THE LEAD UP TO OP SINDOOR

 HAS PAKISTAN BEEN A CIVILIAN OR A MILITARY STATE
SINCE INDEPENDENCE?

The history of the modern-day military of Pakistan began in 1947, when Pakistan achieved its independence as a modern nation. Since its creation, Pakistan has been under a military dictatorship spanning a total of 34 years. When not directly in power, the military elite has discreetly engaged in hybrid regimes, exerting palpable influence on civilian governments from behind the scenes. The military thus continues to hold a significant place in the evolution of Pakistan as a Nation State, playing a significant role in the Pakistani establishment and the shaping of the country.

Pakistan was founded as a democracy after its independence from the British Raj but the military has remained one of the country's most powerful institutions and has on multiple occasions overthrown democratically elected civilian governments on the incontrovertible basis of mismanagement and corruption. Their rise to power is linked to cultivating a collective ethos that portrays politics as inherently corrupt, while positioning themselves as the sole bastion of honesty, discipline and nationalism.

Amid the ever-changing political landscape, the only permanent force is the military establishment, while the political parties only coexist to share power with it. As a result, successive civilian governments have made sure that the military was consulted before they took key decisions, especially when those decisions related to the Kashmir conflict and foreign policy. They are painfully aware that the military has slipped into the political arena through coups d'état to establish military dictatorships, and could do so again. Up to today, no civilian Prime Minister has ever completed his tenure!

On 22 Nov 2022, Pakistan’s outgoing Army Chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, accepted in his last address as Army Chief that the military had routinely, even unlawfully, meddled in politics for decades and declared that it will no longer do so. He was criticised roundly across the globe, and most vocally so by the same Prime Minister who had given him a three-year extension of tenure in 2019, Imran Khan, only to be ousted and jailed, where he is still languishing. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif then appointed Lieutenant General Syed Asim Munir Ahmad Shah, a former Director-General of the Inter Services Intelligence agency, or spy chief, as Bajwa’s successor in the rank of General. On 20 May 2025, General Munir was promoted to Field Marshal, becoming the second to reach the rank in Pakistan's history after FM Ayub Khan and only person to serve office of the Chief of Army Staff with Field Marshal rank. As it stands, the Field Marshal exerts considerable clout in Pakistan and global media is abuzz with speculation that a coup is in the offing, given that Pakistan’s economy is in trouble and the political instability in the country is at an all time high.

THE KARGIL WAR 1999

Prelude The Siachen Glacier – the world's highest battlefield–holds significant strategic importance for India, primarily due to its location overlooking key areas and routes. It acts as a buffer against potential threats from Pakistan and China in the context of the disputed Gilgit-Baltistan region and the Shaksgam Valley, which was illegally ceded to China by Pakistan. The glacier's control provides India with access to vital water resources and the ability to monitor movements along the border areas, like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

In 1984, the Siachen Glacier, under the illegal control of Pakistan since 1965 was re-occupied by India after Operation Meghdoot. India established a military base there that it maintains at a cost of more than US$1 million per day. Pakistan tried in 1987 and 1989 to retake the whole glacier but was unsuccessful. Even so, preparations were not abandoned, but continued on a small but steady scale, hidden among military exercises.

The Betrayal: At the onset of 1999, General Pervez Musharraf’s name held little recognition beyond Pakistan. However, by the year’s end, he had skyrocketed to global notoriety. He became the central figure in igniting a conflict between two nuclear-armed nations and subsequently orchestrated a coup to seize power domestically, becoming Pakistan’s first military dictator since Gen. Zia-Ul-Haq. He had, however, begun his silent machinations in late 1998 as as the chief of Army Staff and, later, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Gen.Musharraf planned to use to his advantage the fact that some months earlier, both India and Pakistan had conducted nuclear tests. Pakistan believed that it now had a working nuclear deterrent; once it had taken the Kargil hills, he gambled that the international community, fearing a nuclear war, would urge a secession of hostilities. Pakistan would emerge with an improved tactical advantage along the LOC and bring the Siachen Glacier conflict to the forefront of international resolution.

Gen. Musharraf began clandestinely reinforcing the groundwork for a bold military incursion across the Kargil border. In February 1999, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee of India was invited by his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, to Pakistan on a pioneering journey toward peace and warmly received. Unbeknownst to the Sharif government, preparations for an invasion were underway. Musharraf’s actions would soon shatter the optimism of the peace mission, transforming it from a historic mission to a footnote in history. He thrust Sharif into a conflict he could not disavow and Vajpayee into a confrontation he could not avoid.

Both sides seemed to be rather naïve. At the onset of winter, all troops would withdraw  from their posts which would see murderous -40°C temperatures to warmer climes, returning to their posts only starting early April at the lower levels and early May at the inhospitable heights. Gen. Musharraf made full use of this naivety and started pushing his troops, in the guise of shepherds and disparate locals, into the Indian posts in the midst of winter, taking care to avoid the lower posts as that could give the game away. In 1999, the Pakistan Army started reoccupying the forward posts in January. In a preliminary step in their bid to capture Kashmir, they reoccupied not only their own posts, but also 132 posts that belonged to India.

The Pakistani SSG Commandos, Northern Light Infantry Forces and Pak Kashmiri militants were tasked with taking over the abandoned Indian bunkers on various hills that overlooked the vital Srinagar–Leh highway that serviced the logistics base from which supplies were ferried through helicopter to the Indian Army at the top of the Siachen Glacier. This would have given Pakistan a significant strategic advantage and disrupted India's supply lines to its troops in the Siachen Glacier area. Success here would demoralise the Indian troops, who would then look back at the Siachen episode as an exercise in futility, playing with their lives on the line. This would bolster, by default, the ongoing insurgency in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir.

The Indian military apparatus got their intel inputs routinely, but these were dismissed as routine sheep herder movements. The Indian Air Force also provided Elint that Pakistani radio activity had increased, but the Army brushed it off. This was while Operation Ibex was underway in Siachen Feb – May 1989. In February Indian troops launched an attack on Pakistani positions there and, after an initial reversal, took over and destroyed Kauser Base, the Pakistani logistical node in the area. The destruction of Kauser Base induced Pakistani troops to vacate their posts concluding Operation Ibex.

The Pakistani-backed forces, now including Mujahideens and local insurgents, took over the numerous vacant bunker complexes around April and May 1999, but the winter snows had melted earlier than usual and an Indian reconnaissance team sent to inspect the bunkers was wiped out by them. The influx of regulars from Pakistan reached alarming proportions. The Indian Army Chief, Gen VP Malik, requested the Air Chief, Air Chief Marshal AY Tipnis for a few helicopter gunship sorties, suggesting that would be enough to seal off the influx route and evict the soldiers who had taken over the Indian posts. Tipnis refused, stating that the induction of the Indian Air Force would require Ministerial sanction and that Gen Malik was being overly optimistic, predicting that almost all helicopters would be lost to SAMs.

The Indian Army responded quickly and massed a force of around 30,000 men to re-take the Kargil hills in Operation Vijay starting May 10, 1999. Actually, 200,000 Indian troops were mobilised. However, because of the nature of the terrain, division and corps operations could not be mounted; the scale of most fighting was at the regimental or battalion level. In effect, two divisions of the Indian Army, numbering 20,000, along with 10,000 from the Paramilitary forces of India were placed at active posts. The Pakistani-backed forces were not fully prepared yet, needing another two to three weeks to meet their requirements of heavy weaponry, ammunition, food, shelter, and medicine. Given the undue uphill tasks, the Indians proved to be easy prey for the Pakistani troops who retained most of the heights in spite of continuous attacks. Two months into the conflict, Indian troops had slowly retaken some of the vital ridges that were encroached upon by the infiltrators; according to official count, an estimated 25-30% of the intruded area and high ground had returned to Indian control.

To avoid escalation, the Government of India (GoI) cleared only limited use of Air Power on May 25, more than three weeks after first reports, with the instructions that IAF fighter jets would remain within Indian territory to launch attacks on intruder's positions within Indian territory and the IAF was not permitted to cross the Line of Control under any circumstance. The IAF started its strike role on 26 May 1999, in an exercise named Operation Safed Sagar. Evidently, the planners could have done better. They used the MiG-21 and MiG-27 in the attack role, both unsuited to the terrain and air defences. Between 27 and 28 May, the IAF lost two fighter aircraft—a MiG-21 & a MiG-27 —and a helicopter. 

Musharraf had serious confrontations and became involved in altercations with other senior officers, Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Fasih Bokhari, Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal PQ Mehdi and senior Lieutenant-General Ali Kuli Khan. Problems with his lifelong friend, Air Chief Marshal PQ Mehdi also arose when Air Chief refrained to participate or authorise any air strike to support the elements of army operations in the Kargil region. The absence of the PAF left the IAF a free hand to operate at its own pace.

Even so, the IAF had its problems, primarily the lack of targets identifiable by troop mobility and action. As winter withdrew, sunrise cast shadows in Kashmir's valleys from 8AM, when visibility was considerably reduced and targets could not be seen. Low clouds engulfed the ridges and peaks by 11 a.m. The window of opportunity was restricted to the three-hour period between 8 a.m. and 11 a.m., provided there was no drizzle. In effect, the Pakistani forces in that area knew they had to stay under cover throughout the morning and start hostile actions only after an early lunch.

The high-altitude environment presented unique challenges, including reduced aircraft and weapon performance, to which a surprise element had to be added, viz., the sudden launch of Stinger SAMs out of virtually nowhere. The Jaguar was impotent at those heights and the MiG-21 and MiG-27 were proving ineffective, particularly after additional restrictions were imposed following the loss of the three aircraft. In this time-frame, trig points were identified where the Pakistani soldiers had shrewdly used terrain masking and difficult to attack hill tops as assault points.

The best aircraft for this kind of Ground Attack at heights of around 15-20,000’ (4,500-6,000m) was the Mirage 2000. Their attack on Muntho Dhalo, their primary Administrative and Logistics Camp at noon on June 16 had convinced the brass that the Mirage was indeed very potent and therefore, when the Litening Laser Designation Pod and Paveway Laser Guidance Kit combination was available to the Mirage fleet finally, and had proven itself capable of delivering bombs, it was but natural that the Mirage fleet would be tasked for all important targets. Muntho Dhalo was eviscerated with 24 x 250 kg dumb Spanish bombs dropped by four Mirage 2000 and proved to be the turning point of the war. 300 Pakistani personnel were killed at Muntho Dhalo. The Air Marshal giving the Presentation in the video below and in the interview in the succeeding video features again when you go to the Post via the link in the para immediately below the videos.

          

          

The introduction of Laser-guided bombs dropped by the Mirage-2000 starting 24 Jun turned the war into a one-sided campaign. The first target chosen was the one that had proved to be the most difficult to attack, Tiger Hill. The story of that air attack is at this link. Within seven days, all difficult and unapproachable targets had been destroyed and the Pakistani Army routed, with heavy casualties. The Indian Army made the most of this opportunity and quickly had the enemy back-tracking, which soon turned into a run for safe haven. Talks of a ceasefire reportedly began as early as 12 July, but certain Pakistani outposts, cut off from the main body and with no radio contact didn’t receive the news in time and had to be neutralised. Finally, Pakistan sued for peace on 26 July, a day celebrated in India as Vijay Divas.