OPERATION Sindoor has
served as a compelling demonstration of India’s growing military capabilities
in several key areas. The technical means to acquire intelligence of targets
deep inside the opponent’s territory; to strike them with long-range missiles
with pinpoint accuracy — all the while maintaining a multi-layered, impervious
air defence of its own assets. This capacity for waging “non-contact warfare”,
using guided weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) without ground troops
or air forces crossing borders, marks a paradigm shift in warfare.
In this context, maritime
power has, historically, specialised in employing strategies that aim to achieve
political objectives through their presence and “non-contact” force projection
rather than by engaging in direct combat. Decades ago, Admiral Sergey Gorshkov
(Commander-in-Chief, Soviet Navy, 1956-85) had described the perennial utility
of naval power: “Demonstrative actions by the fleet, in many cases, have made
it possible to achieve political ends without resorting to armed action, merely
by application of pressure and threat of military operations.”
The Indian Navy’s (IN)
2015 maritime strategy offers, in detail, various options for potential force
projection. These include maritime strikes with carrier-borne aircraft or
long-range weapons like the ship-launched BrahMos, or the
ship/submarine-launched Klub land-attack missiles. In order to apply ‘strategic
leverage, including economic and psychological pressure’, the strategy also
envisages disruption/denial of the adversary’s use of the sea for military
purposes and maritime trade.
The IN, while drawing up
its contingency plans for Operation Sindoor in coordination with sister
services, would have taken note of Pakistan’s maritime vulnerabilities stemming
from its geography, relatively limited naval capabilities and economic
dependence on key coastal infrastructure.
Pakistan’s 1,000-km-long
coastline, stretching mostly across the troubled province of Balochistan, hosts
just a handful of ports. Of these, only Karachi, Port Qasim and Gwadar handle
merchant ship traffic, while Ormara is a naval base and the rest are fishing
harbours. Pakistan’s economy, already strained, relies heavily on maritime
trade, mostly through Karachi and Port Qasim. Disruption of shipping traffic to
and from these ports, even temporarily, can cause a significant impact on
Pakistan’s economy, industry and military operations, apart from affecting
public wellbeing and morale.
As far as naval strength
goes, the IN is a diverse and substantial force organised into two fleets, each
fielding an aircraft carrier and a cohort of missile-armed destroyers and
frigates as well as fleet support vessels. India’s submarine force of nuclear
and diesel-powered submarines is strategically deployed on both seaboards. The
Pakistan Navy (PN) is relatively smaller and lacks many of these key assets.
While the IN aspires to
play the role of a blue-water navy, with power-projection capabilities across
the Indian Ocean and beyond, the PN’s focus is primarily on coastal defence and
maintaining credible maritime deterrence against India through a strategy of
“sea denial”. Although the past few decades have seen both navies growing in
size and capabilities, the IN has managed to retain its significant edge.
In the 1971 war, India’s
maritime power had played a key role in the outcome of the operations in both
theatres of war. In the west, it had undertaken two attacks with ship-launched
surface-to-surface missiles, inflicting attrition on the PN and heavy damage to
the Karachi port, bringing its operations to a halt. In the eastern theatre,
the IN’s carrier-borne aircraft had ranged far and wide over East Pakistan and
inflicted heavy damage on ports, shipping and riverine traffic. The trauma of
this conflict has lingered in the Pakistani psyche, and PN units did not
venture forth during Operation Sindoor.
Today, a major advantage
accrues to the IN from its comprehensive capability for “maritime domain
awareness”. This is a dynamic framework that receives inputs from satellites,
aircraft, UAVs, ships and coastal radars to compile a real-time operational
picture of all activities at sea in the region. The availability of
“situational awareness” on a 24x7 basis in all three dimensions enables the IN
to keep track of the adversary’s moves and respond with alacrity to any
suspicious activity. The PN lacks a similar facility.
‘Naval compellence’ has,
historically, been a useful instrument of state policy to influence the
behaviour of others and force an adversary to do something he does not want to
do, or to stop him from doing something that he intends to do. This is achieved
by the deployment of coercive sea-based forces, which may or may not involve
actual violence.
During media briefings by
the three armed forces, the Director General of Naval Operations announced that
within hours of the Pahalgam terror attack, the IN had deployed a powerful task
force composed of destroyers, frigates and submarines, led by the aircraft
carrier, INS Vikrant, in the Arabian Sea, south of Karachi. Posing a serious
challenge in numbers and capability to the Pakistani fleet, this force
established a de facto blockade, confining PN units to their harbours. Units of
the task force are understood to have conducted live missile firing drills to
revalidate crew readiness and ensure operational preparedness of units.
From its location in
international waters, where it could have remained poised for prolonged
periods, the IN carrier group acted as a force for ‘compellence’. Through rapid
deployment and strategic positioning of overwhelming maritime power, India
confined Pakistan’s navy to harbour, disrupted its maritime operations and
reinforced its dominance in the Arabian Sea.
The IN task force had
ample firepower to target ships, harbours and shore facilities with missiles
having a range up to 300-450 km at sea. But the Navy, true to its sobriquet of
the “Silent Service”, has not said so.
While Pakistani Field Marshal Asim Munir’s oration at
the Pakistan Naval Academy on June 28 has drawn considerable media focus, there
is a need to assess how much attention India should pay to his utterances. The
rabble-rousing tone and toxic India-baiting content of his speech, ill befitting
the occasion — a Navy passing-out parade — was a clear sign of insecurity in
the face of widespread public criticism of the Pakistan army in general and his
promotion in particular.
His banality notwithstanding, we must recognise that
since Field Marshals do not retire, Munir, if he so chooses, will be around for
a long time — either as Army Chief or as political puppet master. By harping on
Hindu-Muslim schisms and framing India as an ‘existential threat’ to its perpetual
‘victim’, Pakistan, Munir seeks to gain favour with the public and cement a
political niche for himself, sidelining the civilian regime.
Given Munir’s continued malevolent presence, India must
steel itself to face escalating tensions. In all likelihood, it was his
inflammatory rhetoric that triggered Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence and
its terror proxies to plan and launch the Pahalgam strike.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in his speech on May 12,
unequivocally spelt out four core principles that would govern India's future
policy against terrorism. Optimists amongst us are hopeful that this
declaration of India’s ‘red lines’ by the PM will cause the Pakistan ‘deep
state’ to pause and perhaps mend its ways. Sceptics, however, believe that it is
only a matter of time before the ISI initiates yet another terror strike on
India.
In these circumstances, no time must be lost in
analysing threadbare Operation Sindoor and disseminating the lessons learnt —
at the strategic, operational and tactical levels — before we are faced with a
similar crisis once again. In this context, we have the admirable precedent of
the Vajpayee government, which constituted the Kargil Review Committee on July
29, 1999 — a mere three days after the cessation of hostilities.
The urgency here is even more marked since this ‘90-hour
war’ saw an unimaginable leap in the level of technologies employed in combat
and the dizzying pace of kinetic action. While India asserted its success in
achieving its objectives of targeting terrorist infrastructure and
demonstrating a markedly bolder and more resolute deterrence strategy, there
are several aspects that require urgent review and analysis.
First, we were found wanting in strategic communication
and narrative-building. While the conflict generated unprecedented levels of
hyperbolic distortion and disinformation from media on both sides, India’s lag
in official narrative-building allowed Pakistan to steal a significant march.
Compared to Pakistan’s proactive media outreach and timely official briefings,
Indian briefings were often reactive, and failed to put across our notable
military successes.
Second, the issue of aircraft losses suffered by India
was ineptly handled across the board. Since aircraft attrition is an inevitable
consequence in combat, there was little to be gained by concealing or acting
coy about Indian Air Force (IAF) losses. The exaggerated Pakistani claims could
not be logically countered by the dribbles of information coming first from the
Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore and then from a seminar in Indonesia. A
forthright admission, followed by an account of the next day’s devastating
Indian response, which claimed six Pakistan Air Force (PAF) fighters and two
other aircraft, would have boosted the credibility of our narrative.
Third, the extensive employment of “beyond visual
range” or BVR air-to-air missiles and advanced airborne radars in this conflict
has proved a major game-changer in air combat. This demands urgent in-depth
study and analysis. The aerial engagements on the night of May 7/8 between the
two South Asian air forces, involving over 100 aircraft, were unprecedented and
have captured the attention of air power analysts worldwide.
Rising above the minutiae of physical conflict, we need
to remind our decision makers that wars, if inevitable, must be waged only to
eliminate the casus belli and achieve a stable and enduring peace. This places
three responsibilities on the country’s political leadership: (a) to lay down,
clear aims for which armed action is being initiated; (b) to specify, to the
military, the desired “end-state” to be achieved, before termination of
hostilities; and (c) to ensure that adequate resources are provided — in time —
for the action contemplated.
There is scant authentic information on these aspects
in the public domain. The waters have been further muddied by US President
Donald Trump’s insistent claims of brokering peace. In the face of incessant
commentary by Western observers about the risks of nuclear first use in South
Asia, it was reassuring to hear from India’s CDS about the “rationality and
maturity”, displayed by both sides in avoiding escalation to the nuclear
threshold.
The extensive utilisation of cyber warfare and missiles
as well as unmanned vehicles enabled both sides to wage “non-contact warfare”.
This calls for a comprehensive doctrinal re-think about the future of manned
combat platforms. Moreover, the sheer intensity of this brief eruption and
rapid expenditure of (expensive) munitions should lead to reflection about the status
of our “war wastage reserves”, and their replenishment.
A comprehensive review of what is being termed, ‘the
largest BVR air combat in history’ during Op Sindoor is best undertaken by the
IAF’S esteemed Tactics and Combat Development Establishment, particularly
against the backdrop of our past experience of ‘aerial ambushes’ in Kargil and
in the post-Balakot encounters. The lacunae in equipment and intelligence as
well as lessons learned and changes required in training, tactics and
strategies must be addressed post-haste.
In essence, the May 2025 conflict served as a stark
reminder of the volatile nature of the India-pakistan relationship and the
critical need for robust crisis management mechanisms as well as military
preparedness. The intent of Operation Sindoor was “deterrence by punishment”
but as we await its long-term impact, India’s national security establishment
needs to think long and hard about alternate strategies to address the casus
belli.
Admiral Arun Prakash, PVSM, AVSM, VrC, VSM is a
former Chief of the Naval Staff of the Indian Navy.
Former Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf died in Dubai on February 05, 2023 after a prolonged illness. The former military ruler, born in Delhi, passed away at the age of 79 after he was diagnosed with the life-threatening disease Amyloidosis, an abnormal protein growth in organs.
Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of Pakistan during the Kargil War, was losing popularity due to a perceived power grab and suspected corruption as his wealthy family grew richer. His acceptance of a perceived defeat led to a growing clamour against him, exacerbated by the fact that he was caught lying when he claimed Gen. Musharraf had gone to war without his approval; in fact, he claimed he wasn’t even informed. Substantial documentary evidence proved otherwise and it was no surprise that he was ousted from power in a bloodless coup on 12 Oct 1999 initiated and pushed through by the military staff at the Joint Staff HQ working under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of Army Staff Gen. Musharraf. Gen. Musharraf declared martial law and took over as President in 2001.
Judging from the Feb 1999 Vajpayee—Sharif talks in Pakistan, war was not something that the Pakistani Government wanted. Musharraf feared that he would be removed by Nawaz Sharif, and therefore decided to launch a small scale and losing war to take up the government’s attention while he could devise a plot to make himself President of Pakistan. He selected Kargil, a geographically difficult area, as the battlefield which would gain international attention and keep part of the Indian armed forces occupied, while Vajpayee would focus on the blatant betrayal of his Feb. 99 talks. Admiral Bhokari wondered aloud about the sense of such an operation, hinting that it was pushed along with an ulterior and sinister motive.
The Pakistani population simply could not understand why the F-16 equipped PAF did absolutely nothing, while the Indian Air Force (IAF) carried out airstrikes and attacked Pakistani forces with gay abandon, defying basic military logic to the point of tacitly permitting the conflict to fail. Was this an attempt to demoralise the Armed Forces and sully the local and global standing of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, while ensuring the conflict would stay below a predetermined threshold?
The employment of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) in an area which would need heavy artillery and ground to air weaponry and ancillary support further compounded the issue. Was this a repeat of Cardigan’s Light Brigade tactics? Such a deployment sans adequate support, infrastructure or special provisions would expose the NLI’s belly, rendering them highly vulnerable with limited capability on an unfamiliar battlefield and busy trying to sort out their own difficulties.
As India Today reported, Admiral Bokhari , the Chief of Naval Staff in 1999 demanded a full-fledged joint-service court martial against General Musharraf, while on the other hand, General Kuli Khan, the Chief of General Staff under Musharraf lambasted the war as 'a disaster bigger than the East Pakistan tragedy', decrying the plan as "flawed in terms of its conception, tactical planning and execution" that ended in "sacrificing so many soldiers." Gen. Musharraf’s coup and subsequent ascension to power put an end to all queries.
Pakistani documents reveal that a war in Kargil was always part of the Pakistani military strategy prior to 1999. Its implementation had been rejected by both political and military leaders on all previous occasions. Initially, it was discussed during General Zia’s regime, but Zia rejected the proposal as it risked leading to full-scale war with India. Later it was reconsidered but shut down on the same grounds, and it was reported that the proposal could only be implemented when Pakistan was ready for a full-scale war. In July 1996, the then Lieutenant-General Musharraf once again forwarded this proposal to Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, but was brusquely turned down. The devious Musharraf then waited for an opportunity to present itself.
The opportunity arose in 1998, when Pakistan conducted its first nuclear tests and India its second series, having first gone nuclear in 1974. Pakistan believed that it now had a working nuclear deterrent; once it had taken the Kargil hills, Musharraf gambled that the international community, fearing a nuclear war, would urge a secession of hostilities. Pakistan would emerge with an improved tactical advantage along the LOC and bring the Siachen Glacier conflict to the forefront of international resolution. However, he had to wait till he became the Pakistani Army Chief, a game of internecine power politics. He was appointed The Chief of Army Staff and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee in late 1988, superceding Admiral Bokhari. All pieces were in place. The result was the desultory Kargil War and yet another slap in the face of Pakistan.
As Dheemant Anil neatly sums up in his April 26, 2024 article on the Gen. Musharraf and the Kargil War published by Nickeled and Dimed, the Kargil conflict of 1999 presents a complex maze of political stratagems, military machination and personal ambition. General Musharraf’s manipulation of the conflict, ostensibly designed to consolidate his power within Pakistan, highlights the intricate maneuvering of key players in the region. The Kargil episode serves as a harsh reminder of how geopolitical tensions and internecine power struggles can collude to shape the course of history. Ultimately, it stands as a admonitory tale against the exploitation of military action for personal gain, emphasising the need for transparent and accountable leadership to navigate the intricate web of international relations.
Takeaways for the IAF:
·High-Altitude Precision Bombing: The IAF
demonstrated its ability to conduct effective, high-altitude bombing missions
with unmatched precision at altitudes above 18,000 feet, utilising the Mirage
2000 jet fighter across its envelope.
·Targeting Enemy Positions: The IAF struck
enemy camps, supply lines, and ammunition dumps, effectively degrading their
offensive capabilities and softening their defenses.
·Avoiding Escalation: The IAF's operations
were conducted without crossing the Line of Control, showcasing the potential
of limited, targeted air strikes to achieve strategic objectives without
triggering a wider conflict.
·Support for Ground Forces: The IAF provided
crucial support to ground troops through reconnaissance, escort missions, and
casualty evacuation, flying over 2,185 helicopter sorties.
·Adaptability and Resolve: The conflict
highlighted the IAF's ability to adapt to a challenging operational environment
and demonstrated its resolve in achieving its objectives.
·Curtailing the War's Length: The IAF's
decisive actions are credited with shortening the overall duration of the
conflict.
·Demonstrating Deterrent Value: The IAF's
performance in Kargil established the deterrent value of calibrated air
strikes, even in a limited conflict.
·Electronic Warfare (EW) and Electronic
Surveillance: The engagement also underscored the strategic need for Electronic
Warfare (EW) and Electronic Surveillance capabilities. The IAF’s expertise in
collecting real-time intelligence through aerial reconnaissance accurately
identified the enemy coordinates and accordingly placed higher premium on
augmenting the EW capabilities duly utilising advanced surveillance
technologies, UAVs and satellite recce.
·Foreknowledge about MANPADS: Timely intel
about MANPADS used by the enemy is crucial to help IAF aircraft to pre-empt the
threats from ground fire. The conflict also put emphasis upon a robust
Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) capability and strategies to elude and
nullify such threats by taking recourse to better ECM and self-protection
suites.
·Augmenting the Night Operation Capabilities
of the IAF:The conflict underscored the importance of equipping the aircraft
with advanced night vision devices and targeting systems for effective
operations despite poor visibility, type of terrain notwithstanding.
·Principles of War: The swiftness and
flexibility of IAF emphasised the indispensability of Air Power as the Primary
constituent of modern warfare.
·Inadequacies in the Aircraft Available: The
conflict stressed the need for fleet upgradation utilising better platforms
incorporating advanced avionics, weapon systems and EW suites.
HAS PAKISTAN BEEN A CIVILIAN OR A MILITARY STATE SINCE INDEPENDENCE?
The history of the modern-day
military of Pakistan began in 1947, when Pakistan achieved its independence as
a modern nation. Since its creation, Pakistan has been under a military
dictatorship spanning a total of 34 years. When not directly in power, the military
elite has discreetly engaged in hybrid regimes, exerting palpable influence on
civilian governments from behind the scenes. The military thus continues to
hold a significant place in the evolution of Pakistan as a Nation State,
playing a significant role in the Pakistani establishment and the shaping of
the country.
Pakistan was founded as a democracy after its
independence from the British Raj but the military has remained one of the
country's most powerful institutions and has on multiple occasions overthrown
democratically elected civilian governments on the incontrovertible basis of mismanagement and
corruption. Their rise to power is linked to cultivating a collective ethos
that portrays politics as inherently corrupt, while positioning themselves as
the sole bastion of honesty, discipline and nationalism.
On 22 Nov 2022, Pakistan’s outgoing Army Chief, General
Qamar Javed Bajwa, accepted in his last address as Army Chief that the military
had routinely, even unlawfully, meddled in politics for decades and declared
that it will no longer do so. He was criticised roundly across the globe, and
most vocally so by the same Prime Minister who had given him a three-year extension of
tenure in 2019, Imran Khan, only to be ousted and jailed, where he is still languishing.
Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif then appointed Lieutenant General Syed Asim Munir
Ahmad Shah, a former Director-General of the Inter Services Intelligence
agency, or spy chief, as Bajwa’s successor in the rank of General. On 20 May
2025, General Munir was promoted to Field Marshal, becoming the second to reach
the rank in Pakistan's history after FM Ayub Khan and only person to serve
office of the Chief of Army Staff with Field Marshal rank. As it stands, the Field
Marshal exerts considerable clout in Pakistan and global media is abuzz with
speculation that a coup is in the offing, given that Pakistan’s economy is in
trouble and the political instability in the country is at an all time high.
THE KARGIL WAR 1999
Prelude The
Siachen Glacier – the world's highest battlefield–holds significant strategic
importance for India, primarily due to its location overlooking key areas and
routes. It acts as a buffer against potential threats from Pakistan and China
in the context of the disputed Gilgit-Baltistan region and the Shaksgam Valley,
which was illegally ceded to China by Pakistan. The glacier's control provides
India with access to vital water resources and the ability to monitor movements
along the border areas, like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
In
1984, the Siachen Glacier, under the illegal control of Pakistan since 1965 was
re-occupied by India after Operation Meghdoot. India established a military
base there that it maintains at a cost of more than US$1 million per day.
Pakistan tried in 1987 and 1989 to retake the whole glacier but was
unsuccessful. Even so, preparations were not abandoned, but continued on a
small but steady scale, hidden among military exercises.
The Betrayal:
At the onset of 1999, General Pervez Musharraf’s name held little recognition
beyond Pakistan. However, by the year’s end, he had skyrocketed to global
notoriety. He became the central figure in igniting a conflict between two
nuclear-armed nations and subsequently orchestrated a coup to seize power
domestically, becoming Pakistan’s first military dictator since Gen.
Zia-Ul-Haq. He had, however, begun his silent machinations in late 1998 as as
the chief of Army Staff and, later, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Gen.Musharraf planned to use to his advantage the fact that some months earlier, both India and Pakistan had conducted nuclear tests. Pakistan believed that it now had a working nuclear deterrent; once it had taken the Kargil hills, he gambled that the international community, fearing a nuclear war, would urge a secession of hostilities. Pakistan would emerge with an improved tactical
advantage along the LOC and bring the Siachen Glacier conflict to the forefront
of international resolution.
Gen. Musharraf began clandestinely reinforcing the groundwork for a bold military incursion across the Kargil border. In February 1999, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee of India was invited by his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz
Sharif, to Pakistan on a pioneering journey toward peace and warmly received.
Unbeknownst to the Sharif government, preparations for an invasion were
underway. Musharraf’s actions would soon shatter the optimism of the peace
mission, transforming it from a historic mission to a footnote in history. He
thrust Sharif into a conflict he could not disavow and Vajpayee into a
confrontation he could not avoid.
The Conflict: Both sides seemed to be rather naïve. At the onset of winter, all troops
would withdraw from their posts which would see murderous -40°C temperatures
to warmer climes, returning to their posts only starting early April at the
lower levels and early May at the inhospitable heights. Gen. Musharraf made full
use of this naivety and started pushing his troops, in the guise of shepherds and disparate locals,
into the Indian posts in the midst of winter, taking care to avoid the lower posts as that could give
the game away. In 1999, the Pakistan Army started reoccupying the forward posts in January. In a preliminary step in their bid to capture Kashmir, they reoccupied not only their own posts, but also 132 posts that belonged to India.
The Pakistani SSG Commandos, Northern Light Infantry Forces and Pak
Kashmiri militants were tasked with taking over the abandoned Indian bunkers on various
hills that overlooked the vital Srinagar–Leh highway that serviced the
logistics base from which supplies were ferried through helicopter to the
Indian Army at the top of the Siachen Glacier. This would have given Pakistan a significant strategic advantage and disrupted India's supply lines to its troops in the Siachen Glacier area. Success here would demoralise the Indian troops, who would then look back at the Siachen episode as an exercise in futility, playing with their lives on the line. This would bolster, by default, the ongoing insurgency in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir.
The Indian
military apparatus got their intel inputs routinely, but these were dismissed
as routine sheep herder movements. The Indian Air Force also provided Elint
that Pakistani radio activity had increased, but the Army brushed it off. This was while Operation Ibex was underway in Siachen Feb – May 1989. In February Indian troops launched an attack on Pakistani positions there and, after an initial reversal, took over and destroyed Kauser Base, the Pakistani logistical node in the area. The destruction of Kauser Base induced Pakistani troops to vacate their posts concluding Operation Ibex.
The Pakistani-backed forces, now including Mujahideens and local insurgents, took over the numerous vacant bunker complexes around April and May 1999, but the winter snows had melted earlier than usual and an Indian reconnaissance team sent to inspect the bunkers was wiped out by them. The influx of regulars from Pakistan reached alarming proportions. The Indian Army Chief, Gen VP Malik, requested the Air Chief, Air Chief Marshal AY Tipnis for a few helicopter gunship sorties, suggesting that would be enough to seal off the influx route and evict the soldiers who had taken over the Indian posts. Tipnis refused, stating that the induction of the Indian Air Force would require Ministerial sanction and that Gen Malik was being overly optimistic, predicting that almost all helicopters would be lost to SAMs.
The Indian Army responded quickly and massed a force of around 30,000 men to re-take the Kargil hills in Operation Vijay starting May 10, 1999. Actually, 200,000 Indian troops were mobilised. However, because of the nature of the terrain, division and corps operations could not be mounted; the scale of most fighting was at the regimental or battalion level. In effect, two divisions of the Indian Army, numbering 20,000, along with 10,000 from the Paramilitary forces of India were placed at active posts. The Pakistani-backed forces were not fully prepared yet, needing another two to three weeks to meet their requirements of heavy weaponry, ammunition, food, shelter, and medicine. Given the undue uphill tasks, the Indians proved to be easy prey for the Pakistani troops who retained most of the heights in spite of continuous attacks. Two months into the conflict, Indian troops had slowly retaken some of the vital ridges that were encroached upon by the infiltrators; according to official count, an estimated 25-30% of the intruded area and high ground had returned to Indian control.
To avoid escalation, the Government of India (GoI) cleared only limited use of Air Power on May 25, more than three weeks after first reports, with the instructions that IAF fighter jets would remain within Indian territory to launch attacks on intruder's positions within Indian territory and the IAF was not permitted to cross the Line of Control under any circumstance. The IAF started its strike role on 26 May 1999, in an exercise named Operation Safed Sagar. Evidently, the planners could have done better. They used the MiG-21 and MiG-27 in the attack role, both unsuited to the terrain and air defences. Between 27 and 28 May, the IAF lost two fighter aircraft—a MiG-21 & a MiG-27 —and a helicopter.
Musharraf had serious confrontations and became involved in altercations with other senior officers, Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Fasih Bokhari, Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal PQ Mehdi and senior Lieutenant-General Ali Kuli Khan. Problems with his lifelong friend, Air Chief Marshal PQ Mehdi also arose when Air Chief refrained to participate or authorise any air strike to support the elements of army operations in the Kargil region. The absence of the PAF left the IAF a free hand to operate at its own pace.
Even so, the IAF had its problems, primarily the lack of targets identifiable by troop mobility and action. As winter withdrew, sunrise cast shadows in Kashmir's valleys from 8AM, when visibility was considerably reduced and targets could not be seen. Low clouds engulfed the ridges and peaks by 11 a.m. The window of opportunity was restricted to the three-hour period between 8 a.m. and 11 a.m., provided there was no drizzle. In effect, the Pakistani forces in that area knew they had to stay under cover throughout the morning and start hostile actions only after an early lunch.
The high-altitude environment presented unique challenges, including reduced aircraft and weapon performance, to which a surprise element had to be added, viz., the sudden launch of Stinger SAMs out of virtually nowhere. The Jaguar was impotent at those heights and the MiG-21 and MiG-27 were proving ineffective, particularly after additional restrictions were imposed following the loss of the three aircraft. In this time-frame, trig points were identified where the Pakistani soldiers had shrewdly used terrain masking and difficult to attack hill tops as assault points.
The best aircraft for this kind of Ground Attack at heights of around 15-20,000’ (4,500-6,000m) was the Mirage 2000. Their attack on Muntho Dhalo, their primary Administrative and Logistics Camp at noon on June 16 had convinced the brass that the Mirage was indeed very potent and therefore, when the Litening Laser Designation Pod and Paveway Laser Guidance Kit combination was available to the Mirage fleet finally, and had proven itself capable of delivering bombs, it was but natural that the Mirage fleet would be tasked for all important targets. Muntho Dhalo was eviscerated with 24 x 250 kg dumb Spanish bombs dropped by four Mirage 2000 and proved to be the turning point of the war. 300 Pakistani personnel were killed at Muntho Dhalo. The Air Marshal giving the Presentation in the video below and in the interview in the succeeding video features again when you go to the Post via the link in the para immediately below the videos.
The introduction of Laser-guided bombs dropped by the Mirage-2000 starting 24 Jun turned the war into a one-sided campaign. The first target chosen was the one that had proved to be the most difficult to attack, Tiger Hill. The story of that air attack is at this link. Within seven days, all difficult and unapproachable targets had been destroyed and the Pakistani Army routed, with heavy casualties. The Indian Army made the most of this opportunity and quickly had the enemy back-tracking, which soon turned into a run for safe haven. Talks of a ceasefire reportedly began as early as 12 July, but certain Pakistani outposts, cut off from the main body and with no radio contact didn’t receive the news in time and had to be neutralised. Finally, Pakistan sued for peace on 26 July, a day celebrated in India as Vijay Divas.