INDIA COMPLAINS ABOUT PILOTS LEAVING FOR BETTER JOBS

 

IS DISSECTING SHORT DECISIVE WARS IN PUBLIC WISE?

 WHY WAR LESSONS MUST STAY CLASSIFIED

Air Marshal R Nambiar PVSM AVSM VM & BAR VSM

Admiral Arun Prakash’s recent article, “After Operation Sindoor, Don’t Delay the Stocktaking,” has sparked widespread interest and lively debate. A decorated war hero and recipient of the Vir Chakra for gallantry during the 1971 Indo-Pak War, Admiral Prakash commands respect across military and civilian circles alike. His dual-service career in both the Indian Navy and Air Force lends weight to his strategic insights. However, his critique of the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) performance in the ongoing Operation Sindoor raises a fundamental concern: should lessons from an active military operation be publicly dissected?

While his observations stem from distinguished service and strategic depth, the public dissemination of such analysis—particularly mid-conflict—carries serious risks. As an IAF veteran, I find this deeply unsettling. Revealing operational insights, even with the best intentions, can inadvertently benefit adversaries. Worse still, it risks undermining the morale and operational freedom of our serving forces at a critical juncture.

The Danger of Public Debriefs

Admiral Prakash’s article essentially performs a debrief in public—an approach more suited to secure military settings than open forums. In classified environments, post-operation reviews are indispensable tools. They help commanders refine tactics and strategy through rigorous internal scrutiny. But when operational critiques are published in the public domain, they become treasure troves of information for hostile intelligence.

Modern warfare is not confined to battlefields; it plays out in psychological, informational, and cyber domains. Every detail—sortie rates, weapon choices, target patterns, or even apparent gaps—can be exploited to construct a revealing picture of our operational thinking. In an active campaign like Operation Sindoor, such disclosures risk shifting the psychological advantage to the enemy.

Seemingly minor details, when collated by hostile analysts, can become key intelligence. Past operations like Kargil (1999) and Balakot (2019) underscore the value of disciplined silence. Their success was rooted not just in combat prowess but in operational secrecy that kept adversaries guessing. The same ethos must govern Operation Sindoor.

Moreover, fixating on losses—whether aircraft, tanks, or personnel—harkens back to outdated metrics such as “body counts” or kill ratios, often irrelevant in modern strategic contexts. Victory today is measured in capability degradation, strategic leverage, and deterrence—not simply in numerical attrition.

Secrecy as Strategy

Operational security is not an impediment to transparency—it is a strategic imperative. Kargil and Balakot demonstrated the importance of need-to-know compartmentalisation. In both cases, critical lessons were internalised and applied effectively without media fanfare. The IAF’s ability to maintain the element of surprise was crucial to operational success.

Operation Sindoor demands similar restraint. The IAF has not officially acknowledged any losses—standard protocol during ongoing missions. Once operations conclude, the force has consistently shown transparency in reviewing and reporting lessons learned. Premature speculation or disclosure, however well-intentioned, serves no strategic purpose and risks giving adversaries a cognitive edge.

Instead of dissecting our own performance mid-conflict, public attention should focus on the gains: the rapid degradation of the adversary’s air force and military infrastructure within the first 90 hours of Operation Sindoor. That outcome, rather than our own attrition, should define public perception.

The “Need-to-Know” Principle: Military Security’s Bedrock

The IAF follows time-tested systems of internal review through secure briefings, war colleges, and classified reports. These forums transform operational experience into doctrinal evolution—away from prying eyes. The “need-to-know” principle is not designed to suppress discourse but to channel it constructively and securely.

Veterans like Admiral Prakash hold deep reservoirs of experience. Their wisdom is invaluable—within appropriate forums. Behind closed doors, they mentor the next generation and enrich our strategic institutions. But open analysis of current operations can inadvertently expose tactical or technological gaps, and sometimes reflect an understanding outpaced by new domains of warfare, such as network-centric operations or AI-enabled targeting.

Veterans must also respect that accountability and authority reside with serving personnel and elected leadership. The baton has been passed. Our successors carry the operational burden and must be empowered to do so without being second-guessed in the public eye.

A Call for Discretion

This is not a dismissal of Admiral Prakash’s right to express his views. His service is legendary, and his intention undoubtedly patriotic. But discretion is vital during active operations. Lessons drawn in the crucible of conflict must be protected—not broadcast. The strategic value of such insights lies in their application, not in their publication.

The legacy of Kargil and Balakot is not only one of bravery in battle, but also of operational discretion. Let Operation Sindoor follow in that tradition. Let us trust in the processes that have long guided the IAF and the government to assess, absorb, and act—at the right time, and in the right way.

Veterans have served with honour. Now, let us honour those who serve today—by giving them the space, confidence, and security they need to carry forward our proud military tradition.

AIR DOMINANCE TO THE FORE

 90 Hours of Dominance: The Decisive Role of the Indian Air Force in Shaping Modern Warfare

Air Marshal Raghunath Nambiar PVSM AVSM VM & BAR (Ret’d)

As an Indian Air Force Veteran, one reflects with immense pride on the unprecedented and decisive role played by the Indian Air Force (IAF) in compelling the Pakistani forces to seek a ceasefire a mere 90 hours after the initiation of full-scale offensive air operations by India. This swift outcome stands as a unique testament to the efficacy of Air Power in modern warfare and marks a significant milestone in Military History.

The catalyst for this telling robust response was the reprehensible murder of 26 innocent tourists in Kashmir on 22 April 2025, a heinous act targeting the Hindu community and demanding a firm, unequivocal and unforgettable answer.   

The Indian Air Force immediately brought its formidable capabilities to bear, deploying a potent combination of advanced aerial assets. This included the agile Rafale fighters, the versatile Mirage 2000s, the powerful Su-30 MKIs, the reliable MiG-29s and the trustworthy Jaguars. Each of these platforms played its predefined crucial role in the ensuing operations, showcasing the IAF's multi-faceted strike capabilities.

The sequence of these historic events unfolded with precision and intensity a fortnight later. Offensive air operations commenced on the night of May 6th/early morning of May 7th at 0115 hours, with pre-planned coordinated long-range strikes against nine identified terrorist camps located within Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. These initial strikes were aimed exclusively at terrorist infrastructure used to perpetrate violence against India and employed vectors such as the Hammer, Rampage, and Spice 1000/2000. The stated intent of India was to differentiate between the State of Pakistan and the state-sponsored terrorist entities funded and controlled by the Government of Pakistan.

Pakistan's retaliatory actions definitely resulted in attrition on the Indian side and caused the conflict to escalate. The IAF reacted with a technologically superior and strategically astute riposte. On the morning of May 8th, the IAF effectively utilised Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) such as the Harpy and Harrop loitering munitions. These assets proved instrumental in neutralising a significant number of Pakistan's Air Defence (AD) assets. Furthermore, the strategic employment of the S-400 Air Defence System against Pakistani aircraft at long ranges demonstrated the IAF's capacity to dominate the airspace and protect Indian assets while projecting power.

The pressure on the adversary was relentlessly escalated. On May 9th and 10th, the IAF executed strikes with long-range vectors. The Rafale aircraft, armed with SCALP cruise missiles, and the Su-30 MKIs, equipped with the BrahMos-A air-launched cruise missiles, conducted deep strikes at multiple enemy air bases with precision. These aerial attacks were complemented by strikes from land-based BrahMos missile systems, creating a multi-pronged assault that overwhelmed Pakistan's defensive capabilities.

The cumulative impact of these relentless and precise offensive operations by the Indian Air Force was undeniable. By 1535 hours on May 10th, the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) of Pakistan was compelled to request a ceasefire. The ceasefire subsequently came into effect at 1700 hours on the same evening. It is pertinent to note that the Indian Air Force, confident in its operational momentum and ability to further degrade the enemy's war-waging potential, was willing to continue offensive action.

The events of those 90 hours underscore the pivotal and decisive role of the Indian Air Force. It was the sustained and impactful application of air power, targeting critical enemy infrastructure and capabilities that directly led to the Pakistani establishment suing for peace in such a remarkably short timeframe. While broader geopolitical considerations and actions by other arms of the military played their part, the offensive air campaign was undoubtedly the principal factor that broke the enemy's will to continue the conflict. The IAF's ability to project power, achieve air dominance, and deliver precision strikes proved to be the linchpin of India's response, compelling a swift cessation of hostilities on terms favourable to India.

This operation will be studied for generations as an exemplary clinical demonstration of how strategic Air Power can shape the outcome of a conflict with unparalleled speed and decisiveness.

AIR MARSHAL RAGHUNATH NAMBIAR
PVSM, AVSM, VM & BAR (Ret’d) 

Air Marshal Raghunath Nambiar is an Experimental Test Pilot who has flown 52 types of aircraft, logging more than 5,200 flying hours. He has held numerous prestigious Service appointments in his distinguished 40-year career, ultimately retiring in 2019 as the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Western Air Command. He commanded No. 1 Squadron AF, flying the Mirage 2000 aircraft; was Defence Attaché of India in Israel; Air Officer Commanding of Air Force Station Jamnagar and Commandant of the Aircraft and Systems Testing Establishment (ASTE) in Bangalore, the IAF’s premier flight test organisation. He was awarded the Vayu Sena Medal (Gallantry) for his legendary exploits during the 1999 Kargil Conflict, a Bar to his Vayu Sena Medal for his pioneering work on the Tejas as well as the Ati Vishisht Seva Medal (AVSM) and the Param Vishisht Seva Medal (PVSM) for distinguished service of an exceptional order.

DID THE INDIAN NAVY TAKE PART IN OP SINDOOR?

 Indian Navy Stood Tall In Operation Sindoor

Admiral Arun Prakash (Ret’d) PVSM, AVSM, VrC, VSM  May 20, 2025

OPERATION Sindoor has served as a compelling demonstration of India’s growing military capabilities in several key areas. The technical means to acquire intelligence of targets deep inside the opponent’s territory; to strike them with long-range missiles with pinpoint accuracy — all the while maintaining a multi-layered, impervious air defence of its own assets. This capacity for waging “non-contact warfare”, using guided weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) without ground troops or air forces crossing borders, marks a paradigm shift in warfare.

In this context, maritime power has, historically, specialised in employing strategies that aim to achieve political objectives through their presence and “non-contact” force projection rather than by engaging in direct combat. Decades ago, Admiral Sergey Gorshkov (Commander-in-Chief, Soviet Navy, 1956-85) had described the perennial utility of naval power: “Demonstrative actions by the fleet, in many cases, have made it possible to achieve political ends without resorting to armed action, merely by application of pressure and threat of military operations.”

The Indian Navy’s (IN) 2015 maritime strategy offers, in detail, various options for potential force projection. These include maritime strikes with carrier-borne aircraft or long-range weapons like the ship-launched BrahMos, or the ship/submarine-launched Klub land-attack missiles. In order to apply ‘strategic leverage, including economic and psychological pressure’, the strategy also envisages disruption/denial of the adversary’s use of the sea for military purposes and maritime trade.

The IN, while drawing up its contingency plans for Operation Sindoor in coordination with sister services, would have taken note of Pakistan’s maritime vulnerabilities stemming from its geography, relatively limited naval capabilities and economic dependence on key coastal infrastructure.

Pakistan’s 1,000-km-long coastline, stretching mostly across the troubled province of Balochistan, hosts just a handful of ports. Of these, only Karachi, Port Qasim and Gwadar handle merchant ship traffic, while Ormara is a naval base and the rest are fishing harbours. Pakistan’s economy, already strained, relies heavily on maritime trade, mostly through Karachi and Port Qasim. Disruption of shipping traffic to and from these ports, even temporarily, can cause a significant impact on Pakistan’s economy, industry and military operations, apart from affecting public wellbeing and morale.

As far as naval strength goes, the IN is a diverse and substantial force organised into two fleets, each fielding an aircraft carrier and a cohort of missile-armed destroyers and frigates as well as fleet support vessels. India’s submarine force of nuclear and diesel-powered submarines is strategically deployed on both seaboards. The Pakistan Navy (PN) is relatively smaller and lacks many of these key assets.

While the IN aspires to play the role of a blue-water navy, with power-projection capabilities across the Indian Ocean and beyond, the PN’s focus is primarily on coastal defence and maintaining credible maritime deterrence against India through a strategy of “sea denial”. Although the past few decades have seen both navies growing in size and capabilities, the IN has managed to retain its significant edge.

In the 1971 war, India’s maritime power had played a key role in the outcome of the operations in both theatres of war. In the west, it had undertaken two attacks with ship-launched surface-to-surface missiles, inflicting attrition on the PN and heavy damage to the Karachi port, bringing its operations to a halt. In the eastern theatre, the IN’s carrier-borne aircraft had ranged far and wide over East Pakistan and inflicted heavy damage on ports, shipping and riverine traffic. The trauma of this conflict has lingered in the Pakistani psyche, and PN units did not venture forth during Operation Sindoor.

Today, a major advantage accrues to the IN from its comprehensive capability for “maritime domain awareness”. This is a dynamic framework that receives inputs from satellites, aircraft, UAVs, ships and coastal radars to compile a real-time operational picture of all activities at sea in the region. The availability of “situational awareness” on a 24x7 basis in all three dimensions enables the IN to keep track of the adversary’s moves and respond with alacrity to any suspicious activity. The PN lacks a similar facility.

‘Naval compellence’ has, historically, been a useful instrument of state policy to influence the behaviour of others and force an adversary to do something he does not want to do, or to stop him from doing something that he intends to do. This is achieved by the deployment of coercive sea-based forces, which may or may not involve actual violence.

During media briefings by the three armed forces, the Director General of Naval Operations announced that within hours of the Pahalgam terror attack, the IN had deployed a powerful task force composed of destroyers, frigates and submarines, led by the aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, in the Arabian Sea, south of Karachi. Posing a serious challenge in numbers and capability to the Pakistani fleet, this force established a de facto blockade, confining PN units to their harbours. Units of the task force are understood to have conducted live missile firing drills to revalidate crew readiness and ensure operational preparedness of units.

From its location in international waters, where it could have remained poised for prolonged periods, the IN carrier group acted as a force for ‘compellence’. Through rapid deployment and strategic positioning of overwhelming maritime power, India confined Pakistan’s navy to harbour, disrupted its maritime operations and reinforced its dominance in the Arabian Sea.

The IN task force had ample firepower to target ships, harbours and shore facilities with missiles having a range up to 300-450 km at sea. But the Navy, true to its sobriquet of the “Silent Service”, has not said so.

This article has been taken from the Tribune newspaper of 20 May 2025. It can be found at this source: https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/indian-navy-stood-tall-in-operation-sindoor/