HAS PAKISTAN BEEN A CIVILIAN OR A MILITARY STATE SINCE INDEPENDENCE?
The history of the modern-day
military of Pakistan began in 1947, when that country achieved its independence
as a modern nation. Since creation, Pakistan has been under a military
dictatorship spanning a total of 34 years. When not directly in power, the
military elite has engaged in hybrid regimes, overtly exerting considerable influence
on civilian governments from behind the scenes. The military thus continues to
hold a significant place in the evolution of Pakistan as a Nation State,
playing a significant role in the Pakistani establishment and the shaping of
the country.
Pakistan was founded as a democracy after independence from the British Raj but the military has remained one of the
country's most powerful institutions and has on multiple occasions overthrown
democratically elected civilian governments on the basis of mismanagement and
corruption. Their rise to power is linked to cultivating a collective ethos
that portrays politics as inherently corrupt, while positioning themselves as
the sole bastion of honesty, discipline and nationalism.
Amid the ever-changing political landscape, the only
permanent force is the military establishment, while the political parties only
coexist to share power with it. As a result, successive civilian governments
have made sure that the military was consulted before they took key decisions,
especially when those decisions related to the Kashmir conflict and foreign
policy. They are painfully aware that the military has slipped into the
political arena through coup d'état to establish military dictatorships, and
could do so again. Up to today, no civilian Prime Minister has ever completed
his tenure!
On 22 Nov 2022, Pakistan’s outgoing Army Chief, General
Qamar Javed Bajwa, accepted in his last address as Army Chief that the military
had routinely, even unlawfully, meddled in politics for decades and declared
that it will no longer do so. He was criticised roundly across the globe, and
most vocally so by the Prime Minister who gave him a three-year extension of
tenure in 2019, Imran Khan, only to be ousted and jailed, where he is still
languishing. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif then appointed Lieutenant General
Syed Asim Munir Ahmad Shah, a former Director-General of the Inter Services
Intelligence agency, or spy chief, as Bajwa’s successor in the rank of General.
On 20 May 2025, General Munir was promoted to Field Marshal, becoming the
second to reach the rank in Pakistan's history after FM Ayub Khan and only
person to serve office of the Chief of Army Staff with Field Marshal rank. As
it stands, the Field Marshal exerts considerable clout in Pakistan and global
media is abuzz with speculation that a coup is in the offing, given that
Pakistan’s economy is in trouble and the political instability in the country
is at an all time high.
THE KARGIL WAR 1999
Prelude: The Siachen Glacier – the world's highest
battlefield–holds significant strategic importance for India, primarily due to
its location overlooking key areas and routes. It acts as a buffer against
potential threats from Pakistan and China in the context of the disputed
Gilgit-Baltistan region and the Shaksgam Valley, which was illegally ceded to
China by Pakistan. The glacier's control provides India with access to vital
water resources and the ability to monitor movements along the border areas,
like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
In
1984, the Siachen Glacier, under the illegal control of Pakistan since 1965 was
re-occupied by India after Operation Meghdoot. India took control of the 76-kilometre-long
(47 mi) Siachen Glacier and its tributary glaciers, as well as all the main
passes and heights of the Saltoro Ridge immediately west of the glacier,
including Sia La, Bilafond La, and Gyong La. India established a military base there
that it maintains at a cost of more than US$1 million per day. Pakistan tried
in 1987 and 1989 to retake the whole glacier but was unsuccessful. Even so,
preparations were not abandoned, but continued on a small but steady scale,
hidden among military exercises. It still holds two posts that overlook five km
of the Glacier, forcing all Indian helicopters to route around the posts to
preclude the use of small arms fire and the Stinger SAM.
The Betrayal:
At the onset of 1999, General Pervez Musharraf’s name held little recognition
beyond Pakistan. However, by the year’s end, he had skyrocketed to global
notoriety. He became the central figure in igniting a conflict between two
nuclear-armed nations and subsequently orchestrated a coup to seize power domestically,
becoming Pakistan’s first military dictator since Gen. Zia-Ul-Haq. He had,
however, begun his silent machinations in late 1998 as the chief of Army Staff
and, later, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Gen. Musharraf
planned to use to his advantage the fact that some months earlier, both India
and Pakistan had conducted nuclear tests. Pakistan believed that it now had a
working nuclear deterrent; once it had taken the Kargil hills, he gambled that
the international community, fearing a nuclear war, would urge a secession of
hostilities. Pakistan would emerge with an improved tactical advantage along
the LOC and bring the Siachen Glacier conflict to the forefront of
international resolution.
Gen.
Musharraf began clandestinely reinforcing the groundwork for a bold military
incursion across the Kargil border. In February 1999, Prime Minister Atal
Bihari Vajpayee of India was invited by his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz
Sharif, to Pakistan on a pioneering journey toward peace and warmly received.
Unbeknownst to the Sharif government, preparations for an invasion were
underway. Musharraf’s actions would soon shatter the optimism of the peace
mission, transforming it from a historic mission to a footnote in history. He
thrust Sharif into a conflict he could not disavow and pushed Vajpayee into a
confrontation he could not avoid.
Musharraf had serious confrontations and became
involved in altercations with other senior officers, Chief of Naval Staff Admiral
Fasih Bokhari, Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal PQ Mehdi and senior
Lieutenant-General Ali Kuli Khan. Problems with his lifelong friend, Air Chief
Marshal PQ Mehdi also arose when Air Chief refrained to participate or
authorise any air strike to support the elements of army operations in the
Kargil region. The absence of the PAF left the IAF a free hand to operate at
its own pace.
The Indians
seemed to be a rather naïve lot. At the onset of winter, all Indian troops
would withdraw to from their posts which would see murderous -40°C temperatures
to warmer climes, returning to their posts only starting early April at the
lower levels and early May at the inhospitable heights. Gen. Musharraf made
full use of this naivety and started pushing his troops, in the guise of
shepherds, into the Indian posts, carefully avoiding the lower posts as that
could give the game away.
Some
elements of the Pakistani SSG Commandos, Northern Light Infantry Forces and Pak
Kashmiri militants planned to take over the abandoned Indian bunkers on various
hills that overlooked the vital Srinagar–Leh highway that serviced the
logistics base from which supplies were ferried through helicopter to the
Indian Army at the top of the Siachen Glacier.
The Indian
military apparatus got their intel inputs routinely, but these were dismissed as
routine sheep herder movements. The Indian Air Force also provided Elint that
Pakistani radio activity had increased, but the Army brushed it off. This was
while Operation Ibex was underway in Siachen Feb – May 1989. In February Indian
troops launched an attack on Pakistani positions there and, after an initial
reversal, launched an artillery attack on Kauser Base, the Pakistani logistical
node in the area and successfully destroyed it. The destruction of Kauser Base
induced Pakistani troops to vacate their posts concluding Operation Ibex.
The
Pakistani-backed forces, now including Mujahideens and local insurgents, took
over the vacant bunker complexes around April and May 1999, but the winter
snows had melted earlier than usual and an Indian reconnaissance team sent to
inspect the bunkers was wiped out by them. The influx of regulars from Pakistan
reached alarming proportions. The Indian Army Chief, Gen VP Malik, requested
the Air Chief, Air Chief Marshal AY Tipnis for a few helicopter gunship
sorties, suggesting that would be enough to seal off the influx route and evict
the soldiers who had taken over the Indian posts. Tipnis refused, stating that
the induction of the Indian Air Force would require Ministerial sanction and
that Gen Malik was being overly optimistic, predicting that almost all
helicopters would be lost to SAMs.
The Indian
Army, as of itself, responded and massed a force of around 30,000 men to
re-take the Kargil hills in Operation Vijay starting May 10, 1999. The
Pakistani-backed forces were not fully prepared yet, needing another two to
three weeks to meet their requirements of heavy weaponry, ammunition, food,
shelter, and medicine. Given the undue uphill tasks, the Indians proved to be
easy prey for the Pakistani troops who retained most of the heights in spite of
continuous attacks. Two months into the conflict, Indian troops by sheer
persistence had retaken most of the ridges that were encroached by the
infiltrators; according to official count, about 25-30% of the intruded
area and high ground had returned to Indian control, but at an inordinately
high cost.
Even without PAF interference, the IAF had its
problems, primarily the lack of targets identifiable by troop mobility and
action. As winter withdrew, sunrise cast shadows in Kashmir's valleys from 8AM,
when visibility was considerably reduced and targets could not be seen. Low
clouds engulfed the ridges and peaks by 11 a.m. The window of opportunity was
restricted to the three-hour period between 8 a.m. and 11 a.m., provided there
was no drizzle. In effect, the Pakistani forces in that area knew they had to
stay under cover throughout the morning and start hostile actions only after an
early lunch.
The high-altitude environment presented unique
challenges, including reduced aircraft and weapon performance, to which a
surprise element had to be added, viz., the sudden launch of Stinger SAMs out
of virtually nowhere. The Jaguar was impotent at height and the MiG-21 and
MiG-27 were proving ineffective, particularly after additional restrictions
were imposed following the loss of the three aircraft. In this time-frame, trig
points were identified where the Pakistani soldiers had shrewdly used terrain
masking and difficult to attack hill tops as assault points.
The best aircraft for this kind of Ground Attack at
heights of around 15-20,000’ (4,500-6,000m) was the Mirage 2000. Their attack
on Muntho Dhalo, their primary Logistics Camp at noon on June 16 had convinced
the brass that the Mirage was indeed very potent and therefore, when the
Litening Laser Designation Pod and Paveway Laser Guidance Kit combination was
available to the Mirage fleet finally, and had proven itself capable of delivering
bombs, it was but natural that the Mirage fleet would be tasked for all
important targets. Muntho Dhalo was eviscerated with 24 x 250 kg dumb Spanish
bombs dropped by four Mirage 2000 and proved to be the turning point of the
war. 300 Pakistani personnel were killed at Muntho Dhalo.
The introduction of Laser-guided bombs dropped by the
Mirage-2000 starting 24 Jun turned the war on its head. The first target chosen
was the one that had proved to be the most difficult to attack, Tiger Hill. Thestory of that air attack is at this link. Within four days, all unapproachable
targets had been destroyed and the Pakistani Army routed, with heavy
casualties. The Indian Army made the most of this opportunity and quickly had
the enemy back-tracking, which soon turned into a run for safe havens. Talks of
a ceasefire began as early as 12 July, but Pakistani outposts, cut off from the
main body and with no radio contact didn’t receive the news in time. Finally,
Pakistan sued for peace on 26 July, a day celebrated in India as Vijay Divas.
