ODDITIES ABOUT THE KARGIL WAR

 WAS THE KARGIL WAR A MUSHARRAF CON JOB?

Former Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf died in Dubai on February 05, 2023 after a prolonged illness. The former military ruler, born in Delhi, passed away at the age of 79 after he was diagnosed with the life-threatening disease Amyloidosis, an abnormal protein growth in organs.

Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of Pakistan during the Kargil War, was losing popularity due to a perceived power grab and suspected corruption as his wealthy family grew richer. His acceptance of a perceived defeat led to a growing clamour against him, exacerbated by the fact that he was caught lying when he claimed Gen. Musharraf had gone to war without his approval; in fact, he claimed he wasn’t even informed. Substantial documentary evidence proved otherwise and it was no surprise that he was ousted from power in a bloodless coup on 12 Oct 1999 by the initiated by the military staff at the Joint Staff HQ working under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of Army Staff Gen. Musharraf. Gen. Musharraf declared martial law and took over as President in 2001.

Judging from the Feb 1999 Vajpayee—Sharif talks in Pakistan, war was not something that the Pakistani Government wanted. Musharraf feared that he would be removed by Nawaz Sharif, and therefore decided to launch a small scale and losing war to take up the government’s attention while he could devise a plot to make himself President of Pakistan. He selected Kargil, a geographically difficult area, as the battlefield which would gain international attention and keep part of the Indian armed forces occupied, while Vajpayee would focus on the blatant betrayal of his Feb. 99 talks. Admiral Bhokari wondered aloud about the sense of such an operation, hinting that it was pushed along with an ulterior and sinister motive.

The Pakistani population simply could not understand why the F-16 equipped PAF did absolutely nothing, while the Indian Air Force (IAF) carried out airstrikes and attacked Pakistani forces with gay abandon, defying basic military logic to the point of tacitly permitting the conflict to fail. Was this an attempt to demoralise the Armed Forces and sully the local and global standing of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, while ensuring the conflict would stay below a predetermined threshold?

The employment of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) in an area which would need heavy artillery and ground to air weaponry and ancillary support further compounded the issue. Was this a repeat of Cardigan’s Light Brigade tactics? Such a deployment sans adequate support, infrastructure or special provisions would expose the NLI’s belly, rendering them highly vulnerable with limited capability on an unfamiliar battlefield and busy trying to sort out their own difficulties.

As India Today reported, Admiral Bokhari , the Chief of Naval Staff in 1999 demanded a full-fledged joint-service court martial against General Musharraf, while on the other hand, General Kuli Khan, the Chief of General Staff under Musharraf lambasted the war as 'a disaster bigger than the East Pakistan tragedy', decrying the plan as "flawed in terms of its conception, tactical planning and execution" that ended in "sacrificing so many soldiers." Gen. Musharraf’s coup and subsequent ascension to power put an end to all queries.

Pakistani documents reveal that a war in Kargil was always part of the Pakistani military strategy prior to 1999. Its implementation had been rejected by both political and military leaders on all previous occasions. Initially, it was discussed during General Zia’s regime, but Zia rejected the proposal as it risked leading to full-scale war with India. Later it was reconsidered but shut down on the same grounds, and it was reported that the proposal could only be implemented when Pakistan was ready for a full-scale war. In July 1996, the then Lieutenant-General Musharraf once again forwarded this proposal to Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, but was brusquely turned down. The devious Musharraf then waited for an opportunity to present itself.

The opportunity arose in 1998, when Pakistan conducted its first nuclear tests and India its second series, having first gone nuclear in 1974. Pakistan believed that it now had a working nuclear deterrent; once it had taken the Kargil hills, Musharraf gambled that the international community, fearing a nuclear war, would urge a secession of hostilities. Pakistan would emerge with an improved tactical advantage along the LOC and bring the Siachen Glacier conflict to the forefront of international resolution. However, he had to wait till he became the Pakistani Army Chief, a game of internecine power politics. He was appointed The Chief of Army Staff and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee in late 1988, superceding Admiral Bokhari. All pieces were in place. The result was the desultory Kargil War and yet another slap in the face of Pakistan.

As Dheemant Anil neatly sums up in his April 26, 2024 article on the Gen. Musharraf and the Kargil War published by Nickeled and Dimed, the Kargil conflict of 1999 presents a complex maze of political stratagems, military machination and personal ambition. General Musharraf’s manipulation of the conflict, ostensibly designed to consolidate his power within Pakistan, highlights the intricate maneuvering of key players in the region. The Kargil episode serves as a harsh reminder of how geopolitical tensions and internecine power struggles can collude to shape the course of history. Ultimately, it stands as a admonitory tale against the exploitation of military action for personal gain, emphasising the need for transparent and accountable leadership to navigate the intricate web of international relations.

Takeaways for the IAF:

• ·       High-Altitude Precision Bombing: The IAF demonstrated its ability to conduct effective, high-altitude bombing missions with unmatched precision at altitudes above 18,000 feet, utilising the Mirage 2000 jet fighter across its envelope.
• ·      Targeting Enemy Positions: The IAF struck enemy camps, supply lines, and ammunition dumps, effectively degrading their offensive capabilities and softening their defenses.
• ·      Avoiding Escalation: The IAF's operations were conducted without crossing the Line of Control, showcasing the potential of limited, targeted air strikes to achieve strategic objectives without triggering a wider conflict.
• ·      Support for Ground Forces: The IAF provided crucial support to ground troops through reconnaissance, escort missions, and casualty evacuation, flying over 2,185 helicopter sorties.
• ·      Adaptability and Resolve: The conflict highlighted the IAF's ability to adapt to a challenging operational environment and demonstrated its resolve in achieving its objectives.
• ·      Curtailing the War's Length: The IAF's decisive actions are credited with shortening the overall duration of the conflict.
• ·      Demonstrating Deterrent Value: The IAF's performance in Kargil established the deterrent value of calibrated air strikes, even in a limited conflict.
• ·      Electronic Warfare (EW) and Electronic Surveillance: The engagement also underscored the strategic need for Electronic Warfare (EW) and Electronic Surveillance capabilities. The IAF’s expertise in collecting real-time intelligence through aerial reconnaissance accurately identified the enemy coordinates and accordingly placed higher premium on augmenting the EW capabilities duly utilising advanced surveillance technologies, UAVs and satellite recce.
• ·      Foreknowledge about MANPADS: Timely intel about MANPADS used by the enemy helped the IAF aircraft to pre-empt the threats from ground fire. The conflict also put emphasis upon a robust Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) capability and strategies to elude and nullify such threats by taking recourse to better ECM and self-protection suites.
• ·      Augmenting the Night Operation Capabilities of the IAF:The conflict underscored the importance of equipping the aircraft with advanced night vision devices and targeting systems for effective operations despite poor visibility, type of terrain notwithstanding.
• ·      Principles of War: The swiftness and flexibility of IAF emphasised the indispensability of Air Power as the Primary constituent of modern warfare.
• ·      Inadequacy of the Aircraft Available: The conflict stressed the need for fleet upgradation utilising better platforms incorporating advanced avionics, weapon systems and EW suites.