periods (up to 12 months, for some!) to opaque medical disqualifications and license renewals.

And now, it wants ICAO to bless a framework that could essentially restrict free movement of trained personnel, camouflaged as “orderly development.” What’s next? Aviation exit visas?

Final Descent — Into Absurdity

What India’s ICAO pitch reveals is less about foreign airlines “poaching” staff and more about a broken HR ecosystem unable to retain its own. It’s a cry for help disguised as a policy proposal — one that seeks to export a domestic inefficiency to the international level, and legitimize it through multilateral diplomacy.

Here’s a radical counterproposal: Maybe, just maybe, Indian airlines should treat their employees like professionals and not indentured labour. Pay them competitively, respect their time, and offer career growth — and they won’t need to look abroad.

Until then, no international code can plug the brain drain — because as long as aircraft can fly, so will the people who fly them.

Air Marshal R Nambiar PVSM AVSM VM & BAR VSM (Ret'd)