While Pakistani Field Marshal Asim Munir’s oration at
the Pakistan Naval Academy on June 28 has drawn considerable media focus, there
is a need to assess how much attention India should pay to his utterances. The
rabble-rousing tone and toxic India-baiting content of his speech, ill befitting
the occasion — a Navy passing-out parade — was a clear sign of insecurity in
the face of widespread public criticism of the Pakistan army in general and his
promotion in particular.
His banality notwithstanding, we must recognise that
since Field Marshals do not retire, Munir, if he so chooses, will be around for
a long time — either as Army Chief or as political puppet master. By harping on
Hindu-Muslim schisms and framing India as an ‘existential threat’ to its perpetual
‘victim’, Pakistan, Munir seeks to gain favour with the public and cement a
political niche for himself, sidelining the civilian regime.
Given Munir’s continued malevolent presence, India must
steel itself to face escalating tensions. In all likelihood, it was his
inflammatory rhetoric that triggered Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence and
its terror proxies to plan and launch the Pahalgam strike.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in his speech on May 12,
unequivocally spelt out four core principles that would govern India's future
policy against terrorism. Optimists amongst us are hopeful that this
declaration of India’s ‘red lines’ by the PM will cause the Pakistan ‘deep
state’ to pause and perhaps mend its ways. Sceptics, however, believe that it is
only a matter of time before the ISI initiates yet another terror strike on
India.
In these circumstances, no time must be lost in
analysing threadbare Operation Sindoor and disseminating the lessons learnt —
at the strategic, operational and tactical levels — before we are faced with a
similar crisis once again. In this context, we have the admirable precedent of
the Vajpayee government, which constituted the Kargil Review Committee on July
29, 1999 — a mere three days after the cessation of hostilities.
The urgency here is even more marked since this ‘90-hour
war’ saw an unimaginable leap in the level of technologies employed in combat
and the dizzying pace of kinetic action. While India asserted its success in
achieving its objectives of targeting terrorist infrastructure and
demonstrating a markedly bolder and more resolute deterrence strategy, there
are several aspects that require urgent review and analysis.
First, we were found wanting in strategic communication
and narrative-building. While the conflict generated unprecedented levels of
hyperbolic distortion and disinformation from media on both sides, India’s lag
in official narrative-building allowed Pakistan to steal a significant march.
Compared to Pakistan’s proactive media outreach and timely official briefings,
Indian briefings were often reactive, and failed to put across our notable
military successes.
Second, the issue of aircraft losses suffered by India
was ineptly handled across the board. Since aircraft attrition is an inevitable
consequence in combat, there was little to be gained by concealing or acting
coy about Indian Air Force (IAF) losses. The exaggerated Pakistani claims could
not be logically countered by the dribbles of information coming first from the
Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore and then from a seminar in Indonesia. A
forthright admission, followed by an account of the next day’s devastating
Indian response, which claimed six Pakistan Air Force (PAF) fighters and two
other aircraft, would have boosted the credibility of our narrative.
Third, the extensive employment of “beyond visual
range” or BVR air-to-air missiles and advanced airborne radars in this conflict
has proved a major game-changer in air combat. This demands urgent in-depth
study and analysis. The aerial engagements on the night of May 7/8 between the
two South Asian air forces, involving over 100 aircraft, were unprecedented and
have captured the attention of air power analysts worldwide.
Rising above the minutiae of physical conflict, we need
to remind our decision makers that wars, if inevitable, must be waged only to
eliminate the casus belli and achieve a stable and enduring peace. This places
three responsibilities on the country’s political leadership: (a) to lay down,
clear aims for which armed action is being initiated; (b) to specify, to the
military, the desired “end-state” to be achieved, before termination of
hostilities; and (c) to ensure that adequate resources are provided — in time —
for the action contemplated.
There is scant authentic information on these aspects
in the public domain. The waters have been further muddied by US President
Donald Trump’s insistent claims of brokering peace. In the face of incessant
commentary by Western observers about the risks of nuclear first use in South
Asia, it was reassuring to hear from India’s CDS about the “rationality and
maturity”, displayed by both sides in avoiding escalation to the nuclear
threshold.
The extensive utilisation of cyber warfare and missiles
as well as unmanned vehicles enabled both sides to wage “non-contact warfare”.
This calls for a comprehensive doctrinal re-think about the future of manned
combat platforms. Moreover, the sheer intensity of this brief eruption and
rapid expenditure of (expensive) munitions should lead to reflection about the status
of our “war wastage reserves”, and their replenishment.
A comprehensive review of what is being termed, ‘the
largest BVR air combat in history’ during Op Sindoor is best undertaken by the
IAF’S esteemed Tactics and Combat Development Establishment, particularly
against the backdrop of our past experience of ‘aerial ambushes’ in Kargil and
in the post-Balakot encounters. The lacunae in equipment and intelligence as
well as lessons learned and changes required in training, tactics and
strategies must be addressed post-haste.
In essence, the May 2025 conflict served as a stark
reminder of the volatile nature of the India-pakistan relationship and the
critical need for robust crisis management mechanisms as well as military
preparedness. The intent of Operation Sindoor was “deterrence by punishment”
but as we await its long-term impact, India’s national security establishment
needs to think long and hard about alternate strategies to address the casus
belli.
Admiral Arun Prakash, PVSM, AVSM, VrC, VSM is a
former Chief of the Naval Staff of the Indian Navy.
Former Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf died in Dubai on February 05, 2023 after a prolonged illness. The former military ruler, born in Delhi, passed away at the age of 79 after he was diagnosed with the life-threatening disease Amyloidosis, an abnormal protein growth in organs.
Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of Pakistan during the Kargil War, was losing popularity due to a perceived power grab and suspected corruption as his wealthy family grew richer. His acceptance of a perceived defeat led to a growing clamour against him, exacerbated by the fact that he was caught lying when he claimed Gen. Musharraf had gone to war without his approval; in fact, he claimed he wasn’t even informed. Substantial documentary evidence proved otherwise and it was no surprise that he was ousted from power in a bloodless coup on 12 Oct 1999 initiated and pushed through by the military staff at the Joint Staff HQ working under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of Army Staff Gen. Musharraf. Gen. Musharraf declared martial law and took over as President in 2001.
Judging from the Feb 1999 Vajpayee—Sharif talks in Pakistan, war was not something that the Pakistani Government wanted. Musharraf feared that he would be removed by Nawaz Sharif, and therefore decided to launch a small scale and losing war to take up the government’s attention while he could devise a plot to make himself President of Pakistan. He selected Kargil, a geographically difficult area, as the battlefield which would gain international attention and keep part of the Indian armed forces occupied, while Vajpayee would focus on the blatant betrayal of his Feb. 99 talks. Admiral Bhokari wondered aloud about the sense of such an operation, hinting that it was pushed along with an ulterior and sinister motive.
The Pakistani population simply could not understand why the F-16 equipped PAF did absolutely nothing, while the Indian Air Force (IAF) carried out airstrikes and attacked Pakistani forces with gay abandon, defying basic military logic to the point of tacitly permitting the conflict to fail. Was this an attempt to demoralise the Armed Forces and sully the local and global standing of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, while ensuring the conflict would stay below a predetermined threshold?
The employment of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) in an area which would need heavy artillery and ground to air weaponry and ancillary support further compounded the issue. Was this a repeat of Cardigan’s Light Brigade tactics? Such a deployment sans adequate support, infrastructure or special provisions would expose the NLI’s belly, rendering them highly vulnerable with limited capability on an unfamiliar battlefield and busy trying to sort out their own difficulties.
As India Today reported, Admiral Bokhari , the Chief of Naval Staff in 1999 demanded a full-fledged joint-service court martial against General Musharraf, while on the other hand, General Kuli Khan, the Chief of General Staff under Musharraf lambasted the war as 'a disaster bigger than the East Pakistan tragedy', decrying the plan as "flawed in terms of its conception, tactical planning and execution" that ended in "sacrificing so many soldiers." Gen. Musharraf’s coup and subsequent ascension to power put an end to all queries.
Pakistani documents reveal that a war in Kargil was always part of the Pakistani military strategy prior to 1999. Its implementation had been rejected by both political and military leaders on all previous occasions. Initially, it was discussed during General Zia’s regime, but Zia rejected the proposal as it risked leading to full-scale war with India. Later it was reconsidered but shut down on the same grounds, and it was reported that the proposal could only be implemented when Pakistan was ready for a full-scale war. In July 1996, the then Lieutenant-General Musharraf once again forwarded this proposal to Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, but was brusquely turned down. The devious Musharraf then waited for an opportunity to present itself.
The opportunity arose in 1998, when Pakistan conducted its first nuclear tests and India its second series, having first gone nuclear in 1974. Pakistan believed that it now had a working nuclear deterrent; once it had taken the Kargil hills, Musharraf gambled that the international community, fearing a nuclear war, would urge a secession of hostilities. Pakistan would emerge with an improved tactical advantage along the LOC and bring the Siachen Glacier conflict to the forefront of international resolution. However, he had to wait till he became the Pakistani Army Chief, a game of internecine power politics. He was appointed The Chief of Army Staff and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee in late 1988, superceding Admiral Bokhari. All pieces were in place. The result was the desultory Kargil War and yet another slap in the face of Pakistan.
As Dheemant Anil neatly sums up in his April 26, 2024 article on the Gen. Musharraf and the Kargil War published by Nickeled and Dimed, the Kargil conflict of 1999 presents a complex maze of political stratagems, military machination and personal ambition. General Musharraf’s manipulation of the conflict, ostensibly designed to consolidate his power within Pakistan, highlights the intricate maneuvering of key players in the region. The Kargil episode serves as a harsh reminder of how geopolitical tensions and internecine power struggles can collude to shape the course of history. Ultimately, it stands as a admonitory tale against the exploitation of military action for personal gain, emphasising the need for transparent and accountable leadership to navigate the intricate web of international relations.
Takeaways for the IAF:
·High-Altitude Precision Bombing: The IAF
demonstrated its ability to conduct effective, high-altitude bombing missions
with unmatched precision at altitudes above 18,000 feet, utilising the Mirage
2000 jet fighter across its envelope.
·Targeting Enemy Positions: The IAF struck
enemy camps, supply lines, and ammunition dumps, effectively degrading their
offensive capabilities and softening their defenses.
·Avoiding Escalation: The IAF's operations
were conducted without crossing the Line of Control, showcasing the potential
of limited, targeted air strikes to achieve strategic objectives without
triggering a wider conflict.
·Support for Ground Forces: The IAF provided
crucial support to ground troops through reconnaissance, escort missions, and
casualty evacuation, flying over 2,185 helicopter sorties.
·Adaptability and Resolve: The conflict
highlighted the IAF's ability to adapt to a challenging operational environment
and demonstrated its resolve in achieving its objectives.
·Curtailing the War's Length: The IAF's
decisive actions are credited with shortening the overall duration of the
conflict.
·Demonstrating Deterrent Value: The IAF's
performance in Kargil established the deterrent value of calibrated air
strikes, even in a limited conflict.
·Electronic Warfare (EW) and Electronic
Surveillance: The engagement also underscored the strategic need for Electronic
Warfare (EW) and Electronic Surveillance capabilities. The IAF’s expertise in
collecting real-time intelligence through aerial reconnaissance accurately
identified the enemy coordinates and accordingly placed higher premium on
augmenting the EW capabilities duly utilising advanced surveillance
technologies, UAVs and satellite recce.
·Foreknowledge about MANPADS: Timely intel
about MANPADS used by the enemy is crucial to help IAF aircraft to pre-empt the
threats from ground fire. The conflict also put emphasis upon a robust
Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) capability and strategies to elude and
nullify such threats by taking recourse to better ECM and self-protection
suites.
·Augmenting the Night Operation Capabilities
of the IAF:The conflict underscored the importance of equipping the aircraft
with advanced night vision devices and targeting systems for effective
operations despite poor visibility, type of terrain notwithstanding.
·Principles of War: The swiftness and
flexibility of IAF emphasised the indispensability of Air Power as the Primary
constituent of modern warfare.
·Inadequacies in the Aircraft Available: The
conflict stressed the need for fleet upgradation utilising better platforms
incorporating advanced avionics, weapon systems and EW suites.
HAS PAKISTAN BEEN A CIVILIAN OR A MILITARY STATE SINCE INDEPENDENCE?
The history of the modern-day
military of Pakistan began in 1947, when Pakistan achieved its independence as
a modern nation. Since its creation, Pakistan has been under a military
dictatorship spanning a total of 34 years. When not directly in power, the military
elite has discreetly engaged in hybrid regimes, exerting palpable influence on
civilian governments from behind the scenes. The military thus continues to
hold a significant place in the evolution of Pakistan as a Nation State,
playing a significant role in the Pakistani establishment and the shaping of
the country.
Pakistan was founded as a democracy after its
independence from the British Raj but the military has remained one of the
country's most powerful institutions and has on multiple occasions overthrown
democratically elected civilian governments on the incontrovertible basis of mismanagement and
corruption. Their rise to power is linked to cultivating a collective ethos
that portrays politics as inherently corrupt, while positioning themselves as
the sole bastion of honesty, discipline and nationalism.
Amid the ever-changing political landscape, the only
permanent force is the military establishment, while the political parties only
coexist to share power with it. As a result, successive civilian governments
have made sure that the military was consulted before they took key decisions,
especially when those decisions related to the Kashmir conflict and foreign
policy. They are painfully aware that the military has slipped into the
political arena through coups d'état to establish military dictatorships, and
could do so again. Up to today, no civilian Prime Minister has ever completed
his tenure!
On 22 Nov 2022, Pakistan’s outgoing Army Chief, General
Qamar Javed Bajwa, accepted in his last address as Army Chief that the military
had routinely, even unlawfully, meddled in politics for decades and declared
that it will no longer do so. He was criticised roundly across the globe, and
most vocally so by the same Prime Minister who had given him a three-year extension of
tenure in 2019, Imran Khan, only to be ousted and jailed, where he is still languishing.
Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif then appointed Lieutenant General Syed Asim Munir
Ahmad Shah, a former Director-General of the Inter Services Intelligence
agency, or spy chief, as Bajwa’s successor in the rank of General. On 20 May
2025, General Munir was promoted to Field Marshal, becoming the second to reach
the rank in Pakistan's history after FM Ayub Khan and only person to serve
office of the Chief of Army Staff with Field Marshal rank. As it stands, the Field
Marshal exerts considerable clout in Pakistan and global media is abuzz with
speculation that a coup is in the offing, given that Pakistan’s economy is in
trouble and the political instability in the country is at an all time high.
THE KARGIL WAR 1999
Prelude The
Siachen Glacier – the world's highest battlefield–holds significant strategic
importance for India, primarily due to its location overlooking key areas and
routes. It acts as a buffer against potential threats from Pakistan and China
in the context of the disputed Gilgit-Baltistan region and the Shaksgam Valley,
which was illegally ceded to China by Pakistan. The glacier's control provides
India with access to vital water resources and the ability to monitor movements
along the border areas, like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
In
1984, the Siachen Glacier, under the illegal control of Pakistan since 1965 was
re-occupied by India after Operation Meghdoot. India established a military
base there that it maintains at a cost of more than US$1 million per day.
Pakistan tried in 1987 and 1989 to retake the whole glacier but was
unsuccessful. Even so, preparations were not abandoned, but continued on a
small but steady scale, hidden among military exercises.
The Betrayal:
At the onset of 1999, General Pervez Musharraf’s name held little recognition
beyond Pakistan. However, by the year’s end, he had skyrocketed to global
notoriety. He became the central figure in igniting a conflict between two
nuclear-armed nations and subsequently orchestrated a coup to seize power
domestically, becoming Pakistan’s first military dictator since Gen.
Zia-Ul-Haq. He had, however, begun his silent machinations in late 1998 as as
the chief of Army Staff and, later, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Gen.Musharraf planned to use to his advantage the fact that some months earlier, both India and Pakistan had conducted nuclear tests. Pakistan believed that it now had a working nuclear deterrent; once it had taken the Kargil hills, he gambled that the international community, fearing a nuclear war, would urge a secession of hostilities. Pakistan would emerge with an improved tactical
advantage along the LOC and bring the Siachen Glacier conflict to the forefront
of international resolution.
Gen. Musharraf began clandestinely reinforcing the groundwork for a bold military incursion across the Kargil border. In February 1999, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee of India was invited by his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz
Sharif, to Pakistan on a pioneering journey toward peace and warmly received.
Unbeknownst to the Sharif government, preparations for an invasion were
underway. Musharraf’s actions would soon shatter the optimism of the peace
mission, transforming it from a historic mission to a footnote in history. He
thrust Sharif into a conflict he could not disavow and Vajpayee into a
confrontation he could not avoid.
The Conflict: Both sides seemed to be rather naïve. At the onset of winter, all troops
would withdraw from their posts which would see murderous -40°C temperatures
to warmer climes, returning to their posts only starting early April at the
lower levels and early May at the inhospitable heights. Gen. Musharraf made full
use of this naivety and started pushing his troops, in the guise of shepherds and disparate locals,
into the Indian posts in the midst of winter, taking care to avoid the lower posts as that could give
the game away. In 1999, the Pakistan Army started reoccupying the forward posts in January. In a preliminary step in their bid to capture Kashmir, they reoccupied not only their own posts, but also 132 posts that belonged to India.
The Pakistani SSG Commandos, Northern Light Infantry Forces and Pak
Kashmiri militants were tasked with taking over the abandoned Indian bunkers on various
hills that overlooked the vital Srinagar–Leh highway that serviced the
logistics base from which supplies were ferried through helicopter to the
Indian Army at the top of the Siachen Glacier. This would have given Pakistan a significant strategic advantage and disrupted India's supply lines to its troops in the Siachen Glacier area. Success here would demoralise the Indian troops, who would then look back at the Siachen episode as an exercise in futility, playing with their lives on the line. This would bolster, by default, the ongoing insurgency in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir.
The Indian
military apparatus got their intel inputs routinely, but these were dismissed
as routine sheep herder movements. The Indian Air Force also provided Elint
that Pakistani radio activity had increased, but the Army brushed it off. This was while Operation Ibex was underway in Siachen Feb – May 1989. In February Indian troops launched an attack on Pakistani positions there and, after an initial reversal, took over and destroyed Kauser Base, the Pakistani logistical node in the area. The destruction of Kauser Base induced Pakistani troops to vacate their posts concluding Operation Ibex.
The Pakistani-backed forces, now including Mujahideens and local insurgents, took over the numerous vacant bunker complexes around April and May 1999, but the winter snows had melted earlier than usual and an Indian reconnaissance team sent to inspect the bunkers was wiped out by them. The influx of regulars from Pakistan reached alarming proportions. The Indian Army Chief, Gen VP Malik, requested the Air Chief, Air Chief Marshal AY Tipnis for a few helicopter gunship sorties, suggesting that would be enough to seal off the influx route and evict the soldiers who had taken over the Indian posts. Tipnis refused, stating that the induction of the Indian Air Force would require Ministerial sanction and that Gen Malik was being overly optimistic, predicting that almost all helicopters would be lost to SAMs.
The Indian Army responded quickly and massed a force of around 30,000 men to re-take the Kargil hills in Operation Vijay starting May 10, 1999. Actually, 200,000 Indian troops were mobilised. However, because of the nature of the terrain, division and corps operations could not be mounted; the scale of most fighting was at the regimental or battalion level. In effect, two divisions of the Indian Army, numbering 20,000, along with 10,000 from the Paramilitary forces of India were placed at active posts. The Pakistani-backed forces were not fully prepared yet, needing another two to three weeks to meet their requirements of heavy weaponry, ammunition, food, shelter, and medicine. Given the undue uphill tasks, the Indians proved to be easy prey for the Pakistani troops who retained most of the heights in spite of continuous attacks. Two months into the conflict, Indian troops had slowly retaken some of the vital ridges that were encroached upon by the infiltrators; according to official count, an estimated 25-30% of the intruded area and high ground had returned to Indian control.
To avoid escalation, the Government of India (GoI) cleared only limited use of Air Power on May 25, more than three weeks after first reports, with the instructions that IAF fighter jets would remain within Indian territory to launch attacks on intruder's positions within Indian territory and the IAF was not permitted to cross the Line of Control under any circumstance. The IAF started its strike role on 26 May 1999, in an exercise named Operation Safed Sagar. Evidently, the planners could have done better. They used the MiG-21 and MiG-27 in the attack role, both unsuited to the terrain and air defences. Between 27 and 28 May, the IAF lost two fighter aircraft—a MiG-21 & a MiG-27 —and a helicopter.
Musharraf had serious confrontations and became involved in altercations with other senior officers, Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Fasih Bokhari, Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal PQ Mehdi and senior Lieutenant-General Ali Kuli Khan. Problems with his lifelong friend, Air Chief Marshal PQ Mehdi also arose when Air Chief refrained to participate or authorise any air strike to support the elements of army operations in the Kargil region. The absence of the PAF left the IAF a free hand to operate at its own pace.
Even so, the IAF had its problems, primarily the lack of targets identifiable by troop mobility and action. As winter withdrew, sunrise cast shadows in Kashmir's valleys from 8AM, when visibility was considerably reduced and targets could not be seen. Low clouds engulfed the ridges and peaks by 11 a.m. The window of opportunity was restricted to the three-hour period between 8 a.m. and 11 a.m., provided there was no drizzle. In effect, the Pakistani forces in that area knew they had to stay under cover throughout the morning and start hostile actions only after an early lunch.
The high-altitude environment presented unique challenges, including reduced aircraft and weapon performance, to which a surprise element had to be added, viz., the sudden launch of Stinger SAMs out of virtually nowhere. The Jaguar was impotent at those heights and the MiG-21 and MiG-27 were proving ineffective, particularly after additional restrictions were imposed following the loss of the three aircraft. In this time-frame, trig points were identified where the Pakistani soldiers had shrewdly used terrain masking and difficult to attack hill tops as assault points.
The best aircraft for this kind of Ground Attack at heights of around 15-20,000’ (4,500-6,000m) was the Mirage 2000. Their attack on Muntho Dhalo, their primary Administrative and Logistics Camp at noon on June 16 had convinced the brass that the Mirage was indeed very potent and therefore, when the Litening Laser Designation Pod and Paveway Laser Guidance Kit combination was available to the Mirage fleet finally, and had proven itself capable of delivering bombs, it was but natural that the Mirage fleet would be tasked for all important targets. Muntho Dhalo was eviscerated with 24 x 250 kg dumb Spanish bombs dropped by four Mirage 2000 and proved to be the turning point of the war. 300 Pakistani personnel were killed at Muntho Dhalo. The Air Marshal giving the Presentation in the video below and in the interview in the succeeding video features again when you go to the Post via the link in the para immediately below the videos.
The introduction of Laser-guided bombs dropped by the Mirage-2000 starting 24 Jun turned the war into a one-sided campaign. The first target chosen was the one that had proved to be the most difficult to attack, Tiger Hill. The story of that air attack is at this link. Within seven days, all difficult and unapproachable targets had been destroyed and the Pakistani Army routed, with heavy casualties. The Indian Army made the most of this opportunity and quickly had the enemy back-tracking, which soon turned into a run for safe haven. Talks of a ceasefire reportedly began as early as 12 July, but certain Pakistani outposts, cut off from the main body and with no radio contact didn’t receive the news in time and had to be neutralised. Finally, Pakistan sued for peace on 26 July, a day celebrated in India as Vijay Divas.
KARGIL : WHEN A BUDDING 'Tiger' COMMANDER ATTACKED 'Tiger' HILL
Air Marshal
R Nambiar PVSM AVSM VM & Bar
"Early on the morning of this very day
21 years ago, 24 June 1999, the Indian Air Force dropped its first Laser Guided
Bomb (LGB) in anger. Release was from a Mirage 2000TH two-seater and I was
privileged to have been the pilot in command. In the exciting days that
followed, I had the singular honour of dropping four more LGBs, thus dropping five
out of the total of 8 LGBs delivered by the Mirage 2000 in the entire Kargil
Conflict."
Air Marshal R Nambiar PVSM AVSM VM
& Bar
Air Marshal
Raghunath Nambiar, an Experimental Test Pilot with vast experience totalling
some 5250 hrs on 42 types of aircraft, first flew the Mirage 2000H/TH as a
young and promising fighter pilot in 1986 at AF Stn Maharajpur, Gwalior, a proud
member of 7 Sqn IAF, The Battle Axes. In time, he went on to command 1 Sqn AF, the Tigers, also at Gwalior, from
22 April 2002 to 07 July 2003 and has, since then, progressed upwards
on outstanding and exemplary personal qualities and ability. He is currently the Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Western Air
Command.
As winter withdrew, sunrise cast shadows in Kashmir's valleys from 8AM, when
visibility was considerably reduced and targets could not be seen. Low
clouds engulfed the ridges and peaks by 11 a.m. The window of opportunity
was restricted to the three-hour period between 8 a.m. and 11 a.m., provided
there was no drizzle. In effect, the Pakistani forces in that area knew they had to stay under cover throughout the morning and start hostile actions only after an early lunch. The Indian Army thus had the entire morning to themselves.
2002: Wg Cdr R Nambiar, CO 1 Sqn AF
Adampur is a
major Air Force Base in Punjab and Wg Cdr Raghunath Nambiar (Nambi) had been
deployed there since 22 May 1999 for Operation Safed Sagar, the Indian
Air Force designation for its Air Operations in Kargil from May to July 1999. Nambi
was then a young Wing Commander and posted as the Station Flight Safety &
Inspection Officer, Air Force Station Maharajpur, Gwalior, where the Mirage
2000H/TH is normally based. He had just over 1900 flying hrs on the Mirage and
was soon to become the only IAF pilot to cross 2000 hrs on that type. The
Battle Axes were deployed at Adampur and he had been attached to the unit as an
“Augmentee” along with a few other officers from other units of the IAF. That's where this epic saga begins.
On the
evening of 22 June 7 Sqn was tasked to attack Tiger Hill with LGBs the next
morning. Nambi was to captain a
two-seater with Sqn Ldr Monish Yadav as his back seater. The target was a set
of enemy tents
perched at the top of Tiger Hill. They got airborne in a two aircraft formation
at 0630h and set course in a North Easterly direction to rendezvous (RV) with
two Mirages from Tiger Sqn, ex-Ambala as their escorts. The join up was uneventful
and they maintained radio (R/T) silence as they winged their way to the target.
Tiger Hill
is unique in shape and size when viewed from the ground. But from 30,000 ft up,
it is indistinguishable from the other tall peaks in the vicinity. The only mountain that stands out in
this grand vista is K2, Mount Godwin-Austen or Chhogori, which at 8,611 metres (28,251 ft), towers
over its surroundings. The aids on board the Mirage allowed them to spot Tiger
Hill with relative ease. They had it in contact from 50 km afar and were
unpleasantly surprised to find a tiny cloud perched right on its tip, obscuring
the Designated Mean Point of Impact (DMPI)
and rendering the LGB impotent. The endurance of the Mirage allowed them to
hold on station for about 30 min, so they went around three more times hoping
the cloud would drift away and they could complete their mission.
In the
fourth attempt, as they turned away from the target, Monish yelled at Nambi to
“flare left” indicating a surface to air missile (SAM) launch from the ground. He reacted instantly as
per prevailing tactics and commenced dropping flares. He did not spot the tiny
shoulder launched missile, but Monish did see it climb towards them and
thereafter fall away as they were outside its envelope. They had no choice but
to go back with the armament load and prepare for a reshoot the next day. A surprise
lay in store for them.
The non-upgraded Mirage 2000 2-seater of today
On the 23rd
afternoon, they were informed that Air Chief Marshal AY Tipnis, the Chief
of the Air Staff (CAS), would be at Adampur and they spent the rest of the day
tidying up the Squadron premises for the visit, among routine duties. The CAS
landed in the evening and was keen to fly and observe the first LGB drop. The
mission profile was revised and the Commanding Officer of 7 Sqn, Wg Cdr
Chhabra, was scheduled to fly the CAS as an observer in a third two-seater, with
the attack formation remaining unchanged.
Morning Met
briefing on the 24th was at 0500h and by 0530h a short brief was
carried out with the CAS in attendance. The plan was for a three aircraft mission with the two lead
aircraft armed with an LGB each, while the third aircraft would follow behind, with the CAS in the rear seat. They
were to hit Tiger Hill first and then proceed to recce Point 4388 located 30 km NW of Tiger Hill.
By 0600h they had walked to the aircraft. Walking to the aircraft is a tedious task in wartime. They
were overloaded with their G-suits, helmets and Makarov 9mm pistols along with the various essential items
necessary for a successful sortie, such as maps, call-sign cards, Route MIPs (data cartridges), Electronic
Warfare (EW) MIPs, Inertial Navigation Unit (INU) plans, authentication tables-all in all, a very cumbersome
procedure.
Wheels roll was at 0630h and their escort Mirages from Ambala joined up with them about 300
km from the target. The RV had been selected well away from the border to remain outside the enemy radar
cover, and as before, was uneventful. They maintained R/T silence and meticulously went over the attack
drill to ensure all their EW systems and weapons were up and ready. The passage of the magnificent
scenery around and below them was barely noticed. They were on the alert, checking their systems time and again, all perked up to go.
Tiger Hill-A very difficult target to hit mandatorily requiring LGB attacks
Tiger Hill was spotted again from about 50 km away in the Litening Pod and they were thrilled to see a totally cloudless sky. Things then moved forward at a rapid pace. Nambi had altered heading
to place the aircraft track directly at a set of seven Arctic tents perched
precariously on the South face of Tiger Hill. The white tents made good
camouflage sense in winter, but in summer, with most of the snow melted away,
they stood out in stark contrast against the black rock formations.
Tiger Hill
is at an altitude of 16,600 ft, and the pre-briefed altitude for the attack was
28,000 ft, to which they quickly descended. A glance at the INU indicated that the winds at this
altitude was 70 kts (~130 kph) in
a westerly direction and at 90° to their planned track. This was
excessive and well outside the release envelope of the LGB.
Going up was
not an option as the Laser was known to switch off automatically at around
30,000 ft. A different direction was also not viable as the target would be
shadowed. A quick decision was taken to descend to 26,000 ft, placing them well
within the envelope of shoulder fired SAMs. The crosswinds, however, were more
tolerable at 50 kts(~93 kph) and just within the limit of the LGB delivery
envelope. They had their regulation IR flares onboard and considered going down
into the shoulder fired SAMs' operational envelope an operational risk which they were willing to take. Inter-cockpit
understanding was excellent and Monish knew exactly what to do.
At 28 km, Nambi
pulsed the laser to designate the target for the first time. The Litening Pod
instantly ranged the distance to target. They had by then accelerated to a ground speed of 550 kts(~1000 kmph) and the distance to the release point rapidly reduced. Nambi repeatedly re-designated the target as it became more discernible when they closed in. At the release range, he depressed the trigger and felt the aircraft jerk upwards as it suddenly shed 600 kg of load. He immediately commenced a
hard turn to the left at 4G and stated dropping flares. Monish took over pod steering and pointed the laser directly at the target while he concentrated on flying a steady 4G turn and monitored the video image. The Laser was steadily flashing
and they waited anxiously for the target to explode, signalling a successful delivery. The time of flight of an LGB, under the delivery conditions that Nambi had dropped it in, was under 30 sec, but to the two pilots in their cockpits, it seemed an eternity. Their joy knew no bounds as the video image of the target showed it to burst out into a wide and soundless explosion.
Bang on target and what an explosion!
Nambi had by then rolled out on a westerly course and reversed right climbing back to 30,000 ft and checked the air distance with the other strike aircraft. The plan was to gather together and then set course for Pt 4388. He noticed that the distance between the two of them had started to build up as they turned towards the North West. Their escorts from 1 Squadron were, however, with them so they decided to press on with the mission. A quick R/T call to check fuel and intention revealed that the other members had already set course back to base. They continued and scanned Pt 4388 for targets. On return, 15 min later, they routed back via Tiger Hill to film the Hill from as close as possible to assess the damage they had caused. The target area had been blown to smithereens, so they filmed the rest of the hill for any other visible signs of the enemy. They had sufficient fuel so they accelerated to their limit speed to get back to Base by 0800h.
After landing they extracted the video tape from the Litening Pod and headed to the crew room for the debrief. The entire squadron was gathered around the TV as the tape was rewound and played back. Loud cheers and back thumping erupted in ecstasy, as, clearly visible on the tape, four enemy soldiers were rushing across the screen a few seconds before the bomb got to them and the huge explosion. Nobody present there could have survived. The video on the way back also revealed a person 2,000 ft below the hill top, climbing painstakingly upward to the camp. The ongoing retreat of the Pakistani soldiers and mujahideen picked up expressly after this and other deadly LGB attacks.
The IAF also used the MiG-25R – which normally cruises at 65-80,000 ft and M 2.3 – at medium altitude (33-35,000’) for high resolution pictures, something that its Russian designers may never have contemplated. The first such photo mission flown by Wg Cdr PV Thakur, was escorted by a pair of Mirage 2000H aircraft, with all three aircraft at M 0.95, the escorts once again led by Nambi. The cameras on the Mig-25 required delicate recalibration to produce optimal results, as it was designed to film from 40-50,000 feet above the target. The films turned out to be exceptionally good.
Nambi was
awarded the Vayu Sena Medal (Gallantry) for repeatedly descending into SAM
infested heights to deliver LGBs. This particular mission is specifically mentioned
in his citation.
All Service
details of this highly decorated Air Marshal and various citations are
available at http://bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/Database/16378
